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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION 
Security. what is it? Why is it necessary? What 
does it mean to the individual? What does it mean to in-
dustry? \vhat does it mean to the government'? ~Jhat does it 
mean to the general public? What is being done-today in 
the field of industrial security? How can we best institute 
and implement a program of industrial security within the 
framework of the individual company or organization? These 
are the questions that must be ansHered if the United States 
is to assure itself of an effective, national system of in-
dustrial security. 
What is it? This question points up the fact that 
the definition of the word security is relative to the cir-
cumstances under which it is being sought. There are many 
types of security being sought in this country these days, 
and each.of these types has as its basis a different frame 
of reference. Every person is constantly seeking security 
of various types and in.varying degrees. In the instance 
of this paper this word 'security' and the term 'industrial 
security' shall be synonomous .and will refer to the protection 
of all classified information entrusted to, or developed 
within the industrial complex of the United States. 
The number of concepts relative to security that 
10 
are prevalent today and the urgency with which they are be-
ing sought would appear on the surface at least, to be de-
finite aids in the development of an industrial security 
program that would be effective and efficient. This is not 
the case. The rules and regulations governing industrial 
security, as outlined and enforced by government agencies, 
have, by their seeming reduction or deletion our our 'civil 
liberties' and our 'individual rights', hWI'.J created a neg-
ative attitude in the minds of the public, in the minds of 
industry's executives, and in the minds of the government, 
for it must be remembered that each of these groups is made 
up of persons whose hopes and fears are reflected in their 
individual actions and attitudes. 
Therefore, the definition of security must finds 
its roots in the mind of each individual and must inspire 
both individual and group actions of a positive nature even 
when these actions appear to be secondary to the economic or 
proprietary interests of the company or group. This does 
not mean that good security practices should always come 
before the interests of the company, group or individual. 
What it means is that an awareness of what security is, what 
its purpose is, and an honest effort to aid in the fulfill-
ment of this purpose is more important than all the laws and 
regulations ever written on the subject. 
11 
It will be the purpose of this paper to develop, 
within the framework of this definition, a program of in-
dustrial security for the individual company, and to show 
how to implement such a program in a manner that will insure 
the protection of classified materials and information. The 
further purpose of the paper is to show that security is an 
attitude, or if you wish, a group of attitudes, and as such 
must be approached with the individual in mind as h'ell as 
the object being secured against. It is not enough for thee 
American people to know their enemy. They must know them-
selves and the purposes behind their 01:m actions, and the 
actions of their contemporaries. They must realize that the 
threat against their way of life can be met and conquered 
only through an understanding of the problem and of the 
necessity for taking the actions that appear to increase 
individual insecurity. Indeed, the best possible development 
in the industrial security program Hould be the elimination 
of this ignorance of national and international affairs that 
engenders such insecurities within the individual. 
HoH then, can this best be accomplished? In this 
paper the following methods were used. First, a study was 
made of periodic literature dealing with the security of ou~ 
country. Then this material was appraised as to its value 
or effect on the industrial security program. After this was 
accomplished, a search fo:.." other information dealing with 
12 
industrial security was made and it was determined that 
there has never been, to the knowledge of the author, any 
serious attempt to develop a program of industrial security 
using the individual as a focal point. It is true that the 
government and many companies fashion their appr·oach to se-
curity to affect the individual. However, the greater 
number of these attempts are mei·ely ineffectual gropings in 
the field of human relations. The governnent, fol' their 
part, have recorded millions of '~mrds shmdng vJhat the Com-
munists have gleaned fron. our indust r·ies and the methods 
they used to do it, but there had been no concl'ete attempt 
to educate industry to this threat until several years 
ago vJhen the Industrial Security School Has set up at Fort 
Holabird, Mar~land. 
It was at this school that the author gathered 
much of the background material used herein, and also de-
veloped his impression of what is being done in the field 
of Industrial Security today. This school provides forty 
hours of class study in the various aspects of industrial 
security and it also provides an excellent opportunity to 
examine what other companies are attempting to do in the 
field. It is interesting to note that the attitude of in-
dividuals working on a classified contract ~as mentioned 
13 
only as something incidental to the problems of performing 
efficiently the various mechanical functions discussed. 
A third area was then exploited. Since it is the 
intention of t:clis paper to develop a program using the 
individual as the focal point it was necessary to utilize 
various course materials and textbooks that deal primarily 
with the individual in an industrial setting. 
Finally, when all this information had been sorted, 
edited, and digested, by the author, who is actively engaged 
in industry as a security officer, it was presented to 
several people in the field of industrial security for 
discussion and comment. The resultant compilation of fact 
and feelings Here then transformed into 1.{hat the author feels 
is an effective approach to industrial security. 
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SECTION II 
Iv'LANAGEMENT 1 S APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
L THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AND THE 
AIMS OF THE COMPANY 
1.1. DEFINITIONS 
1:Jhat is industrial security? Why must management 
be concerned with government security responsibilities? 
These are the questions that must be ans\vered before a realis-
tic and objective evaluation can be made of the relationship 
between industrial security and the aims of the company. The 
first point to be brought out is that there is a great 
variance of opinion concerning industrial security and its 
relative importance to our national defense. The Department 
of Defense, on the one hand, has the job of developing 
programs that will allow the on-schedule completion of classi-
fied contracts while maintaining maximum security of the 
information pertaining to these contracts to insure adequate 
lead time of our technological advancements over those of 
-
our enemies. The stringent measures necessary to provide 
adequate lead time in military and space technology ~ften 
stifles progress in the very areas they are trying to protect. 
To the casual observer such reactions tend to make the whole 
program of industrial security seem silly and futile. Security, 
then, according to the Department of Defense, refers to the 
15 
safeguarding of information classified TOP SECRET, SECRET 
and CONFIDENTIAL,(including CONFIDENTIAL-Modified Handling 
Authorized) against unlawful or unauthorized dissemination, 
duplication, or observation. ~~ 
Management's definition of security, on the other 
hand, varies fron1 company to company and in many instances, 
from individual to individual. One of the reasons for this 
variance is that industry is made up of thousands of companies, 
large and small, centralized and decentralized, and within 
this broad structure there are .many different philosophies and 
goals, both economic and otherwise. Each company defines 
industrial security within its own frame of reference. 
Another reason for this variance within industry is 
that the government, in setting up the program of industrial 
security, has tended toward very broad objectives in order 
to insure enough flexibility to allow different types of 
industrial organizations to operate effectively on classified 
contracts without necessitating a special set of regulations 
16 
for each individual company. This has allowed each organization 
to interpret, according to its own needs and attitudes, the 
requirements of industrial security that are necessary in 
order to fulfill its contractual obligations. This inter-
pretation is, of course, monitored by the various agencies 
responsible for the administration of the contract 
*See Appendix A 
but, with the shortage of personnel available for checking 
each contract or facility and the increasing number of 
classified contracts being put out by the government, it has 
become exceedingly difficult to administer the program. 
The increasing number of classified contracts and 
their effective administration is ample reason why management 
must concern itself with what were at one time government 
security responsibilities. G. F. Kennan says industry must 
not be hotheaded--it must move slowly and democratically in 
the assumption of these responsibilities. Thus far 
management has moved slowly and methodically and such action 
might work if the Corr~unists would play fair. The trouble is 
that the espionage agent's major asset is the lethargy of 
Americans in industry. 
In the past whenever a classified contract was let, 
a contractually separate obligation, the Department of Defense 
Security Agreement (DD44l), was initiated to uphold the 
necessary standards of security to insure that the information 
pertinent to, or developed under the contract, would be 
safeguarded according to the Industrial Security Manual for 
Safeguarding Classified Information (Attachment to DD441). 
In addition to this manual each contractor would be supplied 
with a Security Requirement Checklist (DD Form 254) which in 
17 
outline form, indicated the degree of classification of each 
part of the contract. Management then, armed with these 
directives, proceeded to interpret these broad objectives in 
the light of its own individual and company aims and goals. 
Now, in addition to this, it is of paramount 
importance that each company accept its role in the defense 
of the United States by assuming its responsibilities to the 
industrial security program. The extent to Hhich individual 
companies and industry as a whole have done this is the true 
measure of the relationship between industrial security and 
the aims of the company. 
1.2. ENVIRONMENT IN ~~ICH INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
MUST OPERATE (2) 
There are several elements and areas which are 
affected by, or have an effect on an industrial security 
program. Among these are public opinion, the rapid increase 
in classified defense work, an extension of the period during 
:,rhich material remains classified, the impact of increased 
communications with our allies, and most important, a healthy 
atmosphere in which the program may operate. 
1.2.1. Public Interest. Looking at public interest 
it is readily detected that although it is a factor that may 
color the decisions made by management, public opinion is of 
prime importance to government officials, especially if they 
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occupy elective office. It is important to note here that 
even if the public can be convinced that good industrial 
security is necessary to deter the Communists from attaining 
their goal of economic and military superiority over the 
United States, Americans will not readily relinquish any of 
their rights or liberties in order to accomplish this end. 
Therefore, any legislation or policy relating to industrial 
security must have as its base, insurance of continuance and 
protection of the rights and privileges of the individual. 
1.2.2. Increase in Classified Defense Work. Public in-
terest has been sharpened by several factors including in-
creased defense expenditures, increased number of defense 
contracts, and Soviet successes in science and in weapons 
technology. These Soviet achievements have affected the se-
curity program in two ways. First, they intensified the De-
partment of Defense's concern regarding the protection of 
classified information. Secondly, they added impetus to 
military research and development programs themselves. The 
fiscal year 1958 showed that 6,600 facilities were either 
granted new clearances or had their old ones reactivated. 
Another factor that has sharpened public interest is the 
absurdity of the security classification efforts of the gov-
ernment such as classifying the names and species of monkeys 
(rhesus) being used in research programs for fear of injuring 
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religious relations between the United States and India 
where the monkey is held sacred. 
1.2.3. Extension of Period of Classification. The 
great strides being made in industrial and n1ilitary tech-
nology have created another problem for the security pro-
gram. The introduction of these new systems often means 
that items of equipment now remain classified, not only 
during the research, engineering and production stages, 
but also after they have become operational. This has 
extended the period during which defense information re-
quires protection and has added to the problem of safe-
guarding the classified information. There has also been 
a problem created by, 
a simple human inclination to stamp a thing 'class-
ified' and so dispose of it rather than to take the 
responsibility of dealing with it in detail. The 
same human emotion that causes the average citizen 
to shove letters to the back of his desk instead of 
answering them. (4) 
This means that more attention must be paic to the storage 
and declassification of material, thereby creating further 
expense for the contractor and the government.~} 
1.2.4. Impact of Increased Cormnunication with our 
Allies. During the last few years it has become increasingly 
~}Estimated six b1llion classified documents piled up, in 
government warehouses dating back to the civil war. 
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evident that in order for the Western powers to insure peace 
they must pool their resources, methods, and weapon systems. 
This, of course, increases the number of, and sensitivity of 
communications with our allies, especially those in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Then too, the terrible 
consequences of present-day and contemplated weapon systems 
demands that each country allied with us be consulted on the 
possible effects on their country and its people. 
1 2 5 Healthy Atmos here "The fl. nal element l. n our • • • p • 
future security environment is one that will not be there 
unless we put it there - and that is, a healthy atmosphere." 
This is another way of saying that what is needed is the 
development of a positive attitude within each individual in 
the United States whether they are involved directly with 
defense work or not. Now the development of such an attitude 
or atmosphere cannot be the responsibility of industry alone. 
The government must accept the prime burden of educating the 
public and, indeed, must support and educate industry in the 
area of security needs and methods. A healthy atmosphere 
draws its basic ingredient from a proper knowledge of the job. 
Security consciousness is not a natural instinct, it 
is cultivated. Common sense supplies much of the 
rational but does not satisfy the need for profession-
al guidance and constant vigilance. The stakes are 
too great to trust security entirely to moral con-
siderations. There must always be an active, ag-
gressive campaign to keep a sharp lookout. Nore 
security education is the key to greater knowledge 
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and understanding in this regard. (6) 
This education should include not only what is being done 
and why it is being done but, should include the basic 
philosophy behind the program and a concrete definition of 
why such a program is needed. 
1.3. COST OF AN INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
The most important single factor to management in 
any undertaking is the relationship of the cost of the pro-
gram to the benefits to be derived from it, and a measure 
of this can best be accomplished before the award of a 
classified contract. But, in many instances, management 
either forgets about, or disregards the cost of security 
when bidding on a classified contract and is forced later to 
curtail or 'overlook' certain areas of security. One of the 
main reasons for this disregard or 'loss of memory' on the 
part of management is that it is extremely difficult to 
justify great expenditures of money and administrative effort 
for something whose immediate and apparent purpose is to de-
lay and confuse operations on the contract. What, then, are 
the benefits to be derived from industrial security? 
The main problem with an industrial security pro-
gram is that it does not have any tangible, immediate ben-
efits. The whole reason for security is negative in effect, 
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in that its purpose is to prevent other nations from gain-
ing access to our country's defense secrets. The only 
possible way, much of the time, for us to know whether we 
have performed our job effectively is through intelligence 
reports from agents operating in foreign countries. It is 
possible to sometimes catch a thief or foreign agent in the 
act of stealing defense secrets but this is a rare happen-
ing in this day and age. 
It is very hard for management to read reports 
about the cost of a guard force or of purchasing and main-
taining mechanical security measures, and then have security 
violations arise which place the company in an embarrassing 
position with the government or the general public. And not 
to be forgotten are the stockholders who see their invest-
ments being undermined by excessive indirect costs. 
During the last ten years industrial managers have 
begun to realize the long-run benefits of security, i.e., 
preservation of our way of life and prolongment of peace. 
They are beginning to realize that the Communist threat is 
real and proximate, and that the industrial base is essential 
to national security, therefore, it is a prime target of the 
Communist espionage apparatus which is formidable. After 
many years of hiding their heads some are convinced that 
industrial security is the key to defending our industrial 
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base against espionage and sabotage, and that industrial 
security is the prime responsibility of management and the 
( 7 ) 
mass of workers individually. Indeed, that it is a priv-
ilege, and that the cost of maintaining good security must 
not deter industrial management from developing good in-
dustrial security. If only it were possible to get the 
management of every industrial concern to look beyond the 
economic and private goals of their company and see that 
a lack of effective industrial security now might well lead 
to Communist domination of the United States, then many of 
the 'doubting Thomases 1 might assume their responsibilities 
to themselves and their country. 
An often discussed area of industrial security is 
the apportionment of direct and indirect costs of the pro-
gram. Many companies have several classified contracts in 
process at the same time and they use one set of security 
controls to handle the security functions for all the con-
tracts. In fact the security office usually takes care of 
the proprietary information of the organization and other 
protection functions as well. This type of operation makes 
security an overhead item of expense since it is so hard to 
apportion accurately the direct cost. Management, on the 
other hand, earns its profit out of indirect costs. There-
fore, it behooves management to cut these indirect costs 
wherever possible. In some instances this can mean developing 
new methods that are more efficient, or curtailment of 
functions that are not efficient, or finding ways of having 
costs transferred to direct charges against the contract. 
These possibilities will be discussed further in Section III. 
One other element which affects the cost of an 
industrial security program is the increase in time delay 
factor caused by the efficiency of the program. Although 
this may seem contradictory it is true that the more effi-
cient a program of industrial security becomes, the longer 
it takes to process material through the system. Con-
versely, an inefficient program may lose the material alto-
gether or render it obsolescent before it is delivered, or 
may result in its compromise. 
This time delay factor is most prevalent in two 
areas of security. One of them is the visitor control area 
where personnel visiting another company or pla~t are forced 
to wait for long periods of time while their clearances and 
'need to have access' to the facility are verified. The 
other area is document control where the transfer or re-
moval of classified material must be entered in a log and 
receipts must be signed by the person receiving the material 
(material classified CONFIDENTIAL or below are signed for on 
request of sender only). 
In relation to the time delay factor it must be 
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remembered that an efficient and well run visitor control 
function and document control group can be used to show 
management and worker personnel alike that if every one 
does his job properly regarding security, then this effi-
ciency will continue to take less time than the program that 
is not ·efficiently administered or operated. These two areas 
can effectively alter the attitude of an individual toward 
security either favorably or unfavorably for it is these two 
areas that every person involved in classified defense work 
comes in contact with, more or less frequently. 
It may safely be said, then, that industry tends 
to view security as an expense that provides nothing positive 
to the performance of a contract and, in fact, often hinders 
efficient progress. Management often knows the need of good 
security, yet in many instances, it is unable to place it 
ahead of the attainment of company and personal goals. There 
has been good progress made in the last ten years in the 
area of education of industrial management personnel though, 
and there is every indication that the future will see an 
increase in security consciousness on the part of industrial 
managers. Whether or not this awareness is utilized to create 
efficient and effective industrial security remains to be seen. 
2. THE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MANUAL 
The Industrial Security Manual provides the 
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guidelines that industry must follow to satisfy the require-
ments established by the Department of Defense with respect 
to the protection of classified material developed or utiliz-
ed under a defense contract. Thus, it must be vague enough 
to allow reasonable progress by any type of industrial organ-
ization under varying types of conditions, and still insure 
adequate protection of classified defense information. Such 
a broad set of regulations must be predicated on the assump-
tion that there is a desire on the part of the persons using 
the system to do a proper and conscientious job. 
2.1. OBJECTIVES OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
2.1.1. Safeguarding of Classified Information. 
What, then, are the objectives of the Department of Defense 
that the Industrial Security Manual aims at protecting? The 
prime objective is the safeguarding of classified information. 
This seemingly clearcut statement appears to be a simple pro-
blem on the surface. But, the actual protection of such mat-
erial in a democratic society is one of the most difficult 
tasks ever attempted. This is due, in part, to the very 
nature of a democracy which insures each individual of cer-
tain inalienable rights and privileges; many of which are 
disturbed or endangered by the policies of industrial se-
curity that view the individual as guilty until proven other-
wise. Therefore, people approach security with a negative 
attitude and do just enough to cover themselves legally. 
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It is very easy to make rules and regulations to 
govern the dissemination and control of classified 
information, but, it is something else again to make the 
public and industry obey these regulations. Until recently 
the only incentive to follm-r security regulations ~Alas the 
threat of prison or fine. The American people do not realize, 
even today, that 
maintaining security is no childish game of 
cops-and-robbers. Nor is it only an intellectual 
exercise of matching wits with the enemy. 
Security is actually one of the most important 
elements of our struggle for survival as a free 
nation in a free world, and we are -vmefully weak 
as a nation in preserving it. ( 9) 
A good deal of the apathy prevalent in the United States can 
be attributed to the so-called freedom of the press. The 
average newspaper or magazine will use any material available 
or go to any extreme to get ~-Jhat the American people want to 
read, i.e., sensational copy. Very often this copy is 
actually classified information or of a sensitive nature 
in certain respects. So far the Department of Defense has 
been unable to cope with the problem of unauthorized dissem-
ination of classified material by persons not connected with 
the project or contract. 
These same colunmists are the first to cry out 
about the lack of security in government and industry. They 
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are free with advice and criticism about what is wrong but 
their solutions to the problem of security are as naive as 
they purport the program to be. An example of this is found 
in a weekly news magazine in a statement that reads, 
It is therefore a matter of fundamental importance 
to draw the line clearly and to delineate what data 
should be protected and what should be given out. (10) 
And then there was the recommendation to use one classification 
(11) 
only and to have all security officers train under the FBI. 
If it were possible to do this effectively and efficiently 
within the individual organiz.ation, the job of security 
would be a much simpler one. What the colUF~ist and reporter 
does not, or will not, understand is that much of the material 
and technological data being developed today takes months to 
evaluate and cannot be categorized as to its sensitivity to 
the defense of the country until many inputs are combined 
and evaluated. Also there cannot be one fixed set of criteria 
for the classification of information due to the conplexities 
and variances of today's industrial and military technologies 
outside, of course, of the broad definition regarding the de-
gree of classification. 
When attempting to safeguard classified information 
there is one other point to be considered. As we all know, 
or at least should be aware of, "espionage is not nearly so 
~-See Industrial Security l1anual 
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much a business of a sinister-looking agent slitting a 
throat to make off with a briefcase full of TOP SECRET 
war plans, as it is the patient putting-together of 
(12) 
numerous bits of information to complete the grand design." 
General Trudeau, in a speech to a group of Security Officers 
from industrial firms made this statement that "the advanced 
state of Soviet technology today is due more to Soviet 
success in espionage and subversion than it is to their 
(13) 
scientific apparatus, good as it is." This discussion 
shows the magnitude and the complexities of the problem of 
safeguarding classified information within and without 
industry. 
2.1.2. Maximum Administrative Efficiency. The 
second basic objective of the Department of Defense's 
security program is that of maximum administrative efficiency. 
The :t>apid expansion of the defense program of this country 
multiplies astronomically the problems of insuring effective 
security, especially in industry. As is often the case, the 
expansion of defense spending was not complimented with a 
proportionate increase in security funds, personnel, and 
methods. The government is interested primarily in effecting 
( 14) 
savings in time, man-power, and wherever possible, in money. 
This does not mean that any additional funds will be made 
available in the immediate future, but, only that the under-
manned government agencies must do better vrith 1:Jhat they have. 
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The coordination of the industrial security pro-
gram has always been an enormous job and it continues to 
grow more staggering as time goes on. In order to alleviate 
some of the waiting and inefficiency of the government agen-
cies' handling of clearances for industrial personnel and 
visit authorizations involving other cleared facilities, the 
government has made certain provisions in the security re-
gulations that permit industry to assume some of these respon-
sibilities. It is now possible for the security officer of 
a company to issue a clearance so that an individual can han-
dle material classified up to and including CONFIDENTIAL.~~ 
In all fairness to the government agencies it must 
be stated that a great deal of what appears to be ineffi-
ciency is merely the result of an overload of work. Many 
agencies in all parts of the country are being deluged with 
requests for clearances of personnel so that they may work 
on classified projects. But, in the eyes of industry, delay 
means money and there is no excuse for continuous delays, 
whether they be justified or not. 
It appears that there will always be some delay 
and lack of administrative efficiency in handling the indus-
trial security program due to several factors. First, the 
~~By confirming the birth certificate and doing a local check 
of the employee's background through public sources and per-
sonal references. 
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government has too few workers trained and available to 
* handle the workload, and it has too many forms and systems 
thus making the security program cumbersome and unwieldy. 
Second, industry has too many different methods of handling 
various aspects of security, a fact that often causes un-
necessary delays and a good deal of animosity betHeen com-
panies. There is no one area of industrial security that 
is handled uniformly throughout industry. This lack of 
coordination is costing the government and industry millions 
of dollars every year as well as adding to the confusion and 
inefficiency of our industrial security program. 
2.1.3. Protection of Rights of Individuals. The 
third basic objective of the industrial security program is 
to protect the rights of the individual. Already in this 
paper the rights of individuals have been mentioned several 
times. This is because of the basic premise that every 
policy of the government of the United States must aim at 
preserving these individual rights and privileges and, when 
a policy does not conform to this criterion it is immediately 
assumed to be bad, immoral, or unconstitutional. Now, as has 
been stated previously, the security policies of this country 
are contr'ary to many of these basic, cherished beliefs. Due 
to the negativeness of its purpose, that of preventing the 
~}Estimated 100,000 - lSO,OOO scientific and technical reports 
are produced each year by R & D programs of Army, Navy, and 
Air Force agencies.(l5) 
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loss of defense information, the industrial security program 
has become a sort of secret police or gestapo in the minds of 
many Americans. 
If any security program is to be successful in this 
country it is necessary for its proponents, 
to be conscious at all times of the need for protect-
ing the nation's security interests,(while it must 
be remembered that this does not give us license to 
blind ourselves to the rights of individuals.{l6) 
2.1.4. Keeping Public Informed. Now, then, is it 
possible to attain these ends effectively? The first thing 
necessary is the establishment of a need for mutual confi-
dence and understanding between people and government. Many 
Americans take the position that the problem of the espionage 
agent and the saboteur in industry is wholly and completely 
a government matter. One of the reasons for this assumption 
is that policy decisions are made on a dictatorial fiat 
{17) 
rather than on a basis that the nation can understand and 
approve. Another reason is the ridiculous classifying of 
information that is already in Russian hands. In this same 
vein there has been much information relating to our inten-
tions and our policies given out to the public, which includes 
the rest of the world, that still remains classified. 
The success or failure of the industrial security 
program hinges on the resolution of these differences in 
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attitude that exist between individuals in government, in-
dustry, and the public. It is of absolute importance that 
each individual assumes his role in the protection of nation-
al interests. This country must awaken to the fact that 
capitalism and communism are engaged in a life and death 
struggle that will be won by the one whose people are more 
dedicated to its principles and have faith in themselves and 
their national purpose. "Therefore, to the extent to which 
we have acquired a sound faith and sound principles of right 
and wrong in peacetime we shall be prepared to meet the 
(18) 
emergencies of war.'' The creation of such an attitude is 
a prime objective of the Department of Defense and its se-
curity program. 
2.2. SPECIFIC AREAS COVERED BY THE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
MANUAL 
2.2.1. Definitions. The Industrial Security 
Manual is the supplemental attachment to the Department of 
Defense Security Agreement, DD Form 441. The DD Form 44.1, 
is an agreement between the contractor and the government 
that binds the contractor to acknowledge and follow the 
rules and regulations set forth in the manual while perform-
ing a classified contract. This agreement is required of 
every contractor doing such work. 
The first section of the manual is a general one 
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that defines the terms applicable to industrial security. 
Many of these definitions are extremely broad in scope and 
require a thorough understanding of the program on the part 
of the individual trying to categorize or define certain 
aspects of security such as visitor categories, access to 
classified information, and authorized persons. The manual 
is primarily concerned with laying out specific boundaries 
that comprise an absolute minimum, below or beyond which the 
contractor cannot go. In accomplishing this it has attempt-
ed to be as liberal as possible in order that the individual 
company or organization can operate effectively and yet re-
main within the framework of the manual regulations. This, 
of course, has created a dangerous amount of confusion and 
bad feeling among workers and managers alike. Confusion 
because of the numerous interpretations that the manual lends 
itself to in many areas, and bad feeling because the lack of 
concrete interpretations has created insecurity and a feel-
ing of ignorance within industry. 
2.2.2. Administration of Security Program within 
Industry. The manual provides for the establishment of a 
responsible individual within each company to act as security 
coordinator and to deal with the government agency that has 
cognizance over the security activities of the company. Each 
company working on a classified defense contract is required 
to effect certain protective measures and it is the duty of 
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these security personnel to initiate and administer them. 
These include suitable protective rneasures within his facil-
ity for safeguarding of classified information, and a system 
to control access of employees and visitors to closed and 
restricted areas. vlhen the reader stops to thinK of how many 
different methods could be used to safeguard classified 
information and the varying degrees of protection accorded ty 
each, it will become clear why the security program eneend-
ers such a negative attitude within industrial personnel. 
The economic aspect of administering a program of 
industrial security has a strong effect on the type of 
program that is initiated by management. The exact strength 
of the economic factor is determined by, and directly propor-
tionate to the amount and quality of security education that 
management has been exposed to. Thus the interpretation that 
management places on security requirements, while al~ays made 
with an eye on the costs involved, will reflect the moral 
judgement of the individuals entrusted with security decisions. 
If, through security education, management can be made aware 
of the need for good security, then their actions will go 
beyond the dictates of the security rnanual in the performance 
of their duties. 
2.2.3. Mechanics of Industrial Security Program. 
In as much as it is the intention of this :paper to focus 
attention on the individual in the development of an industrial 
36 
security program, the mechanical aspects of security are 
mentioned here merely to acquaint the reader with the var-
ious areas covered by the Industrial Security Manual. They 
are, of course, most important to the individual who must 
abide by.the regulations outlined in the manual. Therefore 
the way that a security program is inaugurated and implement-
ed will have a great effect on the attitudes that are formed 
within the individual and his group relative to industrial 
security. Included in the manual are rules governing visitor 
clearances, documentation of classified information, repro-
duction of classified information, destruction of classified 
materials, physical safeguards that are necessary, and pro-
cedures for the clearance of personnel in order that they 
can work on classified contracts. These and other related 
rules and regulations pertaining to the protection of class-
ified information will be discussed in some detail in the 
following sections as they are inherent in the development of 
a security program and its attendant effects on the attitudes 
and feelings of the workers. 
2.3. HANAGEMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
SECURITY MANUAL 
2.3.1. Management's Frame of Reference. The fact 
that the Department of Defense has set up a program to control 
and administer classified contracts, and has placed certain 
restrictions and responsibilities on the industrial complex 
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of the country, has not and will not insure acceptance by 
support of industrial management. The government in de-
vising the various methods and systems used to control 
classified information uses a set of criteria predicated on 
the known or assumed ability of foreign agents to gain access 
to this information. This is done with awareness of, but 
too little regard for, the ability of industry to absorb the 
costs of security, and to deliver the final product on the 
scheduled date as contracted, while maintaining adequate se-
curity of the classified information involved. This, of 
course, must be done if the nation is to retain its supre-
macy as a free nation in a free world. 
Management,on the other hand, bases all decisions 
on the premise that the company is in business to make a pro-
fit. If the company does not make a profit and continue to 
grow then the management will be changed. Business success 
means fulfillment of contractual obligations within the 
allowable time limits, and the profits derived therefrom are 
directly proportionate to the efficiency in administering 
the contract and the amount of overhead or indirect costs 
necessary for completion of the job. This means that manage-
ment is forced by sheer necessity of purpose to decide upon 
minimum requirements and to adhere to them. To management 
~~Many people in 1ndustry take the pos1tion that the problem 
of the espionage agent and the saboteur is wholly and com-
pletely a government matter. (20) 
industrial security does not mean the protection of our 
country's secrets from powers that would destroy us, but 
is just another contractual obligation that must be met as 
cheaply as possible. 
2.3.2. Economic Need for Expediency and Effi-
ciency. The prime purpose of the industrial organization is 
to make a profit while that of the individual members of 
management is something different. Each person in industry,, 
VJhether he be management or worker, is there primarily for 
the betterment of himself and his family. He is not so much 
interested in the company's failure to make a profit as he is 
in what effect that failure will have on him. If the 
individual works hard to make a schedule or meet a deadline, 
and in the course of this effort is delayed or thwarted by 
security procedures, he is very likely to disregard or bend 
the security procedures in order to accomplish his goals 
unless he has been successfully educated as to the need for 
bood security. Even then, it will be extremely difficult 
for the individual to refrain from taking shortcuts to maintain 
his stature or position. In short, while one of the under-
lying factors governing the actions and decisions of 
management personnel is the economic needs and goals of the 
company, these decisions are always colored by the personal 
consideration of the people making them. Generally speaking, 
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since the speed and efficiency with which an organization 
operates are prime requsites to prospective buyers (includ-
ing the govern[nent), the probable area to suffer Hill be 
security. 
2.3.3. Use of Industrial Security Manual as a 
Guide to Minimum Requirements. Management use of the In-
dustrial Security Manual has become, in many instances, 
merely a guide to how little can be done legally to cover 
security requirements. Since the manual regulations are 
couched in such broad terminology it lends itself quite 
readily to this sloppy and negative approach to industrial 
security. And there is nothing that could be altered in the 
manual that would make any difference. The only way to get 
members of management to assume security responsibility is 
to convince them that, in the long-run, positive security 
procedures and attitudes are not only cheaper but necessary 
to national security. 
3. GOVERNl\1ENTAL PHILOSOPHY TOwARD INDUSTRIAL SECUHITY AND 
ITS EFFECT ON MANAGEMEN'r 
J.l. PREVALENCE OF NEGATIVE THINKERS IN GOVERNHENT 
J.l.l. Laws and Regulations Governing Industrial 
Security Policy. The philosophy of the government toward 
security is based on two things. One, the need for protec-
ting against foreign powers who would destroy us, and two,the 
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apathy of the American people toward these dangers. In order 
that the government could operate in the security field at 
all it was necessary to make into law certain regulations for 
the handling of classified information and the attendant 
penalties for breaking these laws. Once armed with this power 
the government proceeded to institute a program of security. 
As is often the case, the program was advanced to industry 
as a dictatorial fiat showing what to do and what would or 
could happen if it was not done. Ever since the program was 
first advanced by the government, one of the basic elements 
used to insure adherence to its concepts has been that of 
fear of reprisal for not following the requirements set forth 
in the Industrial Security Manual. A common reaction to this 
(21) 
is one of forced indifference. 
3.1.2. Literature and Posters. The main propa-
ganda instruments of the government, those of written arti-
cles and posters, are being utilized to sell the industrial 
security program to the nation. Much of this material is 
aimed at the consequences of poor security rather than the 
creation of positive individual attitudes. There has been 
some indication in the last few years that the government is 
placing more emphasis on the individual interest in security. 
This has been evidenced by changes in theme and color tones 
used in posters and other propaganda instruments. The use of 
more pleasant pictures and of pastel colors has replaced the 
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heavy blacks and grays of older posters. 
3.2. EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM TO ITS 
PRESENT STATE 
The most dominant element in the evolution of se-
curity thinking in this country is the apathy of the Ameri-
can people. Evidences of this apathy extend far back into 
our history. Being secure as the major po1-ver in the Horlci 
the United States and its people accepted Cormnunism at face 
value. Now, the American people are beginning to see Comr.JUn-
ism for what it is and they are afraid. And it is right 
that they should be afraid for Communism is going to destroy 
them if they let it. If the people had been afraid twenty 
years ago and had passed the necessary legislation to curtail 
and prevent communist activities in this country, Russia 
vmuld be well behind us in technology and other areas vJhere 
she appears today to be very close. It is a well known fact 
(22) 
that "There can be no security where there is no la1o1." 
J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Invest-
igation have uncovered much of the apparatus used by the 
Cow~unists in subversive activities and tell us that a good 
deal of this apparatus works only in areas where there is 
apathy and a false sense of security. Public apathy, says 
Hoover, 
••• is a sure way to national suicide- to death of 
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individual freedom. . It allows the Comi·nunists to 
penetrate and make satellites of once-free countries, 
and it is presently enabling them to honeycomb and 
weaken the structures of the remaining countries, 
and there is today a terrifying apathy on the part 
of Americans toward the deadliest danger which this 
country has ever faced. Some of the apathy is 
deliberately induced. (23) 
Mr. Hoover does not, however, believe we are doomed to 
Communist domination as is evidenced by the statement that, 
~e can prevent the spread of Soviet espionage 
activities in American industry and reduce this 
evil, foreign-inspired, subversive practice in 
our ranks of government and industry. First, ~-Je-
the American people-have to work together to defeat 
it. This, we must do to preserve our great industrial 
advantage and indeed our very civilization. (24) 
These statements bring to mind the fact that the blows to our 
security "often come not from being afraid but from not being 
(25) 
afraid at the right time." An instance of this is the 
apathy during World War II when two men went out as German 
submarine officers and strolled all over Philadelphia openly 
observing water fronts, structures, etc., and were treated 
( 26) 
like old friends. 
This apathy has hindered the growth and effective-
ness of the industrial security program in many areas. The 
reasons for the prevalence of this condition in the United 
States find their roots in our very civilization. The average 
American fails to comprehend the compelling psychological 
effects of CoiT~unism on the individual member during 
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(27) 
peace time. What Americans do not understand is that 
Communism is constantly at war with capitalism even though 
(28) 
there is no violence. 
The fanaticism of the Communists and the refusal 
of the American people to see the danger and accept the 
challenge of \vorld Cornmunism has allowed them. (the col:'ununists) 
to grow into the most formidable threat to our security that 
we have ever faced. It has long been the cry of goverr~ent 
officials that "Industry has failed to realize the rnenace of 
the Secret Communist in industry and that businessmen have 
(29) 
tended to minimize the danger." The bleakness of this 
picture must not becloud the advances that have been made in 
the field of industrial security however. 
Since World War II the field of industrial security 
has become something of a profession. The goverTh~ent has 
passed more and more responsibility to industry thus 
requiring that management appoint qualified administrators 
to handle the problems of security. Where before, management 
had someone handle security in addition to his other duties, 
now there are emerged whole staffs of personnel to administer 
the program. 
In the early years of industrial security the re-
sponsibility of the program i.vas usually placed on a man who 
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had previous experience in the field of law enforcement or 
government security. These people were expected to breech 
the way between government directives and 1--rhat management 1-vas 
prepared to undertake. Such personnel generally had little 
or no administrative experience and their forte was the abil-
ity to detect and prevent thefts and criminal acts against 
the company and protection of government classified informa-
tion was incidental to the interests of the company. 
During the past ten years the trend has been tov.rard 
hiring of college-trained administrators to handle the pro-
blems of industrial security. This although it appears to be 
at opposite poles from the older type security officer, is 
by far the most effective choice. This is so because of the 
complex nature of industrial defense. \-Ji th the grovrth of 
companies and the expansion of defense spending, the job of 
the company security officer has assumed professional status. 
The growth of security departments within companies may 
actually be detrimental to the goal of good security in one 
way. The security officer who has gained executive status 
is trying to get ahead in his company. This may cause him to 
make decisions based on personal considerations and expect-
ations rather than on the tenets of good security. 
3.3. NEED FOR CLOSER COORDINATION 
There is a need for much closer coordination 
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between the various factions involved in the industrial 
security program. With the continui~g growth of the program 
due to increased defense spending and also the expansion of 
project scopes, it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
companies to deal effectively with the goverlli~ent or between 
themselves. The amounts of paper work necessary to set up 
conferences and visits, and to effect the transfer of classi-
fied materials is slow and cumbersome and there must be new 
methods adopted to facilitate such matters. 
Within industry itself there is a great need for 
closer coordination so that several companies who are 
attempting to develop, simultaneously, the same thing, can 
aid each other. Also it is important for the various companies 
in any one field of endeavor to devise systems of handling 
various security matters that are consistant throughout the 
croup. Although this sounds quite idealistic it is not only 
feasible but, within a very few years, it will become necessary 
to take such steps in order to get anything done, due to the 
growing paper workload caused by divergence of interest and 
method. 
Another area requiring better coordination is 
between government agencies. The butt of many jokes and sto-
ries in this country is the ridiculous secrecy maintained 
by the Army, Air Force, and Navy, when dealing with each 
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other. Many times there have been contracts let to in-
dustry by these agencies which had the other agencies 
known about them would have altered their plans according 
to the information already developed under the original 
contract. Such double spending cost the taxpayers many 
millions of dollars every year. 
These government agencies each have their own 
methods and systems for controlling industrial contracts 
also. If some of these systems were altered to conform 
to some standard procedure to be utilized by industry 1-.·hen 
dealing with the government agency who is their cognizant 
office or v-rhen industry is dealing with some other govern-
ment agency, a great deal of time and effort might be saved. 
There is much duplication of effort whenever a company work-
ing on a contract that comes under Army jurisdiction attempts 
to contact an organization working under Navy jurisdiction. 
These problems of coordination and transition are 
not mentioned here that they be solved, but only to illustrate 
some of the reasons why management approaches industrial se-
curity with a jaundiced eye and a negative attitude. It has 
been the intention of this whole section to bring into focus 
the various sides of industrial security and to acquaint the 
reader with the underlying precepts and philosophies that 
will affect the inauguration and implementation of a program 
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of security within an industrial organization. If there is 
one major point to be drawn from the foregoing discussion 
it is that security is an attitude and as such must be 
cultivated within the individual as a positive concept, one 
that will lead to decisions based on the need for security 
rather than the fear of it. 
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SECTION III 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
l. FUNCTIONS OF AN INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
The various functions that are usually associated 
with a program of industrial security are affected by sev-
eral things. One important consideration is the set of re-
quirements established by the government that pertain to 
security procedures. Another consideration is the philo-
sophy of the individual management relative to government 
control and intervention in the affairs of private enter-
prise. A third consideration in the selection and develop-
ment of a program for industrial security is the cost of 
such a program. wben these factors are examined together 
it is evident that the first point, i.e., the government 
regulations, will be seriously affected by management's 
feelings toward the latter two points. Therefore, any 
effective program of industrial security must aim at bring-
ing the goals of the company into accord with the aims of 
the government. The following areas of responsibility are 
important to the accomplishment of this end. 
1.1. CREATE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD A PROGRAM OF 
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
Any endeavor, if it is to be successful, must 
make the people using or participating in it want to 
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cooperate or react positively toward the desired means or 
ends. In this case it is necessary to gain the support of 
every person involved in the program, for a breakdown in 
any area of security can render the whole program 
ineffectual. Most important in the formulation and 
development of the program is to know your people. Manage-
ment must be able to understand the individuals involved in 
their operation and be able to, 
appraise their individual and collective 
abilities; condition their attitudes through 
clearly defined leadership and education; 
develop personal traits of dependability, 
ingenuity, fortitude, the will to cooperate, 
and common sense. 
The obvious prerequisite to this is to gain the support of 
individual members of the management team and to enlist their 
active cooperation in establishing and carrying out the 
program. Without the active participation of every 
individual in the organization, the security program is 
going to be expensive, cumbersome and dangerous to the 
security of the country. 
1.2. DEVELOP WORKABLE SYSTEMS FOR THE HANDLING OF 
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL 
The most sensitive area of industrial security 
from the viewpoint of personnel working with it, is the 
type and effectiveness of the systems used for handling 
classified information. If the system seems overly 
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burdensome, ineffectual, or just plain ridiculous to the 
casual observer, then it is incumbent upon the security 
office or person to study the system for defects or ways 
to improve on it. If the system is deemed suitable then the 
personnel must be educated as to its function and the ne-
cessity for using it. 
In the development of systems for industrial 
security there are three major areas to be considered. 
They are physical security, personnel security, and docu-
(25) 
ment security. Physical security calls for adequate 
perimeter barriers, a tamper-proof badge or identification 
card for eacl1 employee, a complete escort system for the 
accompaniment of all visitors, available side arms for 
emergency use, an effective, emergency communication system, 
and a well secured, well lighted plant. 
Personnel security requires an effective program 
for the screening of job applicants and employees to elim-
inate potential espionage and sabotage agents and other 
security risks. It is the responsibility of the company 
to screen each individual and deny employment on a classi-
fied contract to anyone that appears to be a security risk. 
It is a requirement of the government that each employee, 
prior to access to classified information, be checked by 
either the company or an investigative agency of the 
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government. The better the job done by industry in the 
screening of applicants prior to employment, the more 
effective the government agencies can be in servicing in-
dustry. 
Document security is the area that this paper is 
most concerned with, primarily because it is here that 
classified information is most likely to be compromised. 
The casual handling of classified or sensitive information 
oftens leads to its compromise without anyone except the 
thief being the wiser. By gathering many bits and scraps of 
information and submitting them to a central area, the 
Communists (and other countries) are able to piece together 
accurate data relative to the vital facilities of this 
country which may result in great loss to our industrial 
complex. To the Communist there are two sources of infor-
(26) 
mation, witting and unwitting. The witting sources in-
elude people who are ideologically motivated, those who are 
disaffected with their employer, people who are financially 
embarrassed, and those who will do anything for money or 
liquor. The unwitting sources are those people who don't 
know they are being milked of information, and the type who 
attempts to show off by dropping information of a sensitive 
~~The individual company may issue a Government clearance for 
access to material classified CONFIDENTIAL or below. 
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nature at parties and social gatherings. 
Regardless of the scope and type of system used to 
maintain industrial security, there are two things necessa~y 
for the success of the program. One is a well-trained se-
curity force and security officer, and the other is a desire 
on the part of the persons using the system to make it work. 
Where these qualities are not in evidence, the espionage 
agent will, if he has not already, render the weapon or 
weapon system being worked on, ineffectual and obsolete be-
fore it goes into the production stage. 
1.3. EXPLAIN POLICY AND INTERPRET REGULATIONS OF 
GOVERNMENT SECURITY MANUAL 
Many management personnel consider it the sole 
function of the industrial security officer and his program 
to explain the policy of the government and to interpret 
the Industrial Security Manual so that they, management, can 
make decisions as to their course of action. Although this 
is a prime function of the security program, it is a grave 
mistake to curtail any security program to this extent. 
The security officer should have the responsibility of 
making security policy as well as interpreting it, and if 
he doesn't the program will soon fall prey to economic in-
terests and other pressure groups within the organization. 
The security office, therefore, must be aware of 
53 
• 
any changes in government policy or regulations, and be ca-
pable of presenting these changes to management and the 
workers in such a manner that they will be understood and 
accepted in a fashion that will assure cooperation of all 
personnel concerned. This will be possible only to the ex-
tent that these personnel have been indoctrinated and edu-
cated previously to their responsibilities and duties rela-
tive to the security of classified information. This func-
tion, then becomes part of a constant training program in 
industrial security. 
1.4. FACILITATE THE INTEGRATION OF SECURITY PROGRAM 
WITH OVERALL MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND GOALS 
If a security program does not 'fit in' with the 
apparent aims of the company or group within the company, 
it is assumed to be against the aims and goals of the com-
pany. So it is the job of the security personnel to aid 
management and the individual workers with the integration 
of security systems .and policies into the overall plans and 
functions involved. Since the biggest asset to the program 
is the support of management, it behooves security personnel 
to aid these people in every way possible in the establish-
ment of procedures that will compliment the functions of the 
various sections and activities. 
And most important, the individuals responsible 
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for the mechanical functioning of the system and its vari-
ous operations must be thoroughly trained in the performance 
of their duties. This type of training also allows changes 
in systems in certain areas where there are problems of a 
specific and singular nature that might have been missed or 
disregarded under general conditions. 
1.5. COMPLY WITH AND COMPLEMENT GOVERNMENT POLICY 
AND REGULATIONS 
In the opinion of the government the main function 
of an industrial security program is to carry out the policy 
and directives of the Department of Defense with respect to 
the safeguarding of classified materials and information. 
It is to this end that the government has issued the Indus-
trial Security Manual, and has set up the elaborate network 
of agencies to facilitate the control of industrial secu-
ity. This being the case, the security personnel of the in-
dividual company must insure that the directives and regula-
tions dealing with security are adhered to within their or-
ganization and that the company does nothing that will en-
danger the facility clearance of the company. The security 
program is also responsible for maintaining effective liai-
son between the government and industry. It is just as im-
portant that industry inform the government of policies and 
regulations that are ineffectual or stifling to the progress 
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of a contract as it is for government to keep tabs on management. 
1.6. ASSUME APPROPRIATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFOHMATION 
Industry, through the operation of individual 
security programs in each company performing on a classified 
contract, must make itself responsible for the protection of 
our country's secrets. This responsibility goes beyond the 
letter of the law and the contractual agreement to safeguard 
this information. It is the job of the individuals working 
in the field of industrial security to enlighten their 
prospective managements as to the threat against their own 
security and their very way of life, and to gain their support 
in the form of funds and of personal, active participation in 
good security practices. Most of the really sensitive informa-
tion is in the hands of management and if they do nob protect 
it then it would be a paradox to have absolute security at 
lower levels in the organizational structure. All of the 
other functions of the security program are embodied in thiss 
one, for if the individuals within an organization assume 
their proper responsibility for the protection of classified 
information, they will of necessity utilize the other functions. 
2. CHIT.c:;RIA TO BE STUDIED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
2.1. COST OF THE PROGRAM 
The factors that make up the cost of a security 
program are basically the same that affect any other 
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administrative effort of management. And although this is 
the case, it is often found that the budget allowed for 
security is pitifully inadequate. Two points that must 
always be remembered are that adequate security will cost 
you money, and that effective security can't be bought with 
(27) 
money alone. Besides money, you must have a trained and 
dedicated Industrial Security Administrator who will have 
the complete cooperation and backing of management. 
It is possible to eliminate unnecessary 
precautions, excess personnel, wasteful practices, and time 
concuming procedures that will only hamstring your primary 
effort - to safeguard classified material. The best way to 
do this, of course, is not to include them in the contract 
in the first place. The responsibility for controlling 
security costs rests with management of' the company and 
with the security administrator. This responsibility 
imposes upon us the obligation to analyze the 
expenditures before we suggest or approve it 
to determine that it will support the company's 
objectives and policies and provide improved 
security: that it does not overlap or duplicate 
or conflict ~·Ti th measures already in effect 
and that it achieve better results than the 
available alternatives. However, control of 
costs does not mean, per se, reduction of cost. 
In security, as in most other things, cheapness 
and economy are seldom synonymous. (28) 
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Whether or not the Industrial Security Administrator has 
been involved in the formulation of the security budget, 
he cannot expect to fulfill his obligations properly if 
he has not taken effective steps to plan an economical 
(29) 
program of industrial security for his company. 
2.1.1. Security Organization and Personnel 
Required. The primary concern in costing an effective se-
curity program is the size and quality of the security 
function. This means, how much should be paid to the 
Security Administrator, should he be management caliber, 
and what is often, especially in small companies, the 
tendency to place the responsibility of administering the 
security program with some member of management as an extra 
duty. This almost invariably is inadequate for the proper 
protection of classified information. On the other hand, 
a small company, working on a small contract, often cannot 
afford to pay a separate salary for a security administrator. 
What, then, are the criteria for selection of security 
personnel? 
The most important factor in the selection of a 
person or persons to administrate a program of industrial 
security is the size and complexity of the contract involved. 
It may well be that this person will handle several contracts 
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of a classified nature. If the amount of work and 
responsibility is to be heavy, then a person that is capable 
of assuming such a job is required. If the nature of the 
security requirements is such that most of the resrjonsibility 
is to be for the physical aspects of security, then a 
person with less administrative ability and more experience 
in police methods might be desirable. At any rate, the 
Security AQ~inistrator must be conscious of, and interested 
in learning and understanding management's responsibilities 
and the various segments that constitute the overall operation 
(30) 
of a company. Definitely, the Industrio.1 Security 
Representatj.ve should be at management level, and he should 
have some formal business education so that he is aware of 
the techniques and tools of management. 
After selection of the Administrator, the next 
problem is to decide what amount of help is going to be 
necessary to insure proper flow of information and paperwork 
of a classified nature. The expected document workload must 
be visualized or estimated, and from this estimate the type 
of security control may be established. In many companies 
the various group or private secretaries handle the security 
aspects of the contract under the cognizance of the Security 
Administrator or his assi~tants. In other• companies it is 
-1:-Top Security Administrators salaries· range from $Ib, OCO to 
$25,000 
59 
necessary, due to workload or complexity of security proce-
dures or sensitiveness of information, to establish control 
stations throughout the facility and have these run by cus-
todians who report directly to the security office. Another 
method of handling classified information is through a cen-
tral library or file where all documents are maintained or 
distributed on a loan basis. Each of these systems can be 
inexpensive or very expensive, effective or ineffective, 
adequate or inadequate, appropriate or inappropriate, de-
pending upon the particular company, its goals, methods, and 
facilities. In general, a separate bid or quotation of se-
curity costs should be studied for each classified contract, 
and the administrator should examine the possibility of a 
separate program for each contract. 
The next area of cost for security personnel, that 
of the guard force, comprises the largest element of securi-
(31) 
ty costs. A certain number of guards is probably going 
to be required. It may be found that the number of guards 
necessary to satisfy the minimum requirements of the con-
tract, may not, in fact, provide adequate security. Then it 
is a company decision whether or not to provide the extra 
personnel and this type of decision will depend upon the 
prevalent management attitude toward security, and the a-
vailable alternatives. In the recruiting of the guard force 
it is often cheaper to contract for this service from a 
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professional protection company. It is important to note 
here that the comp?ny has less to say about what personnel 
are supplied, although it can request changes. 
The selection of security personnel from Adminis-
trator down to the guard force, should reflect not only the 
requirements of the industrial Security Manual but, should 
complement the structure and best interests of the company. 
This selection should also reflect the needs of the 
particular contract with respect to the protection of classi-
fied work that the company might be required to handle in 
the future. 
2.1.2. Equipment Necessary for Adequate Protection. 
The U. s. Government is very explicit in its requirements 
for the storage of classified materials. So it is absolute-
ly necessary for any company who wishes a facility clearance, 
so that it can work on classified government contracts, to 
have adequate storage for such information. Storage cabinets 
must conform to government specifications both to construc-
tion and to the means of securing the cabinet. In many 
instances it is necessary to convert the present storage 
containers or to buy new ones. This expense in itself consti-
tutes a great sum of money to new or small organizations. 
The problem of selling the need, outside of contractual 
obligations, for this additional expense falls 
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on the Security Administrator. 
Another equipment expense is that of vehicles that 
may be necessary for adequate protection of more than one 
building or area ~ithin the company. Sometimes a roving 
guard in a vehicle can serve as well as several guards sta-
tioned at rixed points. Vehicles may be required to trans-
port special pieces of equipment develof·ed under the con-
-cract, or to maintain liaison between di1'ferent plants work-
ing on the same or similar projects. 
A third area of equipment expense is that of elec-
tronic devices and other mechanical means of maintaining 
protection over a physical area. These devices include 
closed circuit television, electronic beams, central control 
stations, and many others. It is important for the Adminis-
trator to be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of 
this type of equipment when he is making his budget. Al-
though the initial cost is often high, the long-run savings 
may be quite substantial. 
2.1.3. Geographic Location. The physical location of 
the plant is often a factor that affects the security costs 
of the contract. Sometimes it is necessary to transport 
classified materials, equipment, and information across long 
distances and in foreign countries. The costs of this 
transportation may be multiplied several times if protection 
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of these materials cannot be effected easily. 
The proximity to commercial transportation is im-
portant. If it is necessary for each piece or shipment of 
classified materials to be accompanied by a guard or a cour-
ier, this will greatly increase the cost of physical secu-
rity. Usually commercial carriers have acceptable methods 
of handling this material once it is delivered to some cen-
tral point. 
Geographic location may make it impossible for 
adequate physical protection of the plant facilities due to 
terrain or other natural factors while maintaining a reason-
able security budget. In such a company it is extremely 
necessary for good security education and stringent internal 
control. 
2.1.4. Classification of the Contract. The amount of 
security that is required of classified material is in di-
rect proportion to the degree of classification. As men-
tioned earlier, there are three basic degrees of classifi-
cation, TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL. TOP SECRET 
Material is that which, if compromised, would or could re-
sult in exceptionally grave damage to the nation. SECRET 
material is that which, if compromised, could result in se-
rious damage to the nation. CONFIDENTIAL information could, 
if compromised, be prejudicial to the defense interests of 
63 
the country. 
The protection of TOP SECRET information becomes 
extremely expensive as each item so classified must be 
guarded physically at all times. The equipment necessary 
for storage of this information must conform to strict gov-
ernment requirements and this expense must be borne by the 
contractor. SECRET material, on the other hand, requires 
less stringent procedures and protection than TOP SECRET in-
formation but more protection than CONFIDENTIAL information. 
These relative costs should be kept in mind when planning a 
security program. 
2.1.5. Training Program for Industrial Security. Any 
program whether it be security or production or something 
else, must utilize some form of training to insure its suc-
cess. This training may be on-the-job training, classroom 
training, individual or group training, specific or general 
training. It may be handled by a training group, personnel 
department, or it may be informally handled by the super-
visor or group leader. It may be done during working hours 
or before or after working hours. The time spent on train-
ing for industrial security and the methods used will depend 
on how well the management of the organization is sold on 
the benefits to be derived from good security training. 
Although the method used for training and the 
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amount of time spent for security training varies from com-
pany to company, the quality of security training must be 
maintained. Poor security training will result in the ul-
timate compromise of anything that the Communists or other 
foreign agents decide to steal. Good security training may 
deter the efforts of these espionage agents for a while at 
least. One thing is sure, good training in security will 
enhance the effort put forth by the individuals working with 
security if only because of better understanding of what to 
do and how to do it. 
2.1.6. Size of Company and Plant Layout. The size of 
the company, the number of employees, the physical layout of 
the plant, are all things to be considered by the Security 
Administrator in the development of the security program and 
its ultimate cost. The number of plants, and the degree of 
communication between them is the prime importance. If 
there is conflict of interests between individual plants in 
the same company, security procedures between them will prob-
ably reflect this conflict. The larger the company, the 
larger the administrative costs of security will be. 
The number of employees and their physical posi-
tion within the plant will affect security costs. Areas 
that must be restricted or closed to persons not having a 
'need to know' should be where they can be protected as 
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cheaply as possible. Where there is a great number of em-
ployees, there is need for a larger guard force to keep clas-
sified information from getting into the wrong hands. The 
larger the work force involved in classified contracts, the 
more chance for administrative bottlenecks and clerical er-
rors in dealing with security procedures. These problems 
are indirect costs to efficiency and time-utilization of 
personnel. One way of cutting down on red tape procedures 
is to place as many persons working on one project in the 
same physical area so that security problems arising out of 
the contract or with personnel working on it can be spotted 
more easily and remedied quickly and efficiently. 
2.1.7. Direct vs. Indirect Costs of Industrial Secu-
rity. The difficulty of apportioning direct costs against 
specific contracts is not new to management. In the field 
of Industrial Security, however, it is exceptionally hard 
because security is basically an administrative function. 
It is also hard to charge direct guard labor against a con-
tract when there are other classified contracts in the 
house. The use of outside agencies for the performance of 
guard functions does provide a tangible charge against the 
company for service and this may be apportioned against the 
several contracts relative to their dollar value. 
Therefore, a concentrated effort by the Security 
Administrator to reduce the indirect costs of security may 
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well be an excellent way to gain the support of management 
for the program. In fact, the most obvious method of gaining 
the support of management is by the reduction of any of the 
costs of the security program. It is to this end that the 
aforementioned cost factors be studied, for it must be 
remembered that the Security Administrator is an employee 
of the company and his actions should reflect the best interests 
of the company. If he finds that the best interests of the 
company conflict with good, efficient security then he must 
make adjustments to fit the situation. The best adjustment, 
of course, is to change the attitude of management in the 
direction of good security practices. 
2.2. FEASIBILITY OF PLANNED SECURITY PROGRAM 
The security program that is to be set up must be 
feasible within the structure and abilities and capabilities 
of the individual company. It must fit the particular needs 
of the company according to its administrative abilities as 
well as to the physical problems involved. In short, a 
security program must be tailored to the individual needs of 
each organization and this is why the government has kept thee 
Industrial Security Manual so broad in its concept and 
regulations. 
2.2.1. Ability to Administer the Security Program. 
The success of any program, security or otherwise, depends 
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primarily upon the ability of the management in the 
individual organization to administer it. The best program 
of industrial security is not necessarily the most elaborate, 
but, more important, is one which does the best possible job 
within the capabilities of the organization. This is not to 
say that such a program provides good security, only that it 
usually provides better cooperation on the part of management 
than would a more cumbersome and unwieldy type of oecurity 
program. 
A great deal of responsibility lies with the 
individual management to provide the affininistrative ability 
to handle an effective security program even when they do not 
have the necessary in-house facilities at the time of 
contractual negotiations. This, once again, brings us back 
to the need for positive cooperation rather than lip service 
agreement. The fact that the company does not have the 
personnel or the administrative set-up to facilitate an 
effective program of industrial security should not deter 
security personnel within the organization from recruiting 
assistance from management so that effective security can be 
realized. 
2.2.2. Physical Problems to be Encountered. The 
secu:....,i ty program should take into consideration the various 
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problems arising out of geographic location, plant lay-out, 
number of persons involved and any other elements that might 
make the program ineffectual. Many times a program fails 
because too little attention was paid to the individual ele-
ments comprising the effort. In the case of security the 
best paperwork program is useless without adequate and ef-
ficient physical security. 
2.2.3. Personnel vs. Workload. Another important con-
sideration in the selection of a security program is the a-
vailability of personnel to perform the work. The program 
may have to be cut back in some respects due to the workload 
being too heavy to be handled effectively. When this hap-
pens the program should allow for less detail in the proc-
essing and dissemination of classified information, uti-
lizing adequate physical control and the ability to detect 
weak areas of security. The emphasis should be on actual 
physical control and the gaining of cooperative effort on 
the part of individuals rather than on overly detailed ad-
ministrative workload exceeds the capacity of the personnel 
handling it. 
2.2.4. Systems and Methods to be Used. The systems 
and methods developed for use in a security program should 
be consistent with the overall schemes and methods utilized 
by the company. They should also complement, as much as 
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possible, the various duties of the individuals utilizing 
these systems and methods. They should be developed accord-
ing to the needs of the organization. Each of the several 
methods of documenting and controlling classified informa-
tion should be studied to insure that the one best suited to 
the particular organization be used. Visitor control pro-
cedures should also be studied for best application. And 
very important to keep in mind also is the probable expan-
sion of defense work within the company, the projected work-
load that will be placed on the system, and the adequacy of 
the proposed system for handling that workload. 
2.3. PROBLEMS OF INAUGURATING AND IMPLEMENTING A PRO-
GRAM OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
The first rule to be followed when preparing a 
proposal for a program to be presented to management is to 
know the answers to the questions that are likely to be ask-
ed concerning the program. In the case of a security pro-
gram there are several problems involved with inaugurating 
and implementing it, and since positive cooperation is a 
prime requisite for success, these problems require careful 
study. Although there are many such problems, the seven 
that are found in every organization are considered here. 
2.3.1. Barriers to Positive Attitude and Motivation. 
Each individual within the organization has his own ideas 
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about security and ho~ to maintain it. And when a method of 
handling classified material is presented to him along with 
threats to his security if he does not do the right thing,~~ 
it must be done in such a way as to make the person want 
good security. 
The administrative tie-ups caused by security tend 
to create a negative attitude within individuals whose per-
sonal worth to the company is measured by how well and how 
quickly they get things done. It is very hard to appreciate 
security when you have worked long hours to complete some-
thing and find that it will be held up for some time in the 
security section until it is processed. There are many fac-
tors which affect the individual in his relationship with 
the security program and these factors will be discussed in 
some length in Section IV. 
2.3.2. Establishment of Communication Channels. In 
order for security to be effective there must be adequate 
channels of communication. It is the problem of the Secu-
rity Administrator to develop his lines of co~nunication 
prior to inaugurating the program so that the workers will 
be aware of what is going on and will give the program their 
cooperation. The methods used to communicate will depend on 
the facilities of the company or formal channels, and the 
*Peace time laws provide penalties up to fines of $10,000 
and for imprisonment up to ten years. 
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informal channels. 
The formal channels include bulletin boards, house 
organs, flyers, administrative memoranda, posters, and all 
other official methods utilized by the company. The infor-
mal channels, on the other hand, include word of mouth 
sources (grapevine), social groups, and individuals within 
the organization which act as sounding boards for the feel-
ings of the workers. Most important is the fact that, what-
ever method is used, the communication must reach everybody 
and when necessary, must go up as well as down. 
2.3.3. Indoctrination of Personnel. The method to be 
used to indoctrinate each individual starting on classified 
defense work depends on who the company has available to do 
the job. This initial taste of security procedures should 
eliminate the fear of security and it should also show the 
need for individual cooperation in the program. Management 
may be impatient to start on a contract and decide not to 
indoctrinate each individual prior to that person being 
shown classified information. This is the worst thing that 
could happen to the program. 
Proper indoctrination of personnel is essential 
to the success of the program and management must be con-
vinced of this fact so that procedures may be established 
prior to the inauguration of the program. The security 
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office personnel or the training division, if there is one 
available, should be responsible for indoctrinating employ-
ees on security. 
2.3.4. Development of Industrial Training. There are 
several questions that must be answered relative to a train-
ing program before the proposed security program can be pre-
sented to management. These include - what is available for 
training facilities? How much should be spent on security 
training? How much training is necessary? Who is to be 
trained? Why is training necessary? 
Generally speaking, the more security training 
each employee is subjected to, the less chance there is for 
material to be compromised. But this training must show its 
application to the basic needs of the country and to the in-
dividual, and it must be relative to the working environment 
of the employee and his particular job. Security training 
is basically the creation of the proper attitude in each 
employee, and the method of doing this will depend on man-
agement's awareness of the security problem, the answers to 
the above questions, and their willingness to invest the 
necessary funds to do the job. 
2.3.5. Personnel Security Clearances. Probably the 
most frustrating problem to management in its dealing with 
classified material is the time lost to a project while 
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waiting for the government to check the background or gov-
ernment's files on each individual that handles classified 
information. Since the employee must be on the company pay-
roll before the government can institute a security check, 
that employee often is forced to sit around unless there is 
an unclassified area where he can be utilized. Too often 
there is no place for him and he has to await word from the 
government for periods extending from a month to the better 
part of a year. This period although it is not usually com-
pletely wasted, is of less value to the employer than it 
otherwise could have been. 
The company is also required to furnish the gov-
ernment five copies of several forms which trace the indi-
vidual's life back to 1937. This places quite a burden on 
the typing staff as well as on the administrative personnel. 
These forms are the basis for the government's investigation 
and any discrepancies between findings and what the employee 
has stated are carefully checked out and evaluated to deter-
mine if he is a possible security risk to the government. 
This 'guilty until proven innocent' attitude and approach 
has been the target of many people who feel such action is 
an infringement on our civil rights under the constitution. 
In spite of these charges, it is obvious to the realists in 
this country that without these measures it is very likely 
that the communists might have felt able to win a decisive 
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victory over us several years ago, and would have been 
prompted to start World War III. 
2.3.6. Devising of Security Systems and Standards. It 
has been mentioned before in this paper that the systems 
used in a security program must 'fit in' with the other op-
erations of the company. They must also do what they are 
set up to do, and with efficiency relative to the rest of 
the project operations. A careful study before inaugurating 
the program will save much time and effort in altering pro-
cedures that do not work. Using the right methods the first 
time is also important to the protection of classified in-
formation because espionage agents are expecially interested 
in new projects. 
The problem of establishing standards for security 
procedures is a very confusing one. This is due to the vari-
ance in government philosophy that allows management to de-
vise its own systems while maintaining strict penalties for 
failure to comply with security regulations. In order to 
have an effective security program it is necessary to estab-
lish standards consistent with good security, and manage-
ment's objectives, as well as with the government regula-
tions. 
2.3.7. Phasing Program into Operation. Although the 
establishment of a security program is required before the 
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government will release classified information to a con-
tractor, good timing is imperative to the immediate success 
of it. The security program should be inaugurated according 
to the climate within the organization if at all possible. 
Considerable spadework is often required to prepare employ-
ees of whole departments or plants for acceptance of posi-
tive security procedures. The reasons behind this reluc-
tance or defiance of security procedures may have many dif-
ferent roots. It is the duty of the Security Administrator 
to seek out these reasons and to, through education and per-
sonal contacts, alter these opinions and attitudes to insure 
acceptance and cooperation with the security program. 
The important thing in phasing any program into 
operation is to eliminate as many problems and barriers to 
its success as possible, and to make the program tlexible 
enough to withstand or assimilate any other stumbling blocks 
that may arise. And since most of these problems arise with-
in the minds of individuals, it is incumbent upon security 
personnel and management to convert the attitudes of each in-
dividual, if necessary, from negative attitudes to positive 
reactions. One very serious problem in many security pro-
grams is the attitude of security personnel. They forget 
that the aim of the program is to protect classified infor-
mation and they approach security as if every violation is 
a felony punishable by the maximum penalty. Therefore, 
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security education must begin in the security office with 
the personnel responsible for the program. 
2.4. COORDINATION OF SECURITY PROGHAM IHTH THE UNION 
It is highly probable that there will be some 
union involved Hith the operations of the company and if 
there is, it r,Jill be necessary to discuss the security 
l;rogram with the union orficials and get their blessin~ on 
the undertaking. Her_-;, the union cannot change the .c·equire-
ments of' the government but, it can affect the methods used 
to carry out these requirements. Therefore it is important 
that one of the premises in the develo0nent of a security 
program be its affect on the union agreement and the union's 
sense of well-being. 
2.4.J. Effects on Contractual Obliga~];2ns. The 
security program should be compared in detail 1Ji th the various 
elements of the union-management relationship. When it 
appears that some aspect of the program may create tensions 
among the workers or with the union, there shoul~ be an 
effort made to alter the verbage or metho~ in order that 
the item be acceptable. If this cannot be accomplished it 
will then be necessary to convince the union that the item 
or method is needed for the success of the program. 
2.4.2. Need for Recognitic_!1 ?J Beth Parties of 
Enemy. Education is the key to successful security. It is 
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just as important to train the union officers in ir ...cJustrial 
security as it is to train numbers of management. The 
Security Ac1.'Tiinistrato:c must gain the confidence and respect 
of the union and then he must sell his program anrl the 
necessity for it. He can show the union that they, like 
management, must assume the responsibility of protecting 
classified information. Once this has been done, it will be 
possible to establish another channel of communication, orle 
betvJeen the union and the security acLrnin::strator, to rc;port 
discrerancies and grievances about the security prcgram. 
2.4.3. Enlistment of Union Aid in Sellin0 Program 
to Workers. If there is one fairly certain way to sell a 
program to the workers, it is to have the union speak out for 
it. Even this will not insure its success, but it will go 
far in gaining the support of the workers. Since security 
is dependent on the attitudes of the Horkers, and the union 
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is a sounding board of these attitudes, it behooves the 
Security Administrator to cultivate this source of information. 
Selling security is made even more diffj.cult 
because of its commanding nature. The vwrkers knm'r that they 
have to live with security ~bether they like it or not. T~is 
sometimes makes them less than cooperative in their approach 
to classified work. Security is also an area where 
the union has little control over the situation since an 
employee can be terminated readily for disregard for secu-
rity procedures. Therefore, the best way to sell the pro-
gram is to show the workers that their own leaders believe 
it is for the best interest of the workers. 
79 
SECTION IV 
GAINING SUPPORT OF VillNAGEMENT FOR SECURITY PROGRAM 
l. MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL WHOSE COOPERATION IS NECESSARY FOR 
SUCCESS OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
It is a fundamental truth that, in business, man-
agement holds the purse strings. This means that all de-
cisions affecting the economic structure of the company, or 
any other expenditures for that matter, usually are made by 
management. The industrial security program is no exception 
to these facts. Indeed, it has been said that, 
The question of how far, under certain conditions, 
a particular industrial plant should go in the way 
of actual preparation for physical security, per-
sonnel security, and document security, is pri-
marily a management decision. This decision should 
take into consideration the international situation, 
the character and requirements for continued opera-
tions, geographic location, economic, and all other 
pertinent factors. (37) 
Such a program comes under the severe scrutiny of several 
levels of management, each level applying a different set of 
criteria which is peculiar to the operations at that level. 
If the various management personnel are allowed to voice 
their opinions prior to the implementation of the program, 
many problems or 'bugs' may be worked out at that time rath-
er than after operations are begun. 
The proposed security program faces its most se-
so 
vere test while it is still in the embryonic staees of its 
development. This takes place when the proposed program is 
outlined to management. It is here that the program must be 
justified and molded into the working elements that will 
make it efficient and useful, as well as secure. And the 
way to achieve success for the program is to fulfill three 
basic conditions. These conditions are top management sup-
(38) 
port, operator participation, and staff assistance. 
1.1. TOP MANAGEMENT SUPPORT 
It is futile to attempt any program that top man-
agement is not prepared to support. The security program 
must come from management and must have the endorsement of 
the head of the organization. The lower levels of manage-
ment as well as the workers must know that type of security 
control is required by top management for, 
a widespread uncertainty about the rules, or an im-
pression of utter disorder, is likely to prompt 
withdrawal and defense rather than more active com-
petition. (39) 
And unless the executive branch indicates support of the 
program and gives it direction and importance relative to 
other operations of the company, the person carryine out the 
directives of management will interpret the rules in a man-
ner that he feels will show him off best to his boss, disre-
garding the need for good security. 
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These are people at all stages in the structure of 
the company who will resist change, and who will have a det-
rimental effect on the program unless top management is 
(40) 
strongly behind the program. This is especially true 
of persons whose position is threatened by the program. 
And security is a function that oftens seems to be nothing 
but an obstruction or hindrance in an otherwise efficient 
operation. To these people security takes a back seat in 
their handling of any situation that is short of time, and 
sometimes errors of security policy result from simple neg-
(41) 
lect of pertinent aspects of the situation. They are 
more concerned with the results of their work that will be 
noticed by top management than about security, and they know 
"the coordinator (executive) judges results, not methods. 
(42) 
It is important to note that top management in 
many, if not in all companies, is prone to do things that 
make their personal work more efficient. The executives 
form a certain social class, one of many within the organ-
ization, and they are aware that certain privileges go with 
rank. They feel that they are exempt from performing many 
perfunctory operations of the security procedures, usually 
in the two most sensitive areas, that of document control 
and of access to unauthorized areas. This attitude is per-
haps, the most devastating blow that can be struck against 
the security program because, such action indicates to the 
lower levels top management's philosophy toward industrial 
security. Other people, seeing these actions will soon tai-
lor their behavior when handling security matters to fit 
their image of the executive philosophy. 
Selling the security program to top management 
means more than just getting financial assistance to carry 
through on the mechanical functions of the program. It 
means convincing top management of the necessity of good 
security and the value of the particular program being pro-
posed to them. This will aid in creating a positive atti-
tude within top management personnel, thereby giving them 
the incentive to look beyond the formal structure and opera-
tion of the organization in an effort to determine the real 
effectiveness of the security measures being undertaken. 
''Any managerial system is characterized by a great variety 
of informal unofficial activities, attitudes, sentiments, 
(43) 
and symbols. Very often these sentiments and atti-
tudes make the individuals performing the mechanical func-
tions of the program attempt, consciously or unconsciously, 
to sabotage the program. Only through the insight of top 
management and their ability to keep their finger on the 
pulse of the organization will effective security be at-
tained. 
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1.2. MIDDLE-~~NAGEMENT 
While it is the responsibility of top management 
to maintain continous control of the organization and to 
formulate objectives for the company, the control and opera-
tion of the separate functions of the company, according to 
established objectives is the responsibility of middle-man-
agement. These are the people whose characteristic duty, it 
is, to make the statements of objectives put forth by top 
management and the form of orders concerning these objec-
tives, more and more explicit and specific as they pass down 
(44) 
the line. It is at this level that the operating in-
terpretation of company objectives is made. Therefore, this 
is a very sensitive area in the formulation of security 
policy. 
The members of middle-management are under pres-
sure from above to do an efficient job and to meet their 
schedules. They are also under pressure from above to ad-
ministrate other activities such as industrial security as 
part of their overall duties. To bring the need for secu-
rity into proper prospective for middle-management, the Se-
curity Administrator must concentrate a good deal of effort 
in their education. 
One way of selling the security program to inter-
mediate managers is to enlist their aid in the development 
of the program. If they can see this development taking 
place and have an opportunity to make suggestions and al-
terations in the various procedures and philosophies gov-
erning the operations of the program, they will feel more 
a part of the program and will advance it to their subor-
dinates positively, giving security a sense of purpose and 
direction. 
1.3. LINE SUPERVISION 
The line supervisor is under fire from every level 
of management as well as from his subordinates. He must sat-
isfy the "demands of top management within the existing or 
any concretely attainable social and technical conditions" 
(44) 
He is the one who is basically responsible for the 
successful operation of the security program. That is, the 
supervisor is directly involved in the mechanical function-
ing of the program and the way that these mechanics affect 
the attitudes of the personnel using them. 
Therefore, if the line supervisor can be shown 
that security is as much a part of his job as are production 
schedules, he will be the mainstay of the program among the 
workers. This is so because the urgency of the job is con-
trolled, face-to-face at least, by the actions and direc-
tives of the supervisor. If he believes tl1at security must 
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be carried out properly, then this attitude will reflect it-
self upon the actions of the supervisor's subordinates and 
contemporaries. 
1.4. STAFF PERSONNEL 
Every program needs the overall direction and con-
trol of some member of top management to keep it on its 
proper track. This executive should report directly to the 
president. Reporting directly to him would be the Security 
Administrator. Since the security personnel tend to make 
decisions based primarily on security regulations and train-
ing, it is necessary to have this staff executive to provide 
a guiding hand that will keep the security function in its 
proper relation to the aims of the company and the other 
operations of the organization. 
2. TYPE OF SUPPORT NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE PROGRAM OF IN-
DUSTRIAL SECURITY 
2.1. NEED FOR POSITIVE ACTION 
The success of an industrial security program 
hinges primarily on the type and amount of support given it 
by management. If there is little support there ~ill be 
little security gained. Or if the type of support given is 
negative in nature, that is, "we are doing this because we 
have to," there will be little real security. If, on the 
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other hand, there is positive action by management, the pro-
gram is in good position to succeed. 
Positive support by management is even more im-
portant to the success of a security program than it would 
be to some other type of undertaking because it is imposed 
on the company as something for which the individuals as 
well as the company will be legally liable. This tends to 
make security somewhat fearsome, and something to be shunned 
if possible. And since there are many loopholes in every 
security program, it becomes safer to avoid security pro-
cedures that require signing your name than to accept your 
responsibility toward protection of the government's defense 
information. So this type of avoidance will be in orderly 
proportionate to the amount of positive action support the 
program is given by management. 
2.1.1. Danger of Lip Service Support. In many in-
stances persons in supervisory and managerail positions tend 
to give lip service to certain procedures and then proceed 
to short-cut them personally. This is especially true in 
the case of industrial security procedures. Managers give 
support to the security program because it is expected of 
them, having come from above, but their actions indicate a 
complete lack of understanding or acceptance of security 
procedures especially when they are in a hurry. When the 
supervisor feels that a schedule is not going to be met un-
less he takes shortcuts, it is natural for him to make these 
shortcuts in the area he is least concerned about, and which 
is not productive. All too often this area is security. 
When this lip service type of support reaches the 
lower levels of management and filters through to the work-
ers, they adjust their own feelings toward security to coin-
cide with what they perceive management's feelings to be. 
The workers adjust themselves to a point just inside the 
minimums established by their superiors. And up to now it 
has been possible to plead ignorance of the industrial secu-
rity laws and get away with it in most instances. 
The workers have only the actions and directives 
of management from which they can establish their objec-
tives. According to the command theory of authority, "de-
cision and direction are exclusively managerial functions, 
so that in the most general terms the worker's duty is to 
<45) 
obey orders". This works fine in theory but getting 
the workers to want to do something and to do it requires 
more than just giving orders. 
The differences of management and labor over the 
question of rationalization of productive methods 
are likely to turn upon matters of sentiment and 
not questions of fact. (46) 
This may be why management has found it easier to outline 
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and demonstrate effective procedures than to get the workers 
to accept them. If members of management won't abide by the 
procedures, then why should the workers? The obvious result 
is that they will not cooperate either. Lip service without 
concrete action is of little or no value to the security of 
the country. 
2.1.2. Actions of Management Must Set Example. As you 
have seen, it is incumbent upon management to provide direc-
tion for the personnel under them in the handling of classi-
fied information. But, just what should they do to create a 
positive attitude toward security? The most influencial ac-
tion that management can take is to follow faithfully and 
sensibly the established procedures for handling classified 
information even when the time used to do this may make it 
impossible to meet the intended schedule exactly on time. 
If every member of management did this it would indicate 
sanctioned approval of the program and would provide prec-
edence for the actions of subordinates in similar situations. 
Management can also aid the security program by 
talking in a positive manner about security. This means 
viewing security as a necessary function for the protection 
of government defense secrets, and not as doing the govern-
ment's job for them. If people see the program not as a 
deterrent to their efforts but to the efforts of espionage 
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agents, they may want to help make it succeed. 
So, while it is good for management to give verbal 
support to the security program, this lip service is of no 
help if the actions of these persons do not show that they 
not only talk about good security, they practice it. All 
communication between management and the workers evokes two 
reactions; one is a train of thought, and the other is a 
(47) 
feeling about that thought. Therefore, positive ac-
tion and language together are more likely to create a posi-
tive impression within the workers than is one without the 
other. 
2.2. MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNIC~TION CHANNEL WITH SECU-
RITY OFFICE 
Communication is the lifeline of the security sys-
tern within the organization, and if the program is to be 
effective this communication must be fast and accurate. The 
flow of information must travel in all directions and must 
reach everyone concerned with security. This system of com-
munication must be formalized to insure against a breakdown 
in transmission. This formal structure will depend upon 
the scheme of organization and division of authority within 
the company. 
Since the industrial establishment is, among other 
things, a particular type of social system, it fol-
lo~s that the maintenance of that system depends 
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upon communication among its various members. (48) 
One of the best ways of maintaining con~unication between 
the security office and the workers is through management. 
2.2.1. Management Aid Needed in Pointing Out Trouble 
Spots in Security Program. Once the security program is 
inaugurated it becomes very difficult for the Security Of-
fice to pick out all the flaws in the program. The only 
ones that will be readily picked up are those that cause ex-
cessive discomfort or embarrassment to someone. There will 
be many more areas in the program that irritate various per-
sonnel until they lose their respect for the program. It is 
in these areas that the immediate supervisor can spot the 
trouble and inform the security office so that adjustments 
can be made if possible. Even where the procedure cannot 
be changed the fact that the security office is a-vmre of the 
problem and has tried to help will be of some satisfaction 
to the workers. 
Since security procedures are basically adminis-
trative in the protection of classified information they 
often get in each other's way. The members of management 
can many times pick out areas of security procedures that 
have become administrative bottlenecks. Once the Security 
Administrator has been informed of these trouble spots, it 
is then possible to attempt a solution. Very often these 
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procedures can be eliminated or altered so that the time de-
lay is kept at a minimum. 
2.2.2. Coordination of Activities Which Require Secu-
rity Cognizance. There are two areas of security that re-
quire time prior to actual fulfillment. One is the docu-
mentation and transmission of classified information, and 
the other is personnel visits to other government or defense 
contractor facilities. If these areas are to be run ef-
ficiently and effectively it is necessary for management to 
police their own sections and to inform the security office 
or control station of such material transfers of visits by 
personnel. 
Documentation and control of classified informa-
tion is required by the government and is often time con-
suming. The only way to hurry the process is to have good 
communications with the handling agency and to aid them in 
processing the information. Advance warning is helpful in 
preparing the section so they have adequate help and facili-
ties on hand when the material arrives. 
Visits to other companies must be arranged in ad-
vance by the Security function, a procedure that often takes 
more than a week. This seems to the person making the visit 
to be grossly inefficient unless he is properly oriented and 
educated in security procedures. Management can help to 
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educate their personnel as to the requirements for visits 
and insure that all communications relating to these visits 
are properly handled so that there is no misunderstanding. 
2.2.3. Keeping Workers Informed. A prime function 
of a security program is to keep workers informed as to 
their duties and the reasons behind various procedures of 
security. The security office cannot do this alone. They 
must enlist the aid of management to act as a carrier for 
their communications with workers. An important ingredient 
(49) 
in the program is knowledge of your enemy. This 
applies to both management and the workers, and proper 
education of the workers. 
There are two other reasons for using management 
as a conveyance of security information. One is that 
"promotion in the beauraucratic structure depends to a 
(50) 
marked degree upon the personal judgement of superiors," 
and information coming from their boss denotes direction and 
policy that is acceptable to him. The other reason is that 
management can make the information meaningful within the 
familiar frame of reference of the individuals in his group. 
Briefly stated, the worker is vitally concerned 
with any factors that affect his job, or his industrial well-
being. He does not want to make mistak~s; neither does he 
want to be put in a bad light before his superiors. He would 
rather get his directions from the person to whom he re-
ports directly, as this person's control affects the work-
er's actions toward his job. This supervisor should be 
burdened, vlhen possible, with any administrative decisions 
pertaining to security procedures; therefore, it is his job 
to interpret these procedures for the personnel working for 
him. This seems to be the best way to insure acceptance of 
changes in security procedures as it leaves the supervisor 
in control of his group and allows him to make the decision 
as it were to cooperate with the security program. It also 
gives the workers someone in their immediate area that can 
give them security advice. 
2.2.4. Management Acts as Catalyst Between Workers 
and Security Office. Closely related to keeping the work-
ers informed is the management function of acting as a 
catalyst between the security office and the workers. The 
security office tends to give direction on procedure and 
method, and it is the job of management to water these di-
rectives down, with the aid of the security office, so that 
they conform to the individual needs of various sections 
and departments. On the other hand, management must also 
keep the security office informed about the workers' feel-
ings relative to security so that educational programs may 
be instituted when it is necessary. Since workers interest 
and attitude are the most important elements of the security 
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program, they must be closely watched and checked for nega-
tive tendencies that would jeopardize the protection of 
classified information. It is the duty and responsibility 
of management to see that the security program is effective 
and efficient just as it is their duty to see that sche-
dules are met. 
3. METHODS TO BE USED TO GAIN SUPPORT OF MANAGEMENT 
In order to sell the security program to manage-
ment it will be necessary to create a need within each in-
dividual for the type of protection offered by the program. 
There are many different methods of selling a program to 
management, each having certain applications and certain 
drawbacks. There is no one method that will work all the 
time. The method or combination of methods utilized by a 
particular company will depend upon the structure of the 
organization, the background of the personnel to be ap-
proached, and many other factors affecting the interrela-
tionships of management personnel and the operations of the 
company. The prime criterion for the selection of a method 
for selling the security program to management is "does it 
work?" 
3.1. INDIVIDUAL MEETINGS AND INTERVIEWS 
The most effective method of selling a security 
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program is by meeting face to face with the person to be 
convinced. The Security Administrator should meet 
individually v-ri th as many management personnel as he 
possibly can, to feel them out and to advance the theory 
behind good industrial security. These meetings should 
be two Hay affairs with both persons bringing out points 
that need clarification and to come up Hith an answer 
vJhenever possible. 
The Security Administrator must prepare his facts 
before he meets with any management person. He must show 
his awareness of management's problems, and his Hillingness 
to assist in the removal of any unnecessary obstacles that 
result from the security program. He must have the answers 
to management's questions.and also be able to express his 
own reasons and beliefs clearly and sitinctly, in a manner 
based on fact rather than on fancy. Management personnel 
are not going to back a program which appears to oe 
unnecessary or unwieldy. The Security Administrator must 
convince each individual ~ the threat of Communism, and he 
must relate this threat to the individual. 
It is often Hise to acquaint the individual to 
be interviev-Jed v-li th as many facts about the program as 
possible several days in advance of the meeting. Then ~rhen 
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the persons meet they will both have some facts on which 
to base their discussion. The busy executive who is ap-
proached cold has little or no interest in what is to him 
your problem, unless he has some knor..rledge of the problem 
involved. 
If the Security Administrator has been successful 
and has met with as many individuals as possible, and has 
acquainted them with the problems of inaugurating the secu-
rity program, his job will be simpler when he meets with 
groups of management personnel to discuss security policy 
and the development of the program. These group meetings 
or conferences will almost certainly be required in larger 
companies because of the physical impossibility of meeting 
individually -with each member of management. Therefore, an 
awareness on the part of some member of the group of what 
the program is aimed at doing will be a great asset in get-
ting points of security policy across to the rest of the 
conference members. 
3.2. THE CONFBRENCE METHOD OF SELLING A SECURITY PRO-
GRAM 
Since individual contact with every member of 
management often is not possible or feasible, the next best 
method of selling the security program is the conference or 
group training method. It is said of this type of 
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communication that "the highest aspirations of the in-
dividual seem to be more easily met in group discussion 
(51) 
than by independent action." In this case the feel-
ings of the individual are more likely to shade his judg-
ment than in some other programs advanced by the company. 
This is so because of his preconceived ideas about what 
constitutes security to him. The plum called 'security' 
has always been held out to him as something to be sought 
after, but every time he gets to the next plateau it ap-
pears that he is just as far away from real security as he 
was before. He has never been able to pin down an exact 
definition of security that would apply to him and his 
family. One thing he is aware of, though, is the distaste-
ful type of security engendered by a police state. And 
this feeling colors his reactions to a program of industri-
al security because it is, in many ways a form of police 
state. There are laws that can jeopardize his well-being 
if he should get caught up in them. 
These individual feelings must be dissolved now 
in group discussion and the only way to do this is to allow 
the individual to relate the program and its concepts to 
his own personal frame of reference. This may be done by 
using films, visual aids, case studies and role-playing, 
and directed group discussion. The amount of each to be 
used will depend upon the amount of time available, the 
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amount of money available for security education, and the 
amount of education necessary to convince management of its 
individual obligations toward the protection of government 
classified information. 
3.2.1. Films. There are many films dealing with var-
ious aspects of security that are available to industry, 
free of charge, that depict the dangers of communism, the 
methods used to infiltrate our industrial complex, and the 
methods that can be used to curtail these espionage activi-
ties. It is very effective to use one or more of these 
films to bring the security program of the individual com-
pany into focus during a conference so that the conferees 
can get the feel of security. In this way they can relate 
their own feelings or ideas to the film and so make judg-
ments about them. They can also get an idea of where their 
company stands in its evaluation of industrial security with 
relation to other firms and government agencies. Included 
in this paper is a list of most of the security films ap-
plicable to industry. These movies, mostly l6MM sound 
films, can be better than a lecture and demonstration com-
bined, for, security is primarily an adventure in human re-
lations and its principles can be presented in movies as 
(52) 
~->iell as in lectures. 
-:<- Appendix B 
3.2.2. Visual Aids. The conference method of train-
ing or informing sometimes bogs down in detail. This can 
easily happen when discussing security policy or procedures 
unless there is some way of expediting the proceedings. 
One way of accomplishing this end is through the use of the 
visual media (charts and graphs and slides). The great 
benefit of using visual presentations is that, if they are 
good, they have unity, simplicity, organization, and visi-
bility, thus creating the proper image in the mind of the 
viewer. Another advantage they have is that graphic pre-
(53) 
sentation has the ability to communicate more-faster. 
This type of presentation assures the speaker 
that there will be common ground for discussion and that 
each individual has the same frame of reference. If the 
program can withstand being graphically presented and its 
essentials held up in black and white for discussion, then 
it may well have earned the support of management. It is 
also true that most executives have little time to spend 
in meetings of this type, so that a fast, effective, graph-
ic presentation will probably have a more lasting and posi-
tive effect on management than will a dry, wordy statement 
of principles. 
3.2.3. Case-Studies and Role-Playing. There has been 
a great deal written about the use of case-studies, its 
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advantages and disadvantages, and its uses in industry. 
This paper does not intend to acclaim or discredit this 
method of training, but it does want to illustrate the var-
ious areas of security where it may be used effectively. 
These areas include the mechanical functioning of the pro-
gram, the attitudes that affect the security of classified 
information, and as an indication of what other firms are 
doing in the field of industrial security. 
There are many instances where a case study can 
demonstrate how a particular function should be handled in 
a manner that is more acceptable to the listener than giv-
ing him directions. It is also used to get the individual 
to look at the operation from the overall viewpoint, that 
is, to remove himself from the problem and look at it ob-
jectively. Many of these studies may be worded to fit the 
occasion, and to give the person a better insight into the 
operation. 
Case studies also allow the Security Administra-
tor to show, without hurting anyone feelings, the ways in 
which attitudes can affect the security of the company. 
It allows him to say things about people, obviously ficti-
cious, that he may feel are true of individual members of 
his own management. The best way to handle this type of 
discussion is to present the case and then let the 
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conferees discuss it and bring out its various aspects. 
The less said by the speaker, the better reception his pro-
gram will receive at the hands of management. The speaker 
must be very careful not to make people resentful of his 
program by criticizing individuals involved in running the 
company. This can mean that the whole program will fail 
because of spite or malicious intent on the part of persons 
whose support was lost during these conferences. Although 
they cannot prevent the implementation of the program, they 
can undermine its effectiveness in any number of ways, and 
then rationalize about their right to hinder such an abor-
tive program • 
The use of case studies is very effective in 
showing management the extent that other companies have 
gone into the field of industrial security. Many members 
of management think that they are going overboard in pro-
tecting our classified materials, and that the money being 
spent to run the program is unnecessary and could be better 
utilized in other areas. When these people are shovm that 
other companies are spending great sums of money and time 
in order to maintain adequate security, it allows them to 
justify doing a good security job in their own company. It 
also makes them aware that there really is a need for secu-
rity and that others have realized this need and are doing 
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their share in helping the government in protecting its 
defense information. 
The use of role-playing in industrial security 
has been quite effective because of the obvious emotional 
involvements that accompany the loss or compromise of 
defense information and the ensuing investigation. If there 
is time and inclination during management conferences about 
security, it might be worth while to act out one or more 
skits pertaining to security procedures. But, due to the 
lack of time allotted to most security lectures, this type 
of endeavor is seldom feasible. So, although this medium 
might be quite advantageous and effective, role-playing 
should be remembered only as an alternative method of selling 
security to management, and not as a primary method. 
3.2.4. Directed Group Discussion. Some of the 
security conferences involving members of management will be 
of the directed group discussion type. The leader will 
present a problem and the members will attempt to solve the 
problem. The leader will keep the discussion relavent to 
security policy and will try to steer the conferees toward 
their acceptance of good security practices. The danger of 
this type of meeting is that if the leader cannot steer the 
discussion to acceptance of security policy, he will be 
forced to institute the program over the disagreement of the 
members of management. This will make them antagonistic 
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toward the program, and the program will be relatively 
ineffectual. 
On the other hand, if the conferees are allowed 
to decide on what security measures are to be established, 
within the government regulations, they are more liable to 
uphold the security policy of the company. Uhatever the 
case may be, Hhether films, visual aids, case studies, or 
group discussion is used, or a combination of any or all 
of these, the important thing to be considered is not the 
method but the results caused by that method. The aim is 
protection of classifis~ mate~ial and the means, so far as 
the government is concerned, are only relavent to their 
effectiveness in accomplishing this end legally. The 
company must make this decision as to what method OI' 
approach to use with respect to its internal organization, 
for it is not the function of the security program to sell 
itself to management, it is the function of security to 
insure that the classified information entrusted to the con-
tractor be safeguarded as prescribed by the government. 
3. 3. LITERATURE 
Due to the size and complexity of most industrial 
firms it is impossible to carry all the communications 
concerning the security program by word of mouth. And it is 
not wise to use verbal communications when dealing -vdth 
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security matters because of the complex nature of the animal and 
also because of the legal responsibilities involved. The 
Security Administrator must use formal lines of communica-
tion wherever possible to transmit information to each and 
every individual concerned. How then, can this best be 
accomplished? This is the question that he must ask himself 
as he sets up his organization. 
The Administrator must decide whether he wants 
the information to be ingested and thought about, or is an 
awareness all that is required. The amount and effective-
ness of .verbal communication will determine somewhat the 
amount of supplementary information that is disseminated 
by the security office. It is especially true of management 
that they require everything in writing. The question 
arises as to the most effective medium for reaching both 
management personnel and the workers. 
3.3.1. House Organs. The company paper is an 
excellent place to publish security information as it is 
available to everybody and it is official. This is also 
an excellent place to lay the ground work for inaugurating 
and implementing the security program. It can be used for 
some time prior to D-day to prepare the works and manage-
ment mentally for the institution of security procedures, 
showing reasoning behind the program and the amount of 
top management support for the program. 
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But the use of the company paper as the pfficial 
security organ is not recommended. Security needs to use 
all of the available methods of communication to insure 
that it gets to everyone involved. Besides this fact, 
security regulations must be delivered to management and 
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the workers as a separate entity so that they, the regulations, 
will not be confused with other things. The house organ is 
most effective as a supplemental voice for the security 
program, as are the following methods. 
3.3.2. Administrative Notices and Memoranda. 
This medium is probably the most widely used for the 
dissemination of security information within a company. 
This is the official method by which management makes its 
needs and wants known to the organization, and the way it 
maintains its formal structure and operating efficiency. 
Therefore, security directives coming through administrative 
channels are more likely to receive prompt attention than 
would a story in the company paper. 
However, this type of communication has drawbacks 
as does all written matter. First, the writer cannot 
control the atmosphere in which the communication will be 
read, jeopardizing the value of the information. Secondly, 
to read requires a person to think-to exert more effort (54) 
than when listening. In other words, written 
conwunication is less personalized than is verbal 
communication. The administrative memorandum may require 
compliance; or action attained may be less than what is 
needed even though it covers the letter of the law or 
directive. 
3.3.3. Government Literature. There is a flood 
of material available from the Government Printing Office 
pertaining to industrial security. Most of it revolves 
around the regulations set up the Department of Defense 
or to the lurking Communist waiting for you to leave your 
desk so that he (or she) can steal any classified 
information you may have around. Needless to say, this type 
of propaganda results in many of the workers ridiculing 
the program for being overly concerned with detectives and 
cloak and dagger spies. After all, they have never seen 
a spy and there is no reason to really fear something that 
you have never seen. 
Much of the government literature details the 
legal and moral responsibilities of the individual in 
protecting classified material, but there has been a 
tendency to over-emphasize the penalties for aiding in, or 
allowing the compromise of classified material. The average 
American has no intention of selling his country down the 
river and he feels hurt that anyone would suggest that he 
is not patriotic. 
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Therefore, while this literature is necessary to 
show the workers their legal responsibilities and moral 
obligations, it is often detrimental to their attitude toward 
positive security measures. And yet, due to the cost of 
printing your own literature, a great deal of this free 
material should and will be utilized in selling the security 
program. 
3.3.4. Gimmicks. Many companies devise flyers 
and security gimmicks to get attention for some aspect of 
the security program. These include matches, pens, cigarette 
lighters, balloons, and a host of others. Such items are 
aimed at focusing immediate attention on security and they 
do this the first time they are used. The drawback is 
that the use of these gimmicks becomes just as ineffectual 
as reading laws verbatim to the workers. They become inured 
to this type of surface provocation. I have seen many 
persons pick up one of these gimmicks, study it, replace it, 
and upon being questioned about it, had no idea what had 
been intended by it. 
3.4. QUESTIONAIRES 
The use of questionaires in the development of a 
security program is a natural extension of the principles 
of humanrelations. In order to determine areas of emphasis 
it is necessary to determine the amount and kind of security 
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knowledge possessed by each individual member of management. 
Various types of questionaires can elicit different types 
of information. The true-false questionaire can effectively 
determine the amount of knowledge, and the multiple-choice 
and fill-in questionaires can measure the quality of that 
knowledge. 
3.4.1. True-False Questionaires. Very often the 
Security Administrator discusses security policy with 
management personnel, and he bases his comments on the 
premise that the other parties are cognizant of the basics 
of indistrial security regulations. Just as often this is 
not the case. Most members of management know only that 
security is-required and that all security matters are 
referred to the Security Administrator. 
The true-false questionaire used prior to 
discussion with members of management, and intermittenly 
throughout the development and implementation of the security 
program will serve well to measure the progress made in 
education of personnel. It will point up areas that are 
not being understood or interpreted properly by management 
personnel. Proper use of the questionaire will also aid 
in keeping these persons informed about security. It also 
points out inadequacies to them. 
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It may be feasible to submit reports of learning 
progress from this type of questionaire. Maybe a spirit of 
competition will arise among the groups taking the question-
sire. This type of reaction is good only insofar as it aids 
in the learning process. When it becomes an end in itself, 
it is the learning that suffers. If the questionaire is 
to be used in this manner, for reporting purposes, great 
care must be taken in the application and administration of 
the test. 
The true-false test shows only what amount of rote 
learning has taken place. It is strictly a quantitative 
measurement and should be used only as a guide to show the 
Security Administrator where he needs to place his emphasis. 
If there is some other benefit derived from this operation, 
it is merely incidental. 
3.4.2. Measurement of Management Attitude by 
Questionaires. A rather simple, and fairly accurate measure-
ment of management's attitude toward the security program 
is the multiple-choice questionaire or audit. This is a 
compilation of questions relating the security program 
and the individual is asked to pick out the word or words that 
most closely describe his feeling about that particular 
aspect of the program. This type of questionaire should be 
devised by persons who understand the various meanings and 
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shadings of the words used, and the answers should be 
evaluated by trained personnel also. 
Another method of handling these questions is to 
have a scale drawn beside each question and to have the 
person place a mark on the spot on the scale that denotes 
his degree of feeling for o~ against the question. The 
interpretation of this type is even more difficult than 
true-false but it may be readily compared with other 
attitude scales that the company may have done. 
When such a questionaire is used and something 
is discovered that is affecting the attitudes or feelings 
of management personnel toward the security program, action 
must be initiated immediately to circumvent further damage. 
It may well be that the use of such measures will tend to 
create some interest on the part of the persons taking the 
tests. At any rate, the questionaire can help immeasurably 
in determining what the individuals know about security, 
and how well they are able to apply their knowledge. 
4. POINTS TO BE USED TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF MANAGEMENT 
PERSONNEL 
The problem of preparing ammunition to be used 
to convince management of the need for a good security 
program shall be decided by the climate that exists toward 
security and government regulation of industrial 
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facilities. It will also depend upon the personnel and 
structure of the organization. If the attitude toward 
security is poor then the Security Administrator should 
aim at showing management that security procedures and 
practices, while required by the government, also protect 
the proprietary interests of the company. A good security 
program is an expense, yet when properly evaluated and 
implemented is effective and productive. Productive in 
terms of savings in the commercial application, i. e., 
prevention of thefts, lower fire insurance rates. 
If the attitude toward security is somewhat 
better than negative, other information can be used to 
bolster the individual's opinion of the security program. 
The approach can be to his feelings rather than his factual 
side. It will be possible to talk about security without 
having to defend its virtues and the necessity for it all 
the time. But, whatever the case may be, positive or 
negative attitude, there are several points that can be 
expounded to a greater or lesser degree as the need arises 
and a few of these are presented below. They are not in 
order of importance as their worth is relative to the 
particular situation where they are used. 
4.1. CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
The easiest way to convince management that they 
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do not want to do something is to tell them that they have 
to do it, and that they will be punished if they do not 
comply with certain regulations. Industrial security does 
exactly this. It places the burden of protecting classified 
information on management and even controls the methods 
of inaugurating and administering the program. Yet it is 
important that management be aware of these government 
regulations in order that they may make the right decisions. 
The contractual obligations of the government 
security program should be laid out and interpreted for thee 
benefit of management personnel involved in the formulation 
and development of security policy. But they should be 
advanced in a way that will show the need behind each 
regulation. If these individuals can discover for themselves 
what the government is trying to attain in the field of 
industrial security, they will be more apt to establish 
procedures that fulfill security needs within industry. 
The security personnel should interpret each 
area of government regulations and contractual information 
according to the needs of their particular organization 
before they present their program to management. They 
should take into account the various personal elements 
that affect the control of the company and attempt to 
make the requirements as easy to accept as possible for 
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all concerned. The intention should be to make the security 
· program a joint venture between the government and each 
individual in the company. The management must consider the 
problem of industrial security and the solution to it as 
something that is beneficial to them individually; something 
that is vital to the security of their families and their 
way of life. If this can be done it will erase the stigma 
of a "criminal offense" attached to the handling of classi-
ified information in any but the prescribed manner. It is 
this fear of doing the wrong thing that has prevented many 
persons from doing the right thing, thus enabling espionage 
agents to rob us blind. 
4.2. LONG RUN SAVINGS 
Management's first concern is to make a profit 
for the company. And although the motives of individuals 
in management may differ from this concept, any suggestions 
or information that indicates savings can be effected will 
be welcomed by members of management. One of the first 
questions asked of the proposed security program is how much 
will it cost? If suggestions to reduce security costs can 
be made, acceptance of the program is more likely. Or if 
it can be shown that a proper evaluation of security needs, 
and implementation of the proper procedures according to 
these needs, will reduce the long-term cost of the security 
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program, the company will foster a more open-minded view of 
security. 
In this respect, there are many new methods of 
maintaining physical control of areas. There are electronic 
devices, beams, computers, radios, closed circuit television, 
cameras, and a hundred other inventions that will replace 
or aid the guard force. There are also many administrative 
procedures available commercially for the handling of 
classified information. 
4.3. COMPARISONS OF SECURITY PROGRAM WITH TfffiT OF 
OTHER COMPANIES 
}1any of today 1 s progressive companies are vi tally 
concerned with 1,rhat is being done in other companies. This 
concern can be expanded to include industrial security. 
Management personnel generally, are ready to protect them-
selves legally by instituting the required security 
precautions. Many times they do .just enough to keep the 
government from complaining about their efforts. If these 
people become aware of what other companies have done and 
are doing to protect classified materials they may Hant to 
correct the inadequacies of their own program. 
The knowledge of other companies can be borrowed 
free of charge for security purposes. Most companies are 
more than happy to show off a good security program, 
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especially if they are being hamp·ered by the visiting 
company's security procedures. Some companies even use 
their security systems as conveyances for public relations 
endeavors. While this is not recommendedJ it does help 
to defray the cost of a security program. 
The most important aspect of comparing the efforts 
of others to internal security proposals is that it gives 
management a guide by which they can adjust their own 
thinking to that of other managements with relation to 
industrial security. Armed with this guide they can reduce 
the regulations of the government to fit the experience of 
others, and the needs of this organization, into a feasiblee 
and sensible program. 
4.4. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A favorite point to be made when selling a program 
of security to management or the workers is that security 
is the responsibility of each individual and without their 
help, the program will be ineffectual. While this is true, 
the emphasis placed on it is too direct in its application. 
Telling a person that he has a personal responsibility to 
safeguard classified information does not instill a sense 
of responsibility in the individual. This sense of 
"wanting to protect" this information must be implanted in 
each person, and this is done by constant education in 
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security matters and methods, and constant vigilance by 
security personnel over the whole program and its 
individual elements. 
The government approaches the personal aspects 
of security from the viewpoint that you must do this and 
that, and if you donft there are laws that will punish you. 
This of course, is a negative approach and can be very 
detrimental. This doesn't mean that all government attempts 
in this direction are negative, but very often even their 
best attempts have a negative effect because they 
symbolize an attempt by the authority in power to justify 
something that it has demanded of its citizens. The 
Security Administrator must abolish this type of thinking 
if he is to develop positive attitudes toward security. 
Management should be aware of their responsibility 
to their country, thei~ families, and themselves with respect 
to national security. One good way of creating this 
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awareness is to give them an insight into Communist philosophy 
and the methods the reds are using in American industry to 
deprive us of out way of life. A good illustration of what 
one communist can do in a company may make the dangers of 
Communist espionage more real, more vivid to management 
personnel. It will help them relate their own efforts to 
the problem of espionage and the the attempts of the company 
to control it. 
4.5. EFFICIENT PROGRAM IS MORE ACCEPTABLE TO WORKERS 
If there is one thing that management tries very 
hard to prevent it is worker discontent. The last thirty 
years has created, within management, an awareness of the 
human relations aspects in its dealings with its employees, 
and this awareness is akin to fear in many respects. The 
philosophy behind the various operations that are performed 
in many companies is based on two things; the necessity to 
do the job in a manner most beneficial to the economic 
structure of the company and the need to maintain worker 
morale as high as possible. 
An efficient and logical program of industrial 
security can be held out to management, then, as being more 
acceptable to the workers, thereby aiding in the maintenance 
of worker morale. Efficient security will be more acceptable 
at least, than would a program of security that is obviously 
ineffectual or poorly administered. Depending upon the type 
of relations that the company enjoys with the union, if 
there is one, and the workers, the Security Administrator 
can guage his approach to this aspect of good security to 
cover either healthy or poor relations. 
If the company enjoys good relations with the 
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workers, then an efficient program of security will follow 
logically in the overall operations of the company. 
Management is well aware that the workers, generally speak-
ing respect efficient operation as long as it does not 
conflict Hi th their personal security or "tvelfare. But, if 
the company has had poor relations with the workers, then 
it is doubly important that there be no further antagonism 
than is necessary. The company must be convinced that the 
proposed security program will better serve the interests 
of the organization if it is logically and efficiently run. 
4-. 6. SECURITY IS AS GOOD AS ITS \rJEAKEST LINK 
The truest statement ever made about security 
deals with a fact that seems ever to be eluding management, 
and it is that, 
security must be absolute or its not security. 
One leak, one spy, is all that is needed to 
ruin all the security measures ever taken. (55) 
Education of management personnel to this truth is hindered 
greatly by the sense of well-being that is enjoyed in this 
country. The, members of management, cannot or will not 
bring -~hemselves to believe that any classified information 
that they handle is in danger of being stolen or 
compromised by agents of other countries. It has been the 
experience of these people that the loss of classified 
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material has always turned out to be some administrative 
error or an oversight by someone. What they. do not 
understand is that an espionage agent would attempt to 
leave this exact impression. 
So it is part of the selling job of the Security 
Administrator to bring management's viewpoint toward the 
real dangers that exist into alignment with actuality. 
To do this will require an intensive program of security 
education through movies, case studies, and supplemental 
information about Communism and espionage methods and 
activities. 
4.7. PATRIOTISM 
Although it may be hidden and vague, there is a 
spark of patriotism: in all of us. It appears to be hidden 
or non-existent because most Americans do not feel that 
there is really any physical danger to the United States, 
and they will not become afraid until it is too late. 
When they do realize the danger to the country, the elusive 
incentive known as patriotism will emerge to color our 
actions toward protecting ourselves and the country. 
It is the duty and function of the Security 
Administrator to acquaint the members of management with 
their duty and responsibility to America. They must be 
able to relate this feeling of patriotism to their 
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particular type of work though, if this approach is to 
really be effective. This was done quite successfully 
during World War II vJhere the patriotic value of almost 
all kinds of work was asserted, Hith varying degrees of 
success. One study of this type of phenomena shows that, 
the importance of production for military victory 
is of course most readily apparent in the case 
of plants manufacturing arms and munitions, and 
the evidence seems fairly clear that the extra 
incentive has been real and productive. (56) 
Of course, the manufacture of war goods such as these create 
by themselves a sense of urgency and secrecy in the minds 
of workers. The problem today is to create this sense of 
urgency in areas where the work is of a nature secondary 
to the defense of the country. This becomes even more 
difficult for the individual to comprehend Hhen he spends 
his days Horking on research proJects that deal with outer 
space, an area he has been taught to think of as open to all 
scientists regardless of political or racial affiliation. 
His prime concern may be to serve the world and science, 
not just the ambitions of one country. Or at least,he may 
rationalize his behavior to fit this philosophy. 
~-· 8. NEED FOR PERSONAL SUPPORT OF HANAGEMENT PERSONNEL 
Perhaps one of the strongest points that can be 
made to management is that you need them to put the security 
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program across. Without them the program will surely be 
less than successful, so why not tell them? Make them 
feel that they are responsible for the success of security 
procedures. Let them help in the formulation of security 
policy and in devising systems and procedures for the 
security program. After all, you cannot expect these people 
to support every program that is throvm at them without 
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giving them a chance to study the proposal and make suggestions 
that would make it more efficient or feasible. 
All of these selling points are aimed at the 
acceptance by each individual of his responsibility to the 
security of classified information, and his willingness to 
cooperate actively in the furthering of good industrial 
security. To this end the Security personnel must coordinate 
their efforts of security educations and security policy. 
The use of positively slanted language will be of great 
benefit in this endeavor if the information developed is 
instructive and properly geared to affect the individual's 
sense of personal security. 
Once again it is not hov-r the job is done but the 
effects these methods have upon the safeguarding of 
classified information. Incidental to good security is the 
creation of positive attitudes toward government security 
regulations and laws. A good security program 
will also bolster and reaffirm the sense of purpose of 
the individual American with respect to international 
tensions. 
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SECTION V 
CREATION OF A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
1. ATTITUDES AND THEIR AFFECT ON INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
There has been a great effort by the government 
and by some of our industrial organizations to create within 
the worker an attitude toward industrial security that will 
insure proper protection of classified information. The 
fallacy of their attempts is that they are working on the 
assumption that the worker's predisposed ideas about 
security are positive and loyal, though dormant, and that 
he wants to do the right thing for the defense of the 
country's secrets. These attempts usually include telling 
the worker that he should, and is morally obligated, to usee 
good security procedures, i.e., be loyal to his country, 
while at the same time he must be loyal to the company and 
do his job quickly and efficiently. Very often the 
accomplishment of both these objectives is 'COntradictory 
and the one must be attained at the expense of the other. 
This has frustrating effects on the individuals participat-
ing in the security program, and will probably lead to 
ineffectual handling of matters pertaining to the government 
regulated procedures. 
This vague approach resembles very closely the 
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broad concepts outlined by the government in the Industrial 
Security Manual. It is also similar to the loosely-
connected reasoning by management people relavent to the 
part their particular organization plays in the nation's 
economy. Management personnel, like their employees, are 
primarily concerned with protecting and perpetuating their 
individual interests thus their attitude toward security 
is colored by the fears and desires they have about these 
interests. And the individual attitudes and aims of the 
members of management combine into a company attitude which 
may be different from any of the individual attitudes, and 
which becomes the security policy of the organization. 
This policy is then extended to the employees and 
they are expected to work the procedures and systems properly 
to effect good security. The one thing that is left out by 
this approach to industrial security the the human element. 
The employee's loyalty and motivation are assumed by manage-
ment to be adequate enough to insure acceptance of the 
program. It is also assumed that the employee wants good 
security and that he will act as a sentinel, reporting 
breaches of regulations and attempts at espionage. What 
is not taken into consideration~ the fact that the concept 
of security is relative to the frame of reference of each 
individual and that everybody has a different set of 
criteria that he applies to various types of stimulii. 
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This means that there is no one way of approaching industrial 
security that will insure acceptance by each individual. 
The efforts mentioned above to create a positive 
attitude toward security are all aimed at stopping the 
threat of Communism. True, these programs have been geared 
to convert the attitudes of the individual, but they have 
dealt with the justification of the security program rather 
than the causes of the person's attitudes toward it. The 
threat of espionage and world domination by Communism does 
not have as much effect on an American's predisposition to 
do certain things as do his actual experiences, both past 
and present. Security, if it is to be sold to the industrial 
worker as a positive attitude, must show him the relavency 
of his contribution to national security and convince him 
that good security practices are necessary to his personal 
well-being. He must also be convinced that the attitudes 
of the company and the individual members of management are 
in accord with this philosophy. 
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Therefore, this paper will attempt to define 
attitudes, trace their origins, show their effects on 
industrial security programs, and discover how the individual's 
attitudes affect his personal sense of responsibility toward 
industrial security· and the protection of classified 
information. Then several methods of changing the attitudes 
of workers to insure better security will be discussed. 
1.1. DEFINITION OF ATTITUDE 
Before a proper determination of worker 
attitudes that relate to security can be made it is 
necessary to define what an attitude is. 
Phychologically, an attitude is a kind of mental 
set. It represents a predisposition to form 
certain opinions. (57) 
This is a vague way of saying that, under varying conditions, 
if certain stimulii are applied a person will usually react 
in one way or direction, according to a preconceived behavior 
pattern. But it is not enough to say just this. We must 
know what an attitude does, and this best summed up by the 
statement that, "an attitude regulates and directs the 
(58) 
pattern of experience and behavior." 
Attitudes are very important in the study of 
security programs because without the positive cooperation 
of the workers the program cannot possibly be effective. 
So it is well to know whether the worker's general attitude 
is favorable or unfavorable. This is so because attitudes 
act also as background conditions and the individual tends 
to group them as positive and negative and to relate them 
to groups of people. 
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They are the setting of the point of view 
from which a given pe.rson observes something 
or someone. Usually we classify attitudes 
as favorable or unfavorable and relate them 
to groups of people. There are favorable and 
unfavorable attitudes toward races, political 
parties, social groupings, religious 
denominations, labor unions, and work groups. (59) 
If the person relates the industrial security program or 
regulations to a group he tends to dislike or toward which 
he has a negative bent, the security program must either 
alter his attitude toward the group or must act to change 
his frame of reference to one of his favorable attitudes. 
In order to do this the Security Administrator or training 
department must be aware of the origin of attitudes. 
1.2. ORIGINS OF ATTITUDES 
The interesting point to remember about the 
origins of attitudes is that the factors causing them all 
(60) 
relate to some kind of experience, and they all suggest 
( 61) 
some kind of group membership. Man is basically a social 
animal and it follows that he would derive attitudes from 
the group with which he identified himself. He joins a 
group because he feels that the group will protect him and (62) 
promote his interests. These groups, family, church, 
community, social company, work section, all have opinions 
and attitudes which usually become those of the individual 
member. Although group membership is not the sole factor 
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affecting the formulation of attitudes, it is an 
important one. 
The experience of the individual is also very 
important as a factor in attitude formation. His economic 
position, age, geographical location, education, and many 
other factors, enter into his choices for doing things, or 
his methods of doing them. But his reasons for doing these 
things would probably consist of a set of justifications. 
And to argue about his opinions and attitudes by introducing 
new facts and logic would have little or no effect on his 
attitudes or opinions. The personal experience of the 
individual is more important to him than facts offered by 
another person. 
It is for this same reason that it is wiser 
to analyze the causes of communism rather than 
spend time developing arguments against it in 
attempting to develop healthy attitudes toward 
our form of government. (63) 
The Security Administrator in industry is all too aware of 
the inability to_shake the American people out of their 
lethargy toward Communist tactics and aggressive policies 
by telling them why democracy is a better type of 
government. 
The American worker in industry is complacent, 
well-fed, reasonably secure economically, and he has many 
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set ideas that govern his actions and behavior. It will 
not do ~o tell him that Communism is a threat to his 
personal security in ten years if he doesn't do something 
now because he won't allow himself to really worry about 
it 'just yet-'. What must be done is to get him to examine 
his attitudes objectively and to discover for himself the 
need for good security within industry. This may have to 
be done outside the plant in homes or group functions, or 
it may be done within the working area or training section. 
The one thing that is required of all training of this 
type is constancy. The person must not be allowed to 
forget the tenets of good security until he has altered 
his attitude toward it and is cooperating. Even then a 
program of maintaining constant awareness of the programs 
must be kept up. 
1.3. EFFECTS OF ATTITUDES ON FORMAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
It may be seen from the foregoing discussion that 
attitudes are, at the same time, of individual and group 
origin. That is, they are formed by the individual about 
experiences he had with or through the group. Many of the 
attitudes held by an individual are formed early in his 
life and all his later experiences serve to bolster his 
conviction that his actions are proper, when actually they 
are governed by the original attitude. These deep-seated 
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attitudes are extremely hard to change for several reasons. 
One, they are of long duration and to change them might 
negate the validity of previous actions making the person 
seem stupid or unreliable. Two, the person may be a 
member of a group holding the same attitude and he will not 
want to jeopardize his position in the group by holding 
opinions that are not consistent with those of the group. 
And three, more than likely the individual just doesn't 
want to change his attitude unless he would be more 
uncomfortable holding his present course. 
Generally speaking, management feels that it has 
neither the time nor the money to alter the attitude of 
each individual to insure proper protection of classified 
information. Nor does it have the money to provide physical 
protection for every piece of information separately. 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to entrust the workers with 
the job of maintaining control over this information and 
to do this management· has provided a set of procedures and 
systems to be used in relation to the other functions of 
the organization. With little or no thought to the feelings 
of the individual the program is implemented into actual 
operation. To be sure there is educational training about 
security procedures but this training is premised on the 
fear of penalty for not following government regulations 
and laws. 
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When the security program is put into effect 
without due regard to the attitudes held by individuals 
and groups.within the plant, there is almost certain to 
be many instances of improper and ineffectual handling of 
security procedures. Management can only give the tools 
of security to the workers, it cannot make them use them 
properly. To be sure the workers will follow the security 
procedure to the letter often, but this may be worse than 
not doing the job at all. When a worker does not feel that 
what he is doing is right or necessary he can delay the 
entire operation by just not moving fast enough or by 
misplacing some paper work or by some clerical or technical 
error. 
There are a thousand ways a person can sabotage 
a program of this type is he is predisposed to do it. And 
when a certain function of the security system bothers him, 
he will probably take some action that will negate its 
effectiveness unless his attitude toward this area can be 
altered. Many engineers who are constantly reading 
different books on a subject they are involved with, find 
it extremely annoying not being allowed to trade books with 
each other or to get new books without going through a 
long, involved process of log entries and signed receipts. 
So they make clandestine arrangements among themselves. 
They also find it annoying to have to go through reams of 
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paperwork to make a visit to another cleared facility. To 
them the time wasted while visiting is ridiculous for, after 
all, "they have been cleared and are trustworthy citizens."'' 
Industrial security puts the individual on the 
spot within his group as well as with the company. One of 
the main assumptions of a good security program is that 
everyone will do his job properly and when someone is 
making flagrant violations his co-workers will report him 
to the Security Office. The only time this happens is 
when a member of a group is at odds with the rest of the 
group or with some individual and the reason is not usually 
due to loyalty but to some disagreement between the parties. 
Many times when an employee does attempt to maintain good 
security within his area and follow the established 
procedures faithfully he falls prey to the wrath of his 
fellow workers. He is a 'company man' or an'apple polisher' 
and his actions will be ridiculed and aborted wherever 
possible. 
The group can and does bring great pressure to 
bear against persons utilizing proper security procedures 
if these procedures hinder the operations of the group. 
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Often a secretary is pressured into doing something to short-
cut security procedures by her boss in order to make a 
schedule. This is done even though the secretary may know that 
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material could be compromised because, after all, it is 
move important to her that she keep her boss happy than it 
is to insure protection of something that she feels probably 
will not be compromised anyway. The attitude she has concern-
ing her immediate economic and social well-being takes 
precedence over the long range threat of Communism. Besides, 
other people will take care of Communism - 'thats what we 
have security officers for.' 
This type of group~essure reaches everybody in 
a small company, even the Security Administrator. He usually 
has other duties to perform which demand the cooperation 
of the entire workforce. He has to maintain certain 
standards of performance of his workers, yet he also has 
the duty of administering the security program. This 
double duty leaves him the unenviable position of having to 
hold down cost and time factors while enforcing security 
procedures that will surely add expense and hinder the close 
time elements of a contract. The contradictions of purpose 
that are evidenced in the actions of the Security 
Administrator are very confusing to the workers who tend 
to follow the lead of their boss. When his efforts seem 
erratic they will do less and less or will exhibit some 
other evidence of frustration. 
Another factor that has serious effects on the 
security program is that the worker's definition of security 
differs greatly from his conception of industrial security. 
The desire for security is frequently expressed by the work-
er as, 
••• a conservative tendency; the preservation 
of the status quo, such as continuity of 
employment or keeping well-loved habits and 
routines. Security may mean, in fact, 
simply a guarantee that other ends will be 
satisfied. (64) 
Industrial security practices and procedures appear to the 
worker to be a threat to his security rather than 
protection of it. The worker is torn between satisfying 
the government regulations, the vague moral obligations 
he feels toward his country, or his immediate security in 
his job. Almost invariably the action that most nearly 
satisfies his personal, immediate security is the course 
taken. 
What the worker does and thinks off-the-job also 
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enters into his behavior in the shop. The various associations 
he has socially, and the attitudes formed from these 
(65) 
associations are frequently carried over into his work. 
Therefore, it is not enough to offer platitudes and lofty 
ideals to the individual worker in the hope that he will 
become positively motivated in the performance of security 
activities. There must be assurance that his actions will 
receive the backing of management. 
Whatever the reasons for negative attitudes on 
the part of the workers the solution must be one that will 
be felt by the individual. Several methods of changing . 
attitudes will be discussed briefly to acquaint the reader 
with the fact that there are ways to train individuals 
that are conducive to positive security. 
1.4. CHANGING ATTITUDES 
It has been stated in an editorial that what the 
individual thinks does not count - it is not up to the 
individual to decide whether the government regulations (66) 
should be kept. Technically this is true. The public 
does not know what is absolutely necessary to deter the 
efforts of espionage agents nor are they equipped to make 
such decisions. It is the job of the government to make 
and enforce security policy. But, such thinking does not 
take into account the feelings of the individual worker who 
is faced with the burden of administrative and physical 
security measures. His attitudes regulate the way he deals 
with security as it relates to his job. While he may be 
genuinely apathetic when it comes to national defense and 
international tensions,he will evoke strong feelings of 
resentment or apprehension when he is personally affected 
by its stringent regulations 
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So that the application of the industrial 
security program will be efficient and effective, it is 
necessary to change these fears, resentments, and predis-
posed leanings into positive incentives. One way of doing 
this is through the use of permissive discussion methods. 
Individuals tend to adopt the attitudes of 
their group, and permissive discussions make 
the prevailing attitudes known. (67) 
If the group is brought together for security training and 
education, given the procedure, and the reasoning behind it, 
and then allowed to discuss the problem freely and openly, 
the resultant attitude formed by the group will allow the 
procedure to be more readily accepted by the individual 
members than would a written or oral directive from 
management. If each member is aware that the group 
attitude is favorable toward a system, then his own actions 
will tend to be favorable. 
How are attitudes changed when frustration is 
present? The person who have been frustrated by security 
procedures is potentially dangerous. Dangerous not only 
to the protection of classified information but, a threat 
also to the morale of his fellow-workers. As soon as 
frustration becomes evident procedures designed to release 
(68) 
hostile expression should be brought into play. 
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These include relief created expression of frustration 
(catharsis), counseling the individual on security 
procedures, and role-playing of security problems. If 
the person can bring out his hostile feelings, there may 
be a way of correcting the thing that prompted his frustra-
tion. At least the person can be shown the reasoning behind 
the method or system that bothers him, and reassured that 
there is no danger to him or .his position. 
The individual who can connect pleasant 
experience to the security program is apt to create a 
favorable attitude toward it. So whenever possible security 
should be extended to the workers coached in words or actions 
that evoke pleasantness in the minds of the employees. This 
means employee participation usually, because they must be 
able to relate personally to the formation of positive 
security attitudes. 
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There are other methods of changing attitudes, of 
course, but these few will suffice to demonstrate the ability 
to create positive attitudes toward industrial security 
and the particular program devised by their company. And 
if there is one thing more important than being able to 
change attitudes, it is the ability to discern the need to 
change attitudes and the selection of the proper method to 
effect such a change. In concert with this ability it is 
necessary to know the causes of these frustrations, their 
roots as well as the immediate stimulus. 
2. FRUSTRATIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
PROGRAM 
Frustration and its resultant effects are very 
common to any program of industrial security and they form 
the biggest and most crucial obstacle that must be overcome 
if the system is to be effective. The very nature of 
security and the basic philosophy governing it tend to 
negate or minimize the worker's concept of his fundamental 
freedom. He is not allowed to talk about classified matters, 
he may be refused access to information and areas where 
he has an interest, his movements and the way he handles 
classified materials is closely scrutinized, and his 
bakkground is checked prior to and as a condition of 
employment. And to top off these facts, security measures 
often restrict the way he can carry out his other functions. 
It is little wonder then, that the individual feels frustrat-
ed by the security program, unless he can be convinced of 
the necessity for security and his own importance to the 
particular program and procedures to be instituted by his 
company. 
In all most all companies that work on classified 
contracts there are frustrated individuals that can make 
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the program inefficient or completely ineffectual. The 
legal implications behind security measures give them a 
sense of urgency and indicate the need for absolute 
compliance. When the workers have no precedent for making 
security decisions and they cannot get immediate help for 
making decisions and they cannot get immediate help from 
the security office, they become frustrated. 
The absolute necessity of finding a solution to 
a problem, or the anticipation of punishment if 
the problem is not solved, tends to make 
problems frustrating situations. (69) 
Even after the problem has been solved and the source of 
frustration has been removed, unfavorable attitudes can 
continue. This depends largely upon the degree of 
frustration produced by the situation, which in turn depends 
on many factors: " ••• on the individuals' tolerance, his 
previous history (both immediate and in early life) of 
frustration, his interpretation of the situation and the 
(69) 
pressure under which he is functioning." Since the 
Security Administrator cannot regulate the conditions under 
which security measures will be experienced, he must be 
able to recongnize the various symptoms of frustration that 
arise so he can aid the person in adjusting to these 
conditions. These manifestations of frustration are 
( 70) 
agression, regression, fixation and resignation. 
These variation in behavior have at least three basic 
(71) 
causes. One cause is that each individual reacts 
to security differently, and thus may express his 
frustration in any one of the four types of symptoms. 
Another is that some workers tend to react the same way 
every time they are confronted with frustrating problems. 
The third cause is differences in people's susceptibility 
ro frustrating security problems. It might well be wise 
to mention here that the factors determining the degree of 
frustration will affect the way the individual reacts to 
the problem situation also. 
The remainder of this section shall be utilized 
to show the various ways that frustration manifests itself 
in a program of industrial security, and the methods which 
may be used in dealing with it. The approach will be to 
show the symptoms of frustration and the areas where they 
are most likely to occur, the personnel involved in specific 
instances of this behavior, and the causes of and methods 
for correcting frustration in the security program. 
2.1. AGGRESSION IN THE SECURITY PROGRAM 
Aggressive acts may be either destructive or 
constructive. The course of action taken by the individual 
will depend upon the factors mentioned previously. The 
·point is not what aggressive action is taken but that 
" ••• in its essence aggression is simply the need to do 
something about painful or unpleasant circumstances either 
{72) 
by avoidance or by mastering them." The areas of the 
security program where aggressive tendencies are most likely 
to manifest themselves are those of visitor control, 
documentation, and in physical security measures. 
2.1.1. Visitor Control Procedures. The visitor 
control procedures of the security program require advance 
planning and a good deal of red-tape paper work before a 
person can gain access to the facilities of a company working 
on a classified contract. Therefore, it seems unusually 
cumbersome and awkward to a busy engineer or executive who 
wants to visit a cleared facility, to have to go through 
the process of filling out forms requesting permission to 
visit and giving reasons for wanting to make such a visit. 
And it seems doubly troublesome when he arrives~ the 
facility and has to wait around while all this information 
is checked out. The results of delaying this person, there-
by causing him some embarrassment or discomfort, usually 
evoke some sort of aggressive behavior by the visitor. 
He may feel justified in attacking the procedures that 
restrain him, the individual who refuses him entrance or 
the company itself. This is born out by the fact that, 
when aggression against the frustrating 
agent is prevented the aggression may be 
directed at substitute objects. (73) 
This behavior is known as scape-goating, whereby certain 
individuals or groups are blamed for the delay or discomfort, 
and the fact that the behavior is not justified by the 
need for such action,does not bother the individual as 
justice to him is what he thinks it to be. 
The persons who are hamstrung, or think they are, 
by the visitor control procedures often attempt to avoid 
having to go through the established procedures. They try 
to force the use of emergency action and short-cuts by not 
informing the security personnel until the last minute and 
then saying that they didn't know about the trip until the 
last minute. They usually make the visit appear to be vital 
to the future operation of the contract. As often as these 
trips are prompted by emergencies they are the result of 
frustrated behavior on the part of the parties making the 
visit. 
This aggressiveness is not confined to the visitor 
alone. The personnel handling the administration of visit 
requests and authorizations become just as frustrated by 
the pressures exerted on them by the potential visitors 
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and by the government regulations which prevent them from 
from hurrying as they would like to. To these clerical 
personnel their goal is to process the necessary paperwork 
in time for the engineer or executive to make his visit 
and to this extent their behavior is goal-oriented. But 
when they are frustrated by people or situations their 
action is often aimed at making these people more dependent 
upon them in the hope that they, the clerical security 
personnel, will be able to control the type of pressure 
that is exerted on them. This action often is taken uith 
no regard to good security. 
2.1.2. Aggression Applied to Documentation 
Procedures. The requirement of the government is that all 
classified information will be controlled to degrees varying 
with the sensitivity of the information. The method selected 
by the individual company to assure this protection usually 
revolves around secretarial personnel. This gives the 
secretary another source of power through which she can 
maintain her status and position. The secretary usually 
takes one of two directions in here approach to industrial 
security. One, she may fight against the extra work involved 
and try to make the system a decentralized one that will 
leave her free for her other duties or, two, she may accept 
the full responsibility for the handling of classified 
information in her area. The first reaction results from 
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her fear of anything that will disrupt her little world 
and her natural tendency to protect the interests of the 
individuals working with her. The second approach is one 
that she feels will give her what she feels is the proper 
amount of control over what goes on within her sphere of 
influence. 
The secretary often uses her control over 
security procedures dealing with the control of the actions 
of other personnel. This does not mean that all secretaries 
take out their frustrations on security measures, but it 
is one of the more serious causes of frustration in the 
persons she deals with. The best way of dealing with 
secretaries is to "give to secretaries the deference which 
(73) 
they do not deserve, but which they expect." If this 
is done their attitude toward you and your program will be 
more receptive. It is a well-known fact that the secretary 
has a great deal of influence with her bosses and 
supervisors as do most other clerical workers. This is due 
to their dispersion as a group, in that they stand in much 
closer personal relation with these people than do other 
(74) 
employees. So it behooves the Security Administrator 
to gain the confidence and support of clerical personnel. 
The security personnel in charge of controlling 
the overall control of classified information sometimes 
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lose their perspective with relation to other aspects of 
the company's business operations. Since their function 
is completely one of controlling security, they judge the 
actions of others through this, their primary, frame of 
reference. They view the adherence to each fact of the 
security program as fundamental and absolutely necessary 
to its success. They forget that security is but one small 
part of the overall program of the company, and they exhibit 
forceful and authority-backed instructions showing how to 
perform the delinquent function. This tendency, 
the preoccupation with 'doing each small 
job very, very,well' neglects the 
complexity of social action system. Each 
small job is mmply part of much larger 
ones, and the primary concern of the 
organization must be to get the big jobs 
done. (75) 
Whether this tendency is a symptom of frustration of a true 
desire to maintain security makes no difference, as its 
affect on the workers will be the same--the creation of 
negative attitudes toward the program. 
2.1.3. The Affects of Aggression on Physical 
Security Measures. Many companies hire people for their 
security program on the basis of their past police 
experience. These people very often are motivated by the 
aura of authority that goes with the job of security. 
This is especially true of guard force personnel. The 
price that most managements are willing to spend for the 
services of a guard prohibits the hiring of qualified 
personnel. The average hourly wage for guards in New 
England is around $1.25. When an overhead factor is added 
to this, the price becomes substantial. 
This problem of economics has led to the leasing 
of whole guard forces from protective associations and 
agencies. The company can in this way charge plant 
protection directly to the contract and does not have the 
problem of administering these personnel. The drawback 
to this type of lease-guard arrangement is there is not 
a real control over the type of personnel hired for the 
job. True, they can request that a man be replaced but they 
still have very little control over the replacement. And in 
most cases, management is glad to be rid of the problem. 
So with the physical area being guarded by 
personnel that are mostly retired, and of dubious ability 
and intelligence, many experiences of a frustrating nature 
are sure to arise. If the company require the inspection of 
each briefcase leaving the plant, and the person carrying 
it balks at having it inspected, the guard will do one of 
three things. The proper move is to call his supervisor 
but very often this is impracticable or unthought of. 
Another reaction is to physically restrain the individual 
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and force him to reveal the contents. This, of course, is 
conducive to extremely poor relations and bad publicity 
for the security program in general. The third reaction is 
to let the person go without looking at his material. This 
is the action most often taken and is the way much classified 
information is compromised. All of these reactions result 
from frustrations of one kind or another. 
Frustration may manifest itself in many different 
tendencies of an aggressive nature. This paper would not 
perform any service by attempting to list them all, but 
instead is content to mention the several most prominent 
ones. What is important to the security program is an 
awareness of the problem created by frustrated behavior and 
the ability to remedy these situations. 
2.2. REGRESSION IN THE SECURITY PROGRAM 
Frustration manifests itself in other ways than 
aggression, and one of these ways, is through regression, a 
breakdown of constructive behavior which represents a (76) 
return to childish action. The main symptoms of 
regression in industrial personnel are lack of emotional 
control, responsiveness to rumors, fear, inadequate social 
organization, and blind loy~lties for certain people or 
(77) 
organizations. Most industrial workers do things which 
reflect regressive tendencies, but usually to much lesser 
degree than what the truly frustrated person would do in 
similar circumstances. Where regression is dangerous to 
the security program is when this seriously frustrated 
individual makes major decisions concerning the handling 
of classified information that are colored by these symptoms 
and attitudes. 
2.2.1. Lack of Emotional Control. Some people, 
when confronted with security problems requiring solutions, 
panic because of their seeming inability to cope with the 
situation. They cry, lose their tempers, yell, refuse to 
carry out the job, or react in some other way prompted by 
emotion rather than reason. Many times in the handling of 
classified information there is a tendency on the part of 
people to get mad at the slowness of the process and the 
inconvenience it causes them. This tendency is often caused 
by the security procedures alone, but may be caused by some 
other personal or organizational frustration. It is trigger-
ed by the fact that security is a sociably acceptable area 
to vent their wrath upon; one that is a catch-all not only 
for the workers but for management as well. Besides these 
facts it has been found that if a good emotional display is 
triggered whenever security problems or requirements arise, 
most people will avoid the person so demonstrating when 
dealing with security. 
2.2.2. Responsiveness to Rumors. Personnel who 
are always carrying tales and rumors relating to security 
matters present a serious threat to the effectiveness of 
the program. These people distort the truth until the rest 
of the workers believe them. Then when the true story comes 
out, or the new system is put into effect, the workers 
already have an opinion regarding it--one that often hinders 
progress. Since security is, of necessity, secretive, it 
lends itself readily to rumor-spreading and in many cases 
to the creation of an image in the minds of the workers 
that is negative. 
This is especially true in a program where there 
is poor communications between the security office and the 
people using the program. When the workers are not sure of 
what to do, the frustrated individual may well accept any 
rumor as fact that relates to his dilemma. This not knowing 
what is the right thing to do creates unreasoned fear with-
in the individual, further adding to his responsiveness 
to rumors. 
2.2.3. Unreasoned Fear. When the worker is 
frustrated by certain aspects of the security program or 
by any of the individuals who control it, he often sees 
every movement of security personnel as a move to 'get 
him'. When two people whisper to each other about security 
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or with security people, the frustrated individual feels 
they are trying to do him harm. He feels that every guard 
is his enemy and that the whole security effort is aimed 
at disturbing the work of the company. Furthermore, he 
carries these feelings over into his everyday routines 
and begins to attach similar feelings to personnel working 
with or near him. He is sure that if he makes even an 
administrative error in the handling of classified material 
he will go to prison. So rather than sign his name and 
accepting responsibility for safeguarding this type of 
material, he will sneak it to his area without ever putting 
his name on a receipt. 
This action of not signing for anything becomes 
a fetish with some people. They would rather argue for an 
hour about signing for the doc~ent than do what they know 
is right. Often they will read the item at the other 
person's desk or in the library rather than sign •. The 
refusal of these people and the furor they create whenever 
they are involved with security procedures discourages other 
persons from carrying out their responsibilities to the 
program, thereby creating a laxity of protection that allows 
material to be compromised. 
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2.2.4. Blind Loyalties to Persons or Organizations. 
One of the most important precepts of security is that the 
individual accept his responsibility as a citizen and act 
singularly in respecting his obligations to his country. 
He is expected to help his neighbor to do his duty and to 
report the negligence of his neighbor if he attempts to 
hinder the program in any way. But very often the worker 
is a member of a group toward which he has strong ties, or 
else may follow the lead of one person. While these tend-
encies are normal, when the individual becomes frustrated 
by the security program he sometimes attaches himself 
blindly to the group or to some individual and he will 
follow the directions of the group or person regardless of 
the effect on the program. No matter how flagrantly the 
group or person breaks the rules of security, or how 
improperly security procedures are practiced, he will protect 
them, the group, rather than the classified information 
involved. Although this behavior is extreme, it is well too 
remember that all people are frustrated at one time or 
another by security procedures and their actions indicate 
that the group or individual loyalties become more intense 
during periods of frustration. 
2.3. FIXATION IN THE SECURITY PROGRAM 
One of the most common sights to be seen relative 
to the handling of classified information is the continuance 
of functions that are obsolete or unnecessary. This is 
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called fixation and designates a compulsion to continue an 
(78) 
activity which has no adaptive value. The cause of 
such behavior is frustration born out of a lack of knowledge 
about security procedures and philosophy. The person who 
does not know why he does certain things in a particular 
sequence will continue to do the same things in the same 
way even after he is told he doesn't have to do them. In 
security the individual who is not really sure why he signs 
his name or what happens to the receipt copies after he 
signs will maintain every scrap of information pertaining 
to the transaction even though the entire procedure is 
explained to him. He often cannot be sure of the reasoning 
behind security procedures, while he does know the penalties 
for violating security, so he will continue practices which 
' 
he knows have no particular value or function in the main-
tenance of his security records just in case. This behavior 
creates additional work for the individual and the security 
personnel and adds to the confusion already prevalent in 
the mind of the individual. 
Two important areas where fixated tendencies 
create much hardship on security personnel and make the se-
curity program seem cumbersome and ridiculous are handling 
of classified material and overclassification of material. 
The individual who is not sure what to do with the material 
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will usually overcompensate to the extent that the amount 
of paperwork and physical handling of the material makes 
the persons involved weary, irritated and confused. Once 
these methods and systems are used they become habit and 
the amount of education necessary to change them is often 
prohibitive in terms of money and time. 
The other area is the overclassification of 
material. It has been stated that there are over six 
billion classified documents stored in government vaults 
awaiting disposition: The reason for there being so many 
classified documents around is primarily one of frustration 
and fear of not classifying the material high enough. Most 
individuals in industry are not entirely aware of the reasons 
for classifying material and care only about protecting 
themselves. This ignorance remains widespread even though 
a form has been perfected that breaks down the various 
elements of a classified contract and tells how to classify_ 
each one separately and together (Security Requirements 
Checklist, DD254). The fear each person has of not going 
far enough continues to make people overclassify material 
regardless of the guideposts. They feel it better to be 
safe than sorry. 
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2.4. RESIGNATION AS A FACTOR IN SECURITY 
Resignation, in industry, refers to the 
( 79) 
individual who has lost hope of bettering his conditions. 
This apathy has a depressing effect on other workers and 
their actions will be less positive around the person who 
feels this way. This apathy may be the result of working 
conditions, security regulations,personal involvements, or 
world tensions. But whatever the cause it is extremely hard 
to combat in security because· there seems to be a somewhat 
universal tendency in industry to let the other fellow carry 
the burden of security, and most workers feel less than 
enthusiastic about security programs. So when a truly 
apathetic worker appears, there is an added deterrent to 
positive security attitudes. 
The resigned individual handles security matters 
in a mechanical fashion that merely indicates compliance 
with established regulations. He is not concerned with 
protecting classified information, only with protecting 
himself. His attitude rubs off on people who deal with 
him and they too lose their prespective toward security 
and the need for it. 
Frustration with the security program or caused 
by the elements of security cannot be attributed to this 
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factor alone then, but must be considered as a complex 
development within the individual which has manifested 
itself in a particular way. This conflict may be within 
the individual himself and not with the surrounding 
(80) 
environment. No matter where the frustration 
originates, the Security Administrator and his staff must 
be prepared to prevent or eliminate any manifestations of 
frustrated behavior which affect the company's ability to 
protect classified information. 
2.5. METHODS OF DEALING WITH FRUSTRATION ARISING 
OUT OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
Industrial security is a concept designed and 
instituted by the government to protect classified informa-
tion entrusted to the private contractor. To accomplish 
this end the government developed a set of ground rules 
and minimum requirements and allowed the individual 
contractor to utilize any system which followed these rules. 
Then the government began a program of revisions changes to 
keep the program up to date with current changes in a 
dynamic world.· The reslt has been the addition of hundreds 
of requirements for specific items of security as well as 
changes in general philosophy, so that the effect on 
individuals within industry has been one of frustruation. 
The sheer magnitude of the problem has always left the 
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worker with a feeling of insignificance. To him there is 
always the chance of violating some regulation of security 
regardless of what action he takes, because of the insertion 
of regulations demanding specific action into what is basic-
ally a vague attempt to control the efforts of the 
contractor in security matters. 
The fact that the worker does feel insignificant 
is due, in part, to the global importance attached to 
security, and the urgency apparent in government by its 
attempts to plug up specific holes in the industrial security 
program. Besides technically plugging up areas of weak 
security procedure this flooding of industry with regulations 
without proper education and follow-up has created much 
frustration among industrial workers. The very nature of 
security, dynamic and changing, indicates that the Security 
Administrator cannot hope to prevent this frustration. He 
can only hope to deal with it effectively enough to assure 
the protection of classified information and the proper 
functioning of the security program. A few methods of doing (81) 
this are mentioned below. 
2.5.1. Prevention of Frustration. The most 
desirable method of handling frustration is to prevent it. 
This is especially true in security because of the 
sensitivity of the material involved. If frustrating 
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behavior is allowed to manifest itself the resultant loss 
of classified information to enemy agents could disrupt the 
entire effort of the company or the project. The way to 
prevent this from happening is to adjust the goals and 
methods of the security program so that they are in concert 
with the goals of the individual which are stated below. 
The goals that appear to be dominant in the 
worker's orientation to his job are security, 
pleasant working conditions, and status in a 
competitive society. (82) 
It seems very strange sometimes that while the aims of the 
security program are broadly consistent with the aims of the 
individual, i.e., they both are concerned with his way of 
life, the individual may actually fear the concept of state 
security. If this isoo,how can such an integration be 
accomplished? 
The security program should be geared to show the 
individual that his security and the protection of classified 
information are one and the same; that security procedures 
are part of his job and they will affect his working 
conditions only when it is necessary; and that his status 
can be enhanced by following proper security procedures. 
Many security programs are interested only in protecting 
the company and the individuals working for it. This results 
in a program that is functional on paper but inadequate in 
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actual operation. This type of security neglects the 
worker's definition of the situation. 
The worker must be made to feel that he is an 
integral and important part of the security operation and 
that his contribution will be fruitful and necessary in the 
struggle to maintain our lead over the Communists in as 
many fields as possible. This requires the cooperttion of 
everyone in the program, for laxity by a small group will 
engender an attitude of futility on the part of the many 
who are following the proper methods. And if everyone 
cooperates and does the job as it is suppored to be done, 
it then becomes an integrated part of the individual's 
working conditions and is acceptdd as such. Subsequently, 
it is possible to sell the worker the idea that security 
has a positive value to him and his group, so that his 
status is not hindered by the program and, indeed, may be 
enhanced by a good showing on his part. 
2.5.2. Correction of Situations Causing Frustrated 
Behavior. Once frustrating factors are introduced into the 
security program other methods must be used to deal with 
these factors. It is possible to create favorable attitudes 
by altering certain aspects of the facts that are to be 
interpreted by the individual. If the stimulus that caused 
the frustration is removed the behavior will subside. This 
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does not mean that the frustration is gone, only that it 
is not obviously present at this time. If, for example, an 
individual is refused clearance to work on classified 
information for some time causing him much discomfort and 
embarrassment, but finally receives his clearance, he 
is likely to hold negative attitudes toward the security 
program even though the frustrating barrier has been removed. 
The Security Administrator must be able to JUdge 
the validity of compliants and opinions of employees regard-
ing aspects of the security system before he introduces 
reforms because "when attitudes are unfavorable, employees 
(83) 
can find something to criticize." As has been mentioned 
previously, security is a catchall for the compliants of 
employees and management personnel and often is blamed for 
the sins of other functions and activities of the 
organization. 
2.5.3. Catharsis-Relief by Expression. People 
are often content to state their compliants about situations 
and then return to the area or situation feeling much better. 
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This is called catharsis and indicates relief from frustration 
through mere expression of frustration. Such a tool is 
very helpful to the Security Administrator due to his 
inability to alter many aspects of the program because of 
government regulations. The individual is often aware of 
this fact and once he gets his compliant verbalized and 
out in the open, he is ready to go back to work. Merely 
knowing that he was listened to, or that he has it off 
his chest instead of eating away at his mind removes the 
burden from the individual and places it on the listener. 
This method is perhaps the most widely used way of dealing 
with frustrations arising out of security procedures. Many 
people talk to each other or to their bosses or security 
personnel not in the hope that the situation will change 
but that they will find assurance of the existance of the 
problem and solace from the listener. 
2.5.4. Counseling Individuals on Security Matters. 
Most frustrating situations that arise in security are 
caused by a lack of knowledge or ability on the part of the 
individual. If the person who is frustrated knew the reason-
ing behind the various procedures that bother him, he would 
be less likely to be disturbed by them. It is the job of 
the security personnel to search out these people who are 
unaware of the reasoning behind security procedures and to 
educate them as to why they are doing certain things. 
It is impossible in a large company to thoroughly 
indoctrinate every employee in the policy behind industrial 
security and the specific areas each procedure covers. 
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Indeed, it is not desirable to do this. Such knowledge 
is the forte of the security personnel and they should be 
consulted when there is serious doubt as to what to do 
or why it is being done. The trick is to take the individual 
who is irritated and confused by these procedures and show 
him personally about security. It is possible to counsel 
many individuals who are disturbed by security procedures 
and make them understand that they are not alone in their 
frustration and that everything that can be done is being 
done to alleviate the situation. Or if the problem must be 
lived with, then the counselor can aid the-individual in 
adjusting to it. Many times the disturbing factor turns out 
to be something outside the security area entirely and the 
person can be referred to other areas for help. It should 
be remembered that counseling is primarily not the job of 
security personnel and should be referred to the proper 
section if the problem seems cmplex or if it cannot be 
handled locally. 
2.5.5. Role-Playing of Security Problems. Role-
playing is usually associated with the classroom or with the 
formal training program. This is generally true and it is 
quite effective in showing the exact procedure for handling 
certain types of situations arising fron1 security procedures. 
When documentation systems and the visitor control 
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procedures are being discussed, an actual demonstration is 
invariably superior to a lecture. And the persons involved 
often feel closer to the system after having been a part of 
the demonstration. But there are other times that role-
playing is effective also. 
The security personnel often spot areas of 
confusion and the resultant loss of effective security as 
they make move around the plant. If, at this time, they 
can show the group what they are doing wrong, and create 
some interest in doing it right,they will have done a 
good job. One way of doing this is to get some of the 
persons involved to play various roles and reenact the 
procedure describing the resons behind each part of the 
system. Doing this on the job brings the individuals 
closer to the reality of security than does classroom 
role-playing. It also gives the other persons who have had 
no classroom training in security a better basic feeling for 
the program and its aims. 
2.5.6. Use of Different Approaches to Alter 
Attitudes of Frustration. The security administrator should 
never use a single approach to deal with frustrations of 
personnel. He must use the one method best adapted to the 
individual's needs. To do this requires some skill on the 
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part of security personnel in evaluating the problems of the 
person involved, the stimulii creating the condition, and 
the effect his behavior has on the protection of classified 
information. If he, the Security Administrator, takes time 
to determine these facts before he attempts to alter the 
situation, he may be able to create favorable opinions and 
attitudes toward security as well as to correct improper 
security practices. At any rate, if he uses one method all 
the time we will be doing more harm then good in the long 
run, both to the program and to the individual attitudes 
of the workers. 
As in most things, there is no one best way of 
doing the job. Each individual situation will require 
common sense as well as a set of criteria to be followed 
in disposing of it. Security, regardless of the number of 
stringency of the laws governing it, has got to be 
administered with understanding and common sense. When 
dealing with people it is not enough to establish procedures 
and tell them to do this and that. They must be helped to 
admust to their particular situation. An important thing in 
·dealing with frustration is to remain calm. To become 
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angry with a frustrated person will only add to his confusion 
and his reaction will be more pronounced than before. The 
Security Administrator must not let himself be frustrated 
by the frustrated individual. 
3. FACTORS FACILITATING OR INHIBITING HUMAN BEHAVIOR l~ILE 
DEALING WITH AN INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
The development and implementation of a security 
program by management does not determine the behavior of 
the employees. Nor does it insure the proper protection of 
classified information. The approach used by management 
and several other factors more basic to the person 
individually, determin~the behavior of the individual. 
His behavior depends upon the manner in which he experiences 
the security program and its ramifications and, 
it is the employees' interpretation of 
the stimulus, not management's intention 
which clarifies the behavior of the employees.(84) 
The problem then is to determine what the determinant 
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factors are, and to utilize them in creating positive attitudes 
toward security. 
There are four factors that facilitate or inhibit 
behavior and they are the physical environment of the 
individual, his general organic state, specific chemical 
conditions affecting him, and the incentive and motives 
whcih drive him to do things. 
3.1. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
3.1.1. Geographic Location. The physical 
location of a company or plant affects the employee in that 
if he works in an area where there is a great deal of 
defense work, the tendency is toward tight security. The 
concentration of classified information indicates also a 
concentration of government control. Thus there is a greater 
sense of security consciousness among management and 
employees alike. And where there is a good deal of physical 
exchange or material and personnel visits, the atmosphere 
is usually more favorable for security. One reason for this 
is that the proximity of other companies can cause personal 
embarrassment because of poor security procedures between 
organizations. The closer the companies, the more chance 
to know the individuals working for that company. 
On the other hand, when a plant is located in an 
area that has little or no interest in defense work, such 
as farm areas, the tendency is toward looser security 
controls both physical and administrative. The lack of 
stimulating security violations, or for that matter, of any 
apparent s.ecurity needs will dull the work of security 
personnel. 
3.1.2. Work Area Effects on Security Program. 
If the institution of security procedures seriously affects 
or changes the physical work area of individuals, they will 
probably resent the intrusion. Although the change may be 
better than existing conditions, it represents an invasion 
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of privacy in the eyes of the workers. Therefore, the 
security program should be explained to the workers prior 
to its inauguration to prepare them for the physical changes 
to theiY area. 
The security requirements often cause certain 
areas to be placed out of bounds to employees formerly allow-
ed access to these areas, thus causing dissention and a feel-
ing of being deprived of something. Also, the use of 
restricted areas hinders the movements of employees. They 
cannot understand why they are precluded from moving 
through it. 
But, if the employees can be convinced that security 
will protect their work area, and will not change it too 
much, they will usually accept the intrusion of security. 
The attitudes of workers are often affected by 
their physical position in the plant layout. This is used 
as a status symbol in many companies. Certain physical 
areas are desirable, others are not. The affect this has 
on security is the same as on any other program. If the 
group feel well-disposed toward their area, this will help 
when management tries to sell them a security program. 
The physical area that is wide open creates a 
special problem to the security program as the personnel 
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working in it have a hard time controlling the physical 
flow of material in and out of the department. The Security 
Administrator should make special arrangements for these 
areas to ease their burden of protecting classified 
information. 
3.1.3. Physical Security Measures in Evidence. 
The amount of physical security that can be seen by 
employees and visitors has a great affect on these people. 
The sight of uniformed guards and mechanical security 
devices to prevent theft and compromise as well as fire, 
will do much to create a positive awareness within 
individuals. The fact that there is a deterrent to improper 
security will make persons, who might try to get away with-
out completely carrying out their responsibility to the 
program, think twice about it. And for people who are 
forgetful, the sight of physical security measures is a 
constant reminder of their position. 
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By the same token, the lack of physical control 
evidence will tend to diminish the sense of security 
responsibility of employees. The feeling is that the material 
cannot be very important if the company won't protect it 
with guards. 
3.2. GENERAL ORGANIC STATE 
The physical condition of the individual will 
bear upon his behavior and the way he experiences the 
security program. The person who enjoys good health 
usually has a better outlook on life than has the person 
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whose health is impaired. Besides this, though, is the effect 
caused by immediate and temporary conditions such as 
fatigue, hunger, minor illness, and other discomforting 
conditions. 
3.2.1. Fatigue in the Security Program. Fatigue 
is caused by several things like the physical condition of 
the individual, his mental condition, the amount of work 
placed upon him, the type of resistance he runs into in 
performing his job. if the person is not strong or has been 
sick he will tire easily, whereas the healthy person may be 
in need of more work to keep him happy. And another fatigue 
factor is the way in which the person accepts the stimulus, 
such as a security procedure. His mental attitude toward 
the stimulus can make him feel fatigued if he refuses to 
accept the procedure and is frustrated by its presence. 
Also the amount of work placed upon the individual 
can create physical fatigue. The overworked person will 
probably have a negative attitude toward security program 
which adds more work to his already extended limits. In 
relation to this worker who hurries to finish his 
duties only to find a program that is going to cause him 
further work ~ill try to avoid involvement with security. 
Security procedures should take into consideration 
the fatigue factor of workers and aim at lessening the 
vJorkload when the amount of Hork added by security systems 
increases fatigue and decreases efficiency and morale. 
The more tired the workers become, the less efficient their 
work is, and laxity in security is little better than no 
security at all. 
3.2.3. Hunger in the Security Program. There 
are times in every day with every person when his work is 
secondary to other more primitive demands. One of these 
needs is hunger and until the need is fulfilled the person's 
work will less satisfactory than under normal conditions. 
He often reacts negatively when he is hungry and says and 
does things that we would not ordinarily do. This doesn't 
mean that he goes crazy or does socially unacceptable things, 
only that his actions are the result of his physical needs 
rather than those of security or his other duties. 
Security procedures should be handled, when at 
all possible, at times other than just before lunch or 
rest periods. Or provision should be made to check security 
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work done during these periods after the individual has 
returned. The espionage agent often plans his attack for 
these periods when a person is most susceptible to unorthodox 
procedures advanced under the guise of expediting the work 
through security. 
Security procedures should not be given to workers 
for the first time during or just before lunch or rest 
periods either. The best time to advance these innovations 
is a short time after the start of work in the morning. At 
this time the workers are most fresh and have not gotten 
themselves involved with long or serious problems yet. 
3.2.3. Minor Illness and Other Discomforting 
Conditions. The worker who has a cold or sinus or other 
minor illness is less susceptible to suggestions at this 
time than at any other. He is concerned with only one thing 
himself. At this time his efficiency is at its lowest ebb 
because he cannot concentrate his whole being on the job 
at hand. Part of his thinking process is working to 
protect him from more discomfort than he has already. 
And when the worker is wet or dirty from working 
on other jobs, security is the last thing he thinks of 
when performing his duty. The man who works at precarious 
heights to construct missiles and launchers is interested 
in getting the job done and reaching the ground safely, 
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not about the security of the project. His fear for his 
own safety overrides any other considerations. 
The important point is that the organic state of 
the individual may well control his actions toward security 
measures. The primitive and organic needs of the 
individual cannot be argued against no matter how convincing 
the argument is, for the person can feel his personal 
discomforts and knows only that he has to alleviate them as 
quickly as possible. The security program must allow for 
these conditions and aid the worker in doing his job 
effectively during periods of organic disturbance. One way 
of doing this is to have a relief system whereby personnel 
can be relieved of their security responsibilities when it 
becomes necessary. 
3.3. SPECIFIC CHEMICAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING SECURITY 
The security personnel should be aware of the 
stimulating effects that coffee cigarettes, medicines, and 
various other drugs and medicines have on the individual. 
They should be aware also of ~he importance attached to 
these things by the workers. The security procedures must 
not require any changes in their daily activities which will 
prevent them from having their coffee break or a cigarette 
when they are accustomed to having it. Even more important~ 
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is the effect these stimulants actually has on the person. 
There are many people who will not talk until 
they have had their morning coffee. As soon as they are 
satisfied they become affable and cooperative. Regardless 
of whether the stimulant in the coffee makes them better 
adjusted or whether they have become addicted to a bad 
habit that could be satisfied by other means, it is 
important to note that any suggestions made to these persons 
prior to their coffee break will be disregarded or accepted 
negatively. The best approach is after they are ready to 
1-.rork. 
Cigarettes are as necessary to the smoker as 
alcohol is to the drinker. There is a chemical reaction 
within the individual that comes from smoking and without 
Hhich he is sure he could not survive. So the lack of 
cigarettes can make the individual wholly unconcerned with 
security until his need is fulfilled. Also, many smokers 
get such pleasure out of a cigarette that what they are 
doing is forgotten or improperly handled. This happens 
often in security where the smoker may leave his area to 
have a cigarett, leaving classified material alone to be 
stolen or compromised. 
v.~ile it is not the function of the security 
program to adjust to the individual whims and needs of the 
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workers, it is necessary for security personnel to be 
aware of these needs and the effects they have upon the 
behavior of workers. It would be very difficult to devise 
a program that will please everyone all the time, but if 
people who administer the program know that causes certain 
types of behavior and when they can best get their points 
across, it is possible to make most individuals in the 
program to feel reasonably satisfied that the program is 
for their benefit. 
3.4. INCENTIVES AND I'10TIVES IN ~'HE SECURITY PROGRAM 
The industrial security program can only succeed 
with the proper motivation of the workers. The program 
must provide the motivation l-Thich will bring to expression 
(85) 
an ability the individual already possesses. So he 
will perform the necessary function of security. To do 
this it is necessary to find common goals that exist 
between the security group and individuals, and to remove (86) 
fears and distrust ·that may exist between them. In 
accomplishing this the need present in motivating 
situations is within the individual and not in the security 
program. 
How is the security program affected by the 
motivations of individuals within the company? First, the 
individual every response is to satisfy some need, drive, 
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or desire, so we say he is motivated. And since all human 
activities differ in two respects: kind and degree, 
a change in motivation may shift either 
the kind or degree of behavior, or both. (87) 
In dealing with security the kind and degree of behavior is 
very important, so changes in motivation relative to security 
must be carefully watched. Another element of motivation is 
the security program itself, for once embarked upon it, it (88) 
furnishes its own motivation. So the security program 
becomes, in effect, a method of controlling the kind and 
degree of behavior. If it is successful in this endeavor 
the workers can be properly motivated to handle the 
security of classified information effectively. 
3.4.1. Social Needs. Every person feels the need 
to belong or to be a member of a group. In addition to this 
the individual has a need for status and pride. 
In order to achieve social status and gain 
the respect of others, people will work, 
compete, and deny themselves many of the 
obvious incentives. (89) 
This represents a problem to the Security Administrator for 
security to be truly effective, requires the individual 
175 
action of each person, and this action is often not acceptable 
to the group. The practices of good security require time 
and some effort by everyone concerned and if the group action 
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is distrubed by security, then security Hill not elicit 
favorable response within the group. 
Security procedures may put the individual on the 
spot if he has not done his job properly. vJhen this happens 
the individual is confronted and if the situation is not 
handled properly, he will lose face with his peers. And 
the problem of face-saving is important because it makes 
the incident a matter of principle rather than solution 
(90) 
to the issues involved. The security program must 
provide the individual in his group, keeping in mind the 
absolute necessity for maintaining standards of security. 
Therefore, the group as a unit as well as 
individual members must accept security methods and procedures. 
The program must fulfill the vague desire for peace that 
resides in all of us, thereby giving the program stature from 
1~·hich the individual can gain status and maintain his pride. 
3.4.2. The Achievement Motive as Applied to 
Security. Everyone feels the need to achieve success. The 
variations are due to the many different definitions of what 
constitutes success. To the worker production records, pay, 
and promotion provide the incentives and the 
accomplishment of these goals satisfies the need. He is also 
intersted in pleasant working relations within his group 
a fact that becomes a goal in itself. So his approach to 
industrial security will be determined by whether or not 
he thinks he will achieve his goals by following good 
security. 
The Security Administrator, on the other hand, 
judges success by the amount of relative security and 
physical protection he is able to give the classified 
information within his plant. He wants to achieve ends 
which seem to conflict with those of employees. His 
enthusiasm is often misconstrued by workers as being 
vindictive rather than helpful to their needs. 
There is also a difference in the amount of effort 
applied by individuals to achieve their goals and the 
security personnel must learn to react to differences in 
the way pressures of one sort or another affect these 
individuals. Since the only teeth in the security program 
in many companies are the laws governing espionage and 
sabotage, threats of competition or discipline often are 
used to motivate employees. The fallacy of this technique 
is that what motivates some workers may frustrate others. 
Generally speaking, only people positively motivat-
ed by the security program to achieve certain goals are the 
personnel whose efforts are evaluated according to the type 
of security they maintain. This group includes some 
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secretaries, document control personnel, visitor control 
personnel, and guards. It should be a prime aim of a 
security program to expand this group to include as many 
different individuals as possible. Those people who feel 
that good security is a worthwhile aim will satisfy some 
of their needs by achieving it. 
3.4.3. The Effects of Competition on Security. 
In almost every endeavor competition arises spontaneously, 
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not only for the incentives but also for the mere satisfaction 
(91) 
of winning (ego Need). Individuals in a group tend to 
compete for status and position among themselves quite 
naturally, so competition can be introduced into the security 
program easily once the program is accepted. This 
competitive feature aids in the development of team spirit 
thereby increasing the responsibility of the individual 
member which in turn introduces the element of social 
pressure. 
Caution is advised when creating a competitive 
atmosphere around a security program. The workers may 
become so intent of bettering some record or previous 
achievement that they will lose sight of the actual purpose 
of security. Speed in the handling of classified information, 
while desirable, is secondary to doing the job right. 
Therefore, the use of competitive features in industrial 
security should be limited to suggestion campaigns, 
lessening of security violations, and rivalry against 
Communism. 
3.4.4. Incentive-Positive Versus Negative. 
There are two types of incentives available to the Security 
Administrator to gain effective security. These are positive 
incentive which satisfy needs, and negative incentives 
~-Jhich cause escape patterns. Positive motivation should 
be sought wherever possible although it is very difficult 
because it assumes that the individual knows "not only what 
(92) 
is wanted but how it can be accomplished." This applies 
to security as in most other cases and it is better to train 
workers in correct methods of doing the job rather than 
in incorrect methods. 
But in the event that positive motivation cannot 
be achieved a negative approach is called for. It is better 
to have negative incentives and get the job done, than to 
have no incentives and allow our classified information to 
be compromised. Negative motivation is sometimes used to 
gain desirable ends as men will do a job to avoid 
punishment as well as to obtain rewards. And the protection 
of classified material is the prime concern and function 
of the security system regardless of the measure used to 
get the workers to cooperate with security procedures. 
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3.4.5. Punishment as Motivation in Security 
Program. The use of punishment or the threat of discipline 
is widely used in security. More correctly, the use of 
punishment is basic to maintaining good security as it is 
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the laws governing defense information that deter many would-
be thiefs from stealing this information. And -vJithout 
these laws and methods of punishment the espionage agent 
could get away with the v.rhole country and not be bothered. 
But what effect does the threat of punishment have upon the 
ordinary American worker who feels that he is patriotic 
and above reproach? 
To the average worker the threat of punishment is 
(93) 
a dangerous way to achieve motivation. Although the 
worker will probably comply with the directives of the 
security program he will also have other thoughts about 
the program. He may feel the punishment is unfair and this 
is especially true where the particular practice is widespread 
and he is the only one caught. Or he may associate 
punishment vdth security and create hostile attitudes toward 
the program. Another danger is that punishment highlights 
what not to do, and the threat of punishment creates fear 
and reduces the acceptance of ideas that are constructive. 
The aim of security should be to create good 
attitudes toward security and to stop or prevent certain 
types of behavior. Punishment does just the opposite. It 
creates an avoidance response within the employee. And 
while punishment may be necessary in extreme cases, the 
security personnel should concentrate on creating positive 
attitudes and correcting improper procedures rather than 
attempting to achieve security through threats, fear and 
coercion. Such practices are what America is fighting 
to eliminate. 
3.4.6. Social Pressures and Security. Group 
discussion is far more effective in selling security ideas 
to the workers than is punishment. This is so because 
the total motivation of the group is more than the sum of 
the individual motivations. The individual member is 
allowed to participate in the creation of specific goals 
which are acceptable to the group and, 
group discussion crystallizes the group 
judgment and members feel positively 
motivated not only to constribute, but 
also to help others less able to do 
their share. (94) 
When the individual feels socially motivated to aid in 
carrying out the requirements of the security program he 
becomes the greatest asset security could possibly have 
in its effort to protect the secrets of our nation. 
If the security effort in a company can attain 
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the status of a functional, necessary, and feasible adjunct 
to their other duties, it will be accepted even when there 
is doubt as to what has priority. The problem today is 
that the worker or group cannot decide what is to be given 
greater importance, work schedules or security. The group 
and the security department should use group discussion 
v.rherever possible to iron out such problems. 
4. THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
It is not enough to know about attitudes and 
frustrations prevalent in the industrial society, and the 
way these factors affect the industrial security effort of 
the organization. There must also be a medium through which 
these factors can be utilized or neutralized to make the 
security program efficient and effective. This medium is 
the security education program, an integral part of any 
successful security effort. And the method selected to 
accomplish these ends will depend upon several factors. 
One of these factors is the structure and 
facilities of the company. The training and security 
education of personnel varies with the way the organization 
is set up and operated. This education must coincide with 
the availability of training personnel and with the time 
schedules that govern the operations of the various 
sections. If the company runs more than one shift there 
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is the problem of training mem who work on later shifts. 
And the facilities available for security training will 
affect the nature of the training effort. 'l'hese factors 
will be discussed in more detail in Section VI. 
The most obvious factor in determining the type 
of training that will be done is the cost of the program. 
The economics of the company will color the thinking of 
management when they attempt to determine how much 
security training they Hill have. But, whatever plan is 
used, it must gain for security the workers' respect and 
their cooperation in safeguarding classified information. 
4.1. PURPOSE OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR SECURITY 
Just Hhat does security education accomplish? It 
should develop within each individual a need or desire to 
protect classified information entrusted to him. It should 
also give him the tools to enable him to satisfy this desire, 
and the knowledge of how to apply them most effectively. 
The individual should be aware of the necessity for good 
industrial security and the reasoning behind the mechanical 
functioning of the program. 
The security effort should be intelligent, 
functional and acceptable to the workers. Security education 
must show the workers the purpose of the overall program 
and explain how their individual efforts fit into the 
complete structure. If a person feels that what he is 
doing has a purpose that is acceptable to him and that 
his efforts are helping to accomplish a worthwhile goal 
then particular aspects that annoy or seem unnessary to 
him will be less likely to frustrate him. People who know 
why they must do certain things that they feel are 
unnecessary usually cooperate better than people who are 
forced to do them. 
So the purpose of security education is to clarify 
the basic tenets of the overall security effort and to 
provide the tools and knowhow to carry through on proper 
security procedures. 
4.2. SECURITY INDOCTRINATION OF INCOMING PERSONNEL 
There is much truth in the saying the first 
impressions are lasting ones. This has been evidenced all 
too often by the resentment, fear and confusion that results 
from haphazard security indoctrination of incoming personnel. 
These people usually have no idea of what formal industrial 
security means or the way in which it will affect their 
daily activities. Their first indication of its existence 
is when they are requested to fill out forms detailing their 
activities all the way back to 1937, and many of the 
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questions are ones that the government has told them are 
not conditional to their employment, such as age and race. 
This usually creates doubts and fears in their minds even 
before they report to work. 
Yet, in many compani~s, this indoctrination is 
done by members of the personnel department or by a junior 
member of the security group. The briefing usually takes 
an hour or less during which time the new employee is 
e;iven a security manual and other literature telling Hhat 
he can and cannot do relative to classified information. 
Generally the individual leaves this indoctrination 
thoroughly confused and afraid of security. He cannot have 
hoped to grasp the real meaning behind security procedures 
because he has already set up a defense mechanism to 
protect himself against the dangers of dealing with 
classified information. 
Proper security indoctrination should aim at 
preparing the individual for his future role in security 
matters, and to show him the responsibility that l1e has to 
the company, his country, and to himself in the fight 
against Communism. Another area that can be covered here 
is the dissipation of the fear and uneasiness about what 
is done with the questionaire each person fills out. Many 
people feel that the form will be used against them or 
their families for various reasons. The indoctrinator can 
eliminate these fears very quickly by explaining exactly 
what happens to the completed form, its confidential nature, 
and the reasoning behind it. 
The indoctrination should be used to create the 
favorable atmosphere that is necessary for the effective 
operation of the security program. The technical aspects 
of security should be mentioned only briefly to make the 
individual aware of their presence and to indicate that 
there are factors involving time and effort necessary to 
successful security. This should be primarily a selling 
effort rather than a complete training course. 
4.3. PRINCIPLES OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY TRAINING 
Industrial security training follows the same 
principles as any other type of industrial training. The 
teaching should be meaningful, it should provide self-
(95) 
activity , it should be adapted to individual needs. 
The only variations between different security training 
programs should be in subject matter and methods used to 
achieve good security. The aims of the program always 
remain the same - to protect classified information. 
Security training should be meaningful to the 
individual involved. He should be able to apply what he 
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learns to his own experiences and perceive the relationship. 
The training program should allow the person to practice 
the various steps and procedures so that he can become 
proficient in carrying out his duties. The training 
should also give the trainee a reason for what he does so 
that he can establish clear purposes, and so he can explain 
his actions to others and to himself. He must be taught 
the basic philosophy behind the security effort so he can 
see his position within the structure. And finally, the 
learner must be taught in terms and operations that are 
familiar to him and which are important to this position 
within the company. He must be shown the particular functions 
that he deals with and the way that they are affected by 
security or the lack of security. In short he must be 
oriented to the security program so that he has a frame 
of reference from which he can make decisions and draw 
conclusions. 
Industrial security education should reach all 
levels of personnel Hithin the company, and should train 
(96) 
in skill, knowledge, and attitude. The trainee should 
know how to do the job, why he is required to do it, and 
he must be convinced that it is the right thing to do. 
The emphasis on security education, as on any other, is 
to create the desire and the ability to cooperate with the 
program. 
Security education should provide the trainee 
with the opportunity to react to what he is being taught. 
The trainer must be aware of how the learner is accepting 
what is being taught and make it possible for the learner 
to show how he has integrated the information. Many 
security education programs are premised on the fact that 
if the learner is given the facts and regulations necessary 
to carry out his security responsibility, he will be 
effective. This, of course, is not true. Too many facts 
and regulations only tend to confuse the individual and make 
him less sure of himself. The obvious aim of this type of 
program is to present the entire program to the learner so 
he can get a general impression. But the mere presentation 
of facts and regulations does not do this. It is better to 
present the basic philosophy leading to the development of 
these requirements than it is to clutter up the training 
session with too much data. 
Instead of throwing out factual data the trainer 
should explain the overall operation and show the way each 
element ties in with it. Then he should take up in detail 
the duties of individuals wherever possible to eleminate 
possible confusion. It must be remembered that everybody's 
concept of security is different and that his particular 
interest in security is relative to the way it affects his 
job. It would be nice if the company l1ad the time and 
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money to take each individual and train everyone for 
long periods of time so that they could acquire a complete 
insight and understanding of the security program, but 
this is not feasible nor would it assure us of good 
security. 
The security trainer must utilize the various 
facilities that are available to him, and use them in such 
a fashion that the training is beneficial to the company 
effort as well as to the government effort. Security 
training must aid the company in maintaining worker morale 
and efficiency. To the extent he can do this the company 
will be pleased with security training and its cost in 
money and time. 
4.4. USE OF TRAINING AIDS IN INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
Any methods of training that will make the lesson 
more meaningful to the employee is acceptable to security 
education. The type of training aid used by industry will 
depend upon cost and effectiveness. The various training 
aids mentioned here include films, charts and posters, 
case studies, tests and dramitizations or role-playing. 
4.4.1. Security Films~ There are many films 
available from the government and private sources that deal 
with security (See Appendix B). The films used in security 
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lectures and training should conform to several rules. 
They should not be over-emphatic as this tends to make 
security seem like cops-and-robbers rather than serious 
business. The movie should fit the ability and intelligence 
of the group, and must be relative to jobs represented by 
the group. And the films should bear on the lesson of the 
day. All these rules point out one thing - that the film 
used should relate to the particular group and their 
interests. 
4.4.2. Security Charts and Posters. The 
government has gone to great expense to produce security 
posters. These posters are supposed to sell security to 
the workers and convince them of their responsibilty to 
protect classified information. Such posters utilize 
various themes like patriotiam, the threat of communism, 
our heritage, and are done sometimes in brilliant colors, 
and sometimes in cartoon form. They all carry some message 
about industrial security that has different shades of 
meaning for each individual. 
These posters and charts are effective in training 
only to create interest and to show graphically the effects 
of certain aspects of the security program. They are 
ineffectual in selling security to the uorkers. They do 
provide the trainer with a talking point and allow him to 
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present his facts in a lasting manner. Graphic presentation 
of security information therefore, should be used primarily 
in conjunction with verbal communication to aid in making 
a point. 
4.4.3. Security Case Studies. The learner is 
always interested in what happened to someone else and if 
the case study can be presented in a manner that makes it 
apply to the individual his interest will be aroused. There 
are many interesting case studies pertaining to security 
and tbpir use is most beneficial to security education. They 
can be used to illustrate certain aspects of security or 
to show results and the reactions of the government to 
various types of violations. They give the learner a 
better feel for the program and its importance to national 
safety. Also any case studies pertaining to government 
security agencies have a flavor of intrigue which interests 
the learner and makes him a part of the total picture. 
4.4.4. Security Tests. The use of testing 
\ methods in security education should be expanded. The train-
ee will study harder if he knows that he is to be tested 
on the subject matter of the session. And the test will 
show if there is some point that has not penetrated as 
well as the trainer thought it should have. Testing is an 
indication of the quality of the teaching effort and may be 
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used to develop variations in training methods, It also 
shows the worker where he is not doing Hhat he is supposed 
to do. Finally, testing gives the training session a 
sense of importance and gives the worker an aHareness of 
how the company feels about the area of security. 
4.4.5. Dramitization of Security Situations. 
The presentation of security problems and situations in 
dramitized form has been discussed previously, and at that 
time it was stated that this was a very effective method 
of teaching security attitudes and proper actions. The 
main drawback to this type of teaching is that it requires 
a great deal of preparation and the cost can be prohibitive 
if props are needed for the play. The trainees must not 
be forced to act in these plays though, as this Hill make 
them resent the whole effort for the discomfort it has 
caused them. So role-playing and dramitization should be 
confined to groups that are favorable to this type of 
procedure. 
All of these aids may be used at one time or 
another, or they may be used together. The aid selected 
should fit the particular need of the group at that time, 
and should supplement the rest of the training and make it 
more meaningful. The aid should be neat and shovJ that some 
thought has been put into it. And if the cost of training 
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aids means that the company cannot do a good job in 
preparing them, they should not be used. 
4.5. BEGINNING ACTUAL SECURITY TRAINING 
The implementation of security education should 
be heralded vd th publicity and a selling and promotion 
program. The ·Horkers must be informed as to the aims of 
the training, the requirements that will be rnade upon the 
workers, and the specific effects the training will have 
upon them individually. The training must have the open 
backing of management and the training director must be 
accepted as an authority on security matters. 
After the workers are aware of the program and 
what it is going to do, the sessions may begin. But the 
timing for beginning and carrying out security education 
must be carefully studied to prevent conflicts of interests 
between the worker and the training program. Once this 
has been done the actual training sessions can begin. 
And the director should follow these suggestions for 
(98) 
selling security. 
He should open his classes with a strong opening 
statement that has dramatic overtones. This will help to 
create interst in the subject and also give him command of 
the class. He should be prepared for every eventuality so 
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that he will not be caught short by his pupils. He must 
be prepared to change his class or approach as necessitated 
by mechanical malfunctioning of equipment to prevent loss 
of interest. He should make the first session friendly but 
businesslike. The student should know that he is there to 
learn, not to waste time and the teacher must make the learn-
ing process active so that the individual student can 
maintain his own interest in class materials. 
Finally, the training director should remember 
that there is no one place to begin training and that every 
opportunity that presents itself must be acted upon. If the 
teacher waits for the right time to teach certain aspects 
of security, he may find that his procrastination has 
allowed classified fnformation to be compromised. Security 
being of such a dynamic and changing nature, the teacher 
can only hope to get across the basic elements of protecting 
classified material, thereby providing the ground rules and 
attittudes necessary for the worker to handle the specific 
areas of security effectively. 
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SECTION VI 
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
1. STUDY OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The ultimate effectiveness of the industrial 
security program will depend somewhat upon the implementa-
tion of the various systems or procedures related to it. 
The way these procedures are introduced, when they are 
implemented, and the way they fit in with the general 
scheme and philosophy of the company, all have a bearing 
on the amount of worker participation and cooperation that 
can be expected. Great care must be taken in the 
preparation of systems for maintaining security not only 
in the area of mechanical feasibility but also in the 
evaluation of the workers' attitude toward various methods. 
The security program must complement the other 
operations of the organization and should not obstruct the 
functioning of the formal structure of the company. It 
must observe company policy and conform to the corporate 
image as seen by the workers. But it is also required to 
conform to various needs and pressures of the informal 
organization within the company. A judicious and 
thoughtful decision as to how the security program will 
satisfy both the formal and the informal structures of 
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the company and yet accomplish its primary aim of 
safeguarding classified information, is the first 
requirement for a successful security effort. 
1.1. EFFECTS OF FORMAL STRUCTURE ON SECURITY 
The formal structure of the company will 
determine the basic approaches and functions of the security 
department. The whole concept of industrial security must 
be tailored to coincide with the formal aspects of the 
company organization as it is more likely that the 
program of security will be altered than the structure of 
the company. Basically, the formal aspects of an organi-
zation can be broken down into two parts the company 
policy, and the line and staff organization. 
1.1.1. Observance of Company Policy. The 
security program must conform to the general philosophy 
and policies of the company. It should be organized in a 
manner similar to other operations in the plant and have 
the appearance of being backed 100% by management. 
Security will become company policy as well as government 
policy if it is implemented with proper regard for existing 
conditions, policies and attitudes. But if it does not 
have the backing of management as being policy, then the 
program cannot expect to gain full support and cooperation 
of workers. 
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Many times there is confusion as to what should 
take precedence, security or existing policy. In most cases 
it is wise to compromise between complete security and 
company policy. Any concession made by security should, of 
course, remain within the minimum requirements established 
by the government, and if this cannot be done effectively 
the policy must be altered to cover these basic require-
ments. The way an existing policy is changed will bear 
directly upon the acceptance of the new policy by the 
workers and management alike. 
One other thing to consider when dealing with 
company policy is the amount of general policy and daily 
activity that has become unalterable although it is not 
part of the written, formal policy of the company. The 
individuals working in and for the organization invariably 
establish their own set of norms and criteria for acceptance 
or rejection of individuals, methods, policy, and anything 
else that affects their personal or group attitudes. The 
security program cannot just throw itself upon the company 
and the workers, set up a set of criteria to be followed 
that differs from what the workers see the established 
policy to be, and expect to be welcomed with open arms. 
Indeed, such a plan would be less effective than a carefully 
coordinated effort to safeguard classified information, 
even if the workers did their security duties faultlessly. 
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This is so becuase the plan would be almost sure to have 
loopholes administratively and physically by reason of its 
probable lapses of program coordination between groups. 
1.1.2. Effects of Organizational Structure on 
Security. The way in which the formal chain of command 
operates will determine the way the security program will 
set up the various procedures and systems to control the 
flow and dissemination of classified information. If there 
is a long path for communications to travel and many steps 
along the way, the security office should establish the 
necessary personnel to guide classified information through 
the necessary channels steadily and safely. These personnel 
can also expedite all other communications if they have 
the physical capability for handling them. 
The more complex the structure of the company 
management system is, the heavier the workload in document 
control areas will be. In some larger companies there are 
often many hundreds of personnel keyed for copies of every 
classified document regarding various projects. Such 
volume demands more complex control systems and distribution 
procedures as well as better trained and more capable 
personnel. And if the company is highly diversified and 
decentralized this will demand even more complex methods 
for handling classified information effectively. 
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All these factors must be studied carefully to 
determine the best and most effective way to implement 
industrial security in each particular company. And once 
the formal security program has been adopted and accepted 
by top management, the Security Administrator must then 
turn his attention to implementing the program into 
operation with respect to the informal organization. 
1.2. INFORMAL ORGANIZATION AND THE SECURITY PROGRAM 
~~erever there is formal contact between 
individuals, "their relationships become characterized by 
actions and reactions over and above the formal expectations." 
(99) 
Keeping this in mind security personnel can appraise 
the informal structure of the company to find out vJho the 
key groups and key personnel are, where the program is 
likely to run into bottlenecks, and to develop the timing 
necessary for implementing the program. Then a special effort 
can be made to utilize this information to aid management 
in implementing the security program. 
1.2.1. How Key Personnel Affect the Security 
Program. In industry, as in any other endeavor involving 
people, there are a few people in each department or 
company who become leaders in the informal organization 
and whose attitudes are reflected in the actions of 
members of this group or section. Therefore, the attitude 
199 
of these persons is of importance to the security program. 
If the leader of the informal group is positively 
motivated toward security, then the group of workers that 
come under his sphere of influence will tend toward good 
security. But, if this leader feels negatively toward 
security his attitude can neutralize the values of an 
{100) 
expensive program. 
To train key personnel from the informal 
organization extensively in security practices and philoso-
phy will also save time and money that is usually spent 
in trying to teach every individual a little about security. 
By training key personnel and gaining their support 
management can utilize their potential in convincing their 
followers of the need for good security. This information 
coming from a source that the workers respect becomes more 
palatable and acc~ptable. Then when situations arise that 
were not covered in the brief and vague security 
indoctrination given each employee when he was hired, he 
can go to the person who is the 'functional leader' of 
(101) 
the group and get an answer that is derived from fact 
and precedent. This not only makes the program more 
efficient, it also enhances the position of these 'funtional 
leaders' which, in itself, engenders good will for the 
security effort. 
The aid of informal leaders can be enlisted to 
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inaugurate and implement the program also. They can be 
used to tell the workers of its coming and to prepare 
them for the various functions that are to be performed 
by their group. These people are communications channels 
through which the workers get a good deal of their 
information, and if the security office can show them about 
the program the information will filter back to the rest of 
the employees. In any event the informal group leader 
should be properly oriented to industrial security as the 
group attitude is reflected by the actions of the 
individuals, and the group attitude is often a reflection of 
the group leaders' feelings and attitudes. 
1.2.2. Bottlenecks Facing the Security Program. 
A careful study of the informal organization of the company 
will often indicate the areas that will cause the most 
trouble in implementing a security program. There may be 
groups or individuals who hold key positions in the 
informal structure whose efforts will determine the success 
or failure of the program in those areas. Such areas must 
be sought out and eliminated or altered to insure effective-
ness before the program is put into effect if possible. 
But there are other types of bottlenecks confronting any 
new program. 
The Security program, in order to cover all the 
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regulations of the Industrial Security Manual, often renders 
other operations ineffectual because of its stringent measures. 
Or the program may not take into consideration the physical 
or structural aspects of the individual company or department 
which could result in delays or compromise of classified 
information. These delays and compromises help to 
irritate the workers and cause them to lose respect for the 
security effort of the company. The best cure for these 
bottlenecks is foresight enough to prevent them from ever 
happening in the first place. 
1.2.3. Timing Involved in Implementing a Security 
Program. One of the most important aspects of inaugurating 
and implementing a security program is timing. That is, 
the sequence and continuity used to put the program into 
effect, coupled with a working knowledge of the other 
operations and worker attitudes prevalent within the company 
that might effect security in any way. Security, if it is 
to be thought of positively, must not conflict with the 
workers' attitudes. Therefore, when a procedure is put into 
effect, it should be done when the worker is most likely 
to accept it, or least likely to reject it. This means 
sometimes waiting several days or weeks to implement 
certain phases of security practice, but this may be better 
than jeopardizing a whole project at a later date. 
Timing means also the maintenance of security 
after the procedure is placed into operation. The 
implementation of security procedures should follow 
sequentially from beginning to end. There should be no 
procedure implemented that will cause violations because 
a preliminary system has not been inaugurated. Nor 
should there be any conflict between groups or section due 
to a lack of proper phasing in setting security into motion. 
Generally speaking, security should be implemented 
unofficially prior to the reception of classified material, 
and the personnel trained and oriented consistent with 
good security. Then, on a given date, the whole program 
is put into operation throughout the plant or the classified 
areas simultaneously. This places everyone on equal footing 
relative to security. 
After the formal and informal organization of the 
company has been evaluated, the Security Administrator can 
sit down with management and map out the specific types 
of security systems that they are going to use, if 
management has been properly sold on security documentation 
of classified information, and visitor control. Needless 
to say the Security Administrator's approach and how well he 
has prepared his case may well be the deciding factors in 
determining the type of security program that will be 
utilized. 
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2. PREPARATION OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
All of the information and knowledge gained from 
studying the attitudes of workers, from management's 
approach to security, and from the varying physical aspects 
of individual department and companies is compiled and 
used to determine the methods and systems that will be 
implemented to safeguard classified information. These 
variances are the cause of much of the confusion that 
arises between companies and indeed, between departments 
of the same company in handling classified information. 
One of the prime considerations to be acknowledged in the 
devising of security systems is the existence of this 
confusion and what can be done to eliminate it from the 
program. 
There are three areas of security control and 
they are document security; physical security; and 
personnel security. Each of these areas require special 
attention and the application of skills and knowledge that 
goes beyond the interests and abilities of most individuals 
involved in the security effort. And since each of these 
areas is aimed at providing a different type of protection, 
a different set of criteria must be applied to each. The 
two criteria that are applicable to all areas are "does it 
work?", and "does it fulfill all obligations to government 
security regulations?" 
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2.1. DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY SYSTEHS 
2.1.1. Document Security. One of the most 
insidious types of espionage is that of obtaining 
(compromising) from various sources a vast mass of defense 
information, detailed and accurate, relative to the vital 
(102) 
facilities of this country. And yet many of the 
executive personnel in industry refuse to accept their 
responsibility in this regard. The control of documents 
is usually relegated to the library functions within the 
organization where the emphasis is on dissemination rather 
than on protection. \;Ihile the library function should be 
used extensively for the movement and storage and catalog-
ing of classified information, it should not be the 
authority on such information. 
The security office must control and regulate 
access to, dissemination of, and cognizance over classified 
material and information. Not that every piece of material 
must be cleared through the security office before it can 
change hands, or that every movement of it has to be 
coordinated by security. It means simply that a method of 
controlling this material be devised that allows the security 
personnel to verify the existence of, and the physical 
location of every piece of material classified SECRET or TOP 
SECRET at any time. And the only way to insure the 
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effectiveness of such a system is to be in absolute 
control of it at all times. 
This brings us to the question of what type of 
document control system is best suited to the particular 
organization. There are two basic types of control, 
centralized and decentralized. Each of these has advantages 
and disadvantages as is indicated in Table I. 
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TABLE I 
DOCUMENT SECURITY SYSTEMS 
CENTRALIZED 
Advantages: 
1. Standarization of forms and 
procedures 
2. Makes available a complete 
listing of all classified 
information 
3. Control rests with few 
well-trained individuals 
4. Ease of security. checks 
and inventory control 
5. Easy physical control as 
material is centrally 
stored for the most part 
6. Less duplication of effort 
7. Proper dissemination and 
and transmission is assured 
DECENTRALIZED 
Advantages: 
1. Use of system best 
suited to indivi-
dual area 
2. Availability of 
material 
3. More informal 
4. Maintains better 
group secrecy 
5. Initial system is 
less expensive to 
to implement 
6. Allows off-duty 
hours work to 
continue when central 
area is closed 
Disadvantages: 
TABLE I (Cont.) 
Disadvantages: 
1. Physical distance to 
central point may 
hinder individual 
progress 
2. Facilities may be 
bottlenecks when work-
load is heavy 
3. Cost of implementing 
system is high when 
machinery and special 
storage facilities must 
be purchased 
4. One improperly oriented 
person can disrupt the 
whole program 
5. Hinders personal relation-
ships and dealings 
concerning classified 
information 
1. Requires training of 
many persons in 
security procedures 
2. Difficult to control 
many areas physically 
3. Does not facilitate 
complete listing of 
company's classified 
holdings 
4. Requires many storage 
containers in several 
areas 
208 
The thing that finally determines what document 
security system will be utilized is management's attitude 
toward security and their willingness to spend money and 
devote time to protecting the defense information within 
their facility. So any system must be set up with this in 
mind, incorporating features that will appeal to the 
particular memebers of management. And while centralized 
control of classified information is desirable, a good 
system of decentralized control or compromise system using 
features of both types may be better to cope with the 
individual aspects and problems of the company. In many 
instances truly effective and efficient security has been 
developed using less than perfect systems and procedures. 
What happens is that the Security Administrator has 
supplemented the imperfect controls with an energetic and 
effective training and security education program that 
creates the proper attitude and sense of orientation within 
each individual and points up the loop holes in the 
procedures and allows the individual's positive response 
to fill the hole with a personal awareness of what is really 
needed. 
While it is not possible to set up procedures 
that will fit the needs of every company it is possible to 
compare a centralized document system with a decentralized 
system. The centralized control revolves around a master 
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control point (usually the library). Every classified 
item goes through this one central point when entering or 
leaving the plant, or v.rhen being transferred from e;roup 
to group. (See Chart I). All material comes under the direct 
control of this area and it is lent out to individuals on a 
temporary or permanent basis. The main drawback to this 
type of strict control is that persons in different groups, 
who must deal with each other daily and oftener, cannot 
legally transfer classified information between each other 
without first returning it to the central office for 
redistribution. This hinders individual progress and creates 
tensions among groups and individuals, and the usual result 
is that material is transferred without permission and 
sometimes uithout receipts from group to group. 
The decentralized system leads to eventual 
administrative choas and compromise and loss of classified 
info~nation (See Chart II). Without a central office to 
log in and out the various pieces of material that enter 
and leave the facility it is impossible to knov.r exactly 
what is in the house at any time. Therefore, material that 
is lost or compromised may not be discovered until months 
or even years later. In this type of control each area 
acts as an autonomous document control center accountable 
for material entering and leaving the group and has no 
regard for the total picture other than maintaining 
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standards of security performance. And these standards 
cannot be checked or verified except through the 
administrative effort evidenced by paper work entries 
and receipts. 
The individual effort of each group leads to 
confusion and great variance in method. 'rhis confusion 
leads to disregard for the established procedures and the 
group method may be accepted as being established policy. 
Since both centralized and decentralized systems are 
usually not adequate for good security it is necessary to 
compromise and establish a system that i_ncorporates the 
best feature of both Hith the individual aspects of the 
company (See Chart III). Such a system maintains control 
and cognizance over the material, yet provides ease of 
transfer between groups and individuals. These transfers 
are facilitated by a receipt system for internal transfers 
and the use of receipts and courier letters for transmission 
of classified information outside the physical plant. 
Internal transfers can be accomplished by using a 
four-copy carbon receipt which indicates date, name of 
sender, name of receiver, title and number of classified 
material, and the signature of the receiver. The signature 
copy is retained by the sender as proof of wl1ere the material 
went, the second copy is filed at the group control center 
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by date, or number, the third copy is sent to master control 
indicating the transfer, the fourth copy is held by the 
receiver for his records. After an appropriate time the 
master control section initiates new receipts for the 
material to confirm the transfer and bring the master 
records up to date. Hhen new receipts are issued the old 
ones are destroyed or returned. 
External transmission of classified information 
is accomplished by a four-part receipt and courier letters. 
The courier letter is signed by security personnel authoriz-
ing transmittal and when the material leaves the plant a 
copy of this letter must be presented to the guard and he 
returns it to the security office. This is held in 
abeyance until the signature copy of the receipt is returned 
to security or master control. The second copy of the 
receipt is held by the receiver, the third is filed by date 
sent, and the fourth may be filed or used as a follow-up copy. 
One other very important aspect of docuraent 
security is the numbering system used. It should indicate 
the type of material, the classification, the originating 
section, the year of origin, and the copy number 1.-vhen 
applicable. There are hundreds of numbering systems in use 
today for all types of endeavors and the main consideration 
in picking one is its adaptability to future expectations 
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and growth. As the company grows and its defense work 
incrases, it becomes necessary to implement more complex 
systems that can be altered to fit machine systems of 
accounting and inventory, so foresight in this area will 
facilitate the changeover later. 
2.1.2. Physical Security. The proper selection 
of security personnel is more important than the system 
put into operation to protect classified information. 
Inadequately trained or oriented men will not perform 
their duties as effectively as will men who are devoted to 
the company or their particular type of work. But, if there 
are not adequate physical barriers and methods of protection, 
the best personnel in the world cannot do the job 
effectively. What is needed is an intelligent, well-train-
ed security force, and the necessary physical safeguards 
and equipment to perform efficiently and effectively. 
The visitor control function is a prime concern 
to the guard force as well as to administrative security 
personnel. The necessity of checking each visitor to 
classified facilities as to his clearance status and his 
'need to know' requires time and effort, usually a job 
given to the guard force. To make his job easier and more 
reliable it is a good idea to issue visitor badges which 
indicate the status of the visitor, whether he is in the 
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right area and if he requires an escort. If there are to 
be many .isitors and they will be hard to control, then 
provision should be made to detain them at strategic 
points, i.e., the waiting room or reception area, until 
escort or guard personnel are available to help them. The 
extra expense for more guards to aid these people may well 
save the company a great deal of embarrassment and loss 
of time, and should be considered when this situation arises. 
The visitor control area should be larbe enough to 
handle the expected work load without making serious admini-
strative mistakes that might hold up a visit for hours or 
days. Provision should be made to channel all visit requests 
to the security office to assure the person that it is in 
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order. Then the security office can process it through the 
proper channels. If there are physical aspects of co~munica­
tion or transportation of visitors they must be settled prior 
to the inception of the program or else classified information 
might be Jeopardized. The concept of visitor control and 
document control security is based, of course, on the personnel 
who work in and with the security program. And to insure that 
the people handling classified information are good security 
risks the security program must include another area of control, 
that of personnel security. 
2.1.3. Personnel Security. Each and every person 
who handles classified information must, prior to access to 
such material, be checked by the government, or the 
company in some instances, to adjudge whether that person 
will protect the material in accordance with government 
regulations and in good conscience. To do this, the 
government requires a background history statement by the 
individual which is processed through various agencies to 
assure its validity. In some instances a background check 
is made of the individuals friends and neighbors to 
determine the risk this person represents to the government 
and to national security. 
The amount of effort the company expends in this 
endeavor, the evaluation of prospective employees, can save 
the government and the company great expense in checking 
their backgrounds. If the company is aware of anything that 
could delay or prevent clearance of a person it is their 
duty to inform the government of these facts, When this 
happens, if the company has a properly established program, 
this person's application will indicate the security problem 
that may arise and he and the employer can determine what 
should be done. All too often there is no action taken 
until the clearance is denied and then his effectiveness to 
the company is greatly reduced. 
Therefore, the security aspects of hiring personnel 
must be closely coordinated with the personnel function if 
they are to be used on classified projects. And this 
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coordination should come before the hiring to insure 
protection of company interests. ·It has been said 
that "employee security is the cornerstone of any sound 
(103) 
security system; without it there is no security. 11 
And yet many business firms and corporations in this country 
do not make pre-employment investigations, and even more do 
not coordinate their personnel functions with security 
personnel. 
2.2. SELECTION OF THE SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM 
2.2.1. Formal Security Training. To this point 
there has been discussion about what to teach but no mention 
of the formal or informal structure of the training program. 
Now we must consider the method that will best suit our 
security training needs. The Security Administrator in 
setting up his program must use all available help and 
facilities. It may be that the company has a formal train-
ing set-up being used for other types of training and can 
accomodate the needs of security. Or there may be funds 
available for security training. But usually, this is not 
the case and other arrangements must be made. 
The use of formal training sessions and other 
training ideas is expensive and often does· not fit in with 
the operations and facilities of the company. In these 
cases some form of informal training may be used or, if 
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funds and time permit, formal training methods and films 
' 
can be used informally during slow periods. The formal 
sessions take place in designated areas which are used for 
training only during the period of the class, and this type 
of training is the best way to bring out various points of 
security, because there is time to supplement lectures 
with other training aids and techniques such as movies, 
demonstrations, and graphic illustrations. If the company 
allows formal security training there are several questionss 
which must be answered. 
The extent of security training must be determined, 
the number of persons who shall attend and where they shall 
come from must be decided upon, timing and length of classes 
must, be arranged and the training director and his staff 
must be chosen. These determinations will depend upon the 
amount of money the company has allotted for training and 
what emphasis the company places upon safeguarding 
classified information. The Security Administrator should 
be aware of what training is needed and his attempts to 
sell management should aim at quality security education 
rather than at quantity training which does not stimulate 
the workers to do what is actually needed, but only to 
protect their own interests. 
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2.2.2. Informal Security Training. Except for a 
few firms that have extensive security training there has 
been little formal security education of employees. Most 
companies use informal methods of telling their employees 
about security. The Security Administrator usually gives 
on-the-job training for secretaries and others who handle 
classified information and must use security procedures. 
And any other security training is covered by correspond-
ence and various communications, posters, charts, movies, 
and demonstrations within the department. Besides these 
efforts the security personnel have the function of 
maintaining liaison between themselves and the workers to 
insure that security procedures are used. This relation-
ship is not adequate. 
Formal training being very expensive and informal 
training being ineffective, the Security Officer must 
combine whatever methods he can get management to agree to 
and, by careful planning,administer security education to 
insure enough general and enough specific training for the 
proper proctection of classified information. 
2.3. EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS 
The main function of any security program is to 
communicate information to the workers to that they can 
better protect the material entrusted to them. To 
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accomplish this security personnel must use either one or 
several of the formal channels of communications set up 
by management or, the informal social channels that derive 
from the personal relationships of the employees. The 
formal method is used to relay information that is official 
and binding usually, while the informal type is used to 
supplement official directives or to prevent rumors or bad 
information from spreading when formal channels are inap-
propriate. 
Whatever system is used for security communication 
it should reach everyone, and the material transmitted 
should have meaning to the person receiving the information 
for, 
the importance of language is not what was meant 
by the person using it, but more importantly, 
what people thought the user meant. (104) 
The particular channel of transmission should attempt to 
relate to the individuals who read it and give them 
personal interest and motivation. 
Words which are full of meaning for one person 
may be devoid of meaning for another. A person 
must carry meaning to a word before he can carry 
meaning from that word. (105) 
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So the choice of words used to communicate security directives 
and information becomes sensitive to interpretation by the 
workers as well as does the information itself. 
The choice of a communication system is only 
part of the job, If the information transmitted is trivial, 
nonsensical or incapable of fulfillment, 
the most painstaking compliance with the 
principles indicated would not achieve the 
general objectives of the organization. (106) 
The material disseminated must be functional, reasonable, 
and must be necessary. To clutter up channels of communica-
tions with trivial matters can disrupt the system, and 
will surely make workers question the validity of future 
communications. 
The security personnel should evaluate available 
means of disseminating information in terms of availability, 
validity and effectiveness in reaching the intended 
parties. Whatever system is used should conform to these 
requirements and be flexible enough to handle any type of 
information with the proper amount of finesse and 
discretion. The successful communication system is a two-
way street so that the employees' attitudes and ideas can 
be transmitted to the security office for evaluation and 
action. This means that the information and methods used 
to communicate them from management to the workers should 
indicate attitudes and feelings also so the worker can 
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determine the philosophy the communication is based upon. 
Security is an attitude and the actions and procedures 
of management and of the security personnel will reflect 
this attitude anyway, and it is necessary to be aware of 
this when preparing a communication and picking the channel 
to be used. 
3. MECHANICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY PROGRAM 
3.1. PHASING SYSTEMS INTO OPERATION 
Management and the Security Administrator must 
decide how the security effort will begin. Should it start 
all over the plant at once, or is it better to stagger it 
and phase the various systems into operation by department? 
Should the whole program begin at the same time or should 
the program be integrated one procedure at a time? The one 
controlling factor is that the whole program must be in 
effect when the first piece of classified information 
arrives. 
The individual company will have individual 
problems with the security effort and the program should 
be implemented to minimize them. If there are not enough 
security personnel available to prevent mass confusion 
when the company-wide system is put into effect all over 
the plant at the same time, then a method that will 
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utilize the number of help available to the best advantage 
should be adopted. And if the implementation of security 
procedures might hinder the present effort of individuals 
in other endeavors unnecessarily, it would be wise to 
phase the security procedures into operation slowly and 
surely. 
Many of the present company operations must be 
altered or abandoned to accomodate good security practices. 
The way this is done may have a great effect on the individ-
uals who must use the new method and if things are changed 
all at once if may create negative feelings toward the 
intruding procedures. On the other hand, the people being 
dealt with may be used to having things done quickly and 
may feel better if the shift is made at once, neatly and 
completely. 
There are as many reasons for taking a certain 
course in security matters as there are individuals 
involved. The Security Administrator must evaluate all this 
information and place values on each method. Then, depend-
ing on the circumstances of the specific instance, he has 
to make a decision as to what to do. His effectiveness in 
putting the systems and procedure into operation will 
determine the immediate response to the security effort. 
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3.2. RETENTION OF FLEXIBILITY WITHIN SECURITY 
PROGRAM 
Security procedures must be flexible enough to 
cover any emergency, whether it be physical theft, 
suspected compromise of classified information, or 
administrative problems that arise due to peculiarities 
in the program. They must work adequately and effectively 
under all conditions and when they cease to operate they 
should allow alteration of present methods and conditions, 
or replacement. Members of the security force must be 
able to replace others who are ill or called away from 
their duties. Each document control area should have an 
alternate custodian to insure continuation of effort. 
The program should be albe to adapt itself to 
the individual situations that arise in daily affairs. 
It is not always possible to follow security procedures 
exactly because of time factors of other hindrances and 
the procedures must allow enough leeway and freedom of 
operation that other arrangements can be made and still 
cover the material physically and administratively. Yet 
it must remain stringent enough to insure proper protection 
of classified information and the use of the established 
procedure except under these conditions. 
The security effort must maintain close liaison 
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with the directives of management and the general trends of 
the company to keep in line with the best interests of the 
orgazization. It has to be capable of carrying out its 
objectives within the framework of management policy, and 
this often takes flexibility on the part of the personnel 
running the security effort as well as with the security 
policy and procedures. In this area the security system 
must maintain its integrity as much as possible while 
permitting progress to be made in other areas. 
Flexibility does not mean looseness in the handl-
ing of security affairs. It means the ability to bend the 
procedure to accomodate emergency situations without 
endangering the continuing effectiveness of the procedure. 
Any changes of this nature or omrnission of certain 
established aspects of security should be cleared through 
the security office prior to execution. And when these 
measures become frequently necessary the security office 
should alter the existing procedure to allow for them. 
3.3. FOLLOW-UP AND CLOSE VIGILANCE OVER SECURITY 
PROCEDURES 
No program is completely effective and Hithout 
flaws and this includes security. Whenever people are 
involved there are bound to be discrepancies and lapses of 
efficiency. It is the job of the security personnel to 
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check up on security conditions within the plant and to 
educate when necessary in the proper handling of classified 
information. There will be times when individual attitudes 
will change for the worse and these persons will not perform 
the necessary security functions. There will also be 
changes in other operations and methods which might create 
security Heaknesses tvithin the plant or certain areas. All 
of these things and more will arise in the course of 
everyday activity and only constant vigilance and follow-up 
by security personnel can prevent serious lapses of security~ 
Security is ever-changing ~ust as the methods of espionage 
change with specific needs. We nust be prepared to meet the 
threat of Communist es9ionage and to do this we must create 
a system of security that is based on constant vigilance 
and the ability to forsee and solve any problems that may 
arise. Our enemies never sleep-they are committed to total 
war with the United States and our allies. 
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SECTION VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of classifying a defense contract is 
to maintain the relative worth of the project f~as long as 
possible through secrecy. This is known as maintaining lead 
time which is the length of time it would take the Communists 
either to develop a similar type of equipment or to effect 
countermeasures. The government realizes that no security 
system that can be resonably expected of industry can or 
will provide absolute security. But it does feel that a 
great deal of the burden for industrial security of 
classified information should lie with the contractor, and 
that it is his duty to establish and carry out the 
necessary security procedures to the best~ his ability. 
To this end industrial firms have applied themselves and 
their resources with varying amount of success. 
The government approach to industrial security 
has been one of law-making and enforcement. The laws and 
regulations have been put into effect and then the 
government agencies have shown management what they must do 
to conform to them. Now, within the last few years there 
has been a trend toward cultivating industrial security 
personnel and training and educating them as to the 
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objectives behind the government security policy as applied 
to industry. This type of cooperation and sharing of ideas 
has led to more understanding and rapport between industry 
and the government on security matters. 
Another approach used by the government is visual 
media such as posters and charts. There has been a great 
deal of faith placed on these vehicles and it is my feeling 
that their only worth lies in the ability they have to make 
the workers know that someone is interested in security. 
This type of impact co~~unication usually has little effect 
on the worker because of its inability to create specific 
attitudes with the workers. The aim is usually of a general 
nature and the poster leaves a vague impression with the 
vwrker, one that he cannot define. The problem evolves from 
the mistaken idea held by government officials that the 
individual worker in America is an American first and an 
individual second. If each worker has been properly oriented 
as to his security responsibility, and if each had a 
positive attitude tmv-ard the program, then security posters 
would be a definite aid in maintaining attitude and good 
security. But such is not the case; the average American 
worker has little or no regard for international affairs 
until they threaten his personal security. And, after all, 
he has never seen a Communist espionage agent in his company, 
and besides, what he is working on is of too little 
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importance for anone to want to steal it. This is his 
attitude and it will take more than pretty posters to 
change it. 
What is needed for effective industrial security 
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is to create a positive attitude within each individual 
member of the company, management and workers alike, so that 
each one will want to protect his country's secrets againstt 
attempts at espionage and sabotage. This will require 
intelligent, well-trained security personnel who can evaluate 
the needs of individuals and groups and can establish within 
them a need to cooperate and safeguard classified information. 
The Security Administrator should be a college-graduate or 
equivalent capable of dealing with management effectively 
and able to understand the needs of the employees. 
The most necessary requirement of a good security 
program is a management that understands the problems involved 
and the need for security measures. A management that is not 
afraid to assume its responsibility for protecting government 
information even though good security will lower its profitt 
picture. Without this type of people to support the program 
security will become just another figment of someone's 
imagination, an administrative burden on the company. 
There are,in the United States today, many 
companies who have fine security programs which include not 
only excellent physical security measures but, also include 
extensive security education and training. But, for every 
company who·has adequate security there are fifty whose sole 
aim is to cover their security mistakes and keep the govern-
ment from bothering them. It is with these companies that 
we must concentrate out efforts for, it is here that 
espionage agents are concentrating their efforts. If they 
can get all the information they need from these firms then, 
they needn't waste their time or jeopardize their safety by 
stealing from companies or firms Nhich have tight security. 
Security is as good as its weakest link. If you do not 
have total security, you do not have any security at all. 
The only vmy to create the need for maintaining 
good, tight security within these wayward organizations is 
by developing a healthy environment around them. An 
environment that will provide the incentive to build a system 
that will keep the Communist out of reach of our classified 
information, as well as one that covers contractual 
obligations. The government must assume a major role in this 
activity, especially in organizations where security attitudes 
are poor from the top to the bottom. So far the efforts in 
this area have been less than successful. 
One reason for our lethargic attitude is that we 
do know who our real friends are, or whether He really have 
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any. \ve assume that the so-called "'Jest ern PoHers are 
our allies. There must be no doubt as to the individual 
intentions of these countries. Each one of them has its 
own interests at heart and would steal our country's 
defen,se secrets if they thought they would be of value to 
their own defense or offense. So we mus't not consider the 
Communists as our only enemies tvhen protecting classified 
information. Therefore, the healthy environment and 
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positive attitude which must pervade each individual American 
and make us strong enough to resist aggression and oppression 
must come, not from outside sources, but from within ourselves, 
our traditions, our very way of life. If we do not tvake 
up and take the necessary action, then Hr. Khrushchev's 
prediction may very 1.-..rell become a reality and our grand-
children will live under Communism. 
Effective industrial security is possible and 
feasible, but it will require the cooperation and support of 
all of industry. The amount of effective security will 
depend upon the amount of motivation the individual feels to 
protect his heritage and way of life. So far the lethargy 
of the American people has been the legacy they will leave 
to their children. 
APPENDIX A 
DEFINI'riONS 
Access, Accessibility, The ability and 
opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information. 
An individual, in fact, may have access to classified 
information by being in a place where such information 
is kept, if the security measures whicl1 are in force do 
not prevent him from gaining knowledge of the classified 
information. 
Alien, 
the United States. 
Any person not a citizen or national of 
(See Immigrant Alien, below.) 
234 
Authorized Persons. Those persons who (1) have a 
"need to knov;r 11 for the classified information involved, and 
(2) have been-cleared by the Department of Defense or the 
contractor, as appropriate, for the receipt of such 
information. (See "Need to Know, n below) Hesponsibili ty for 
determination whether a person's duties require that he 
possess,or have access to, any classified information, Hhether 
he is authorized to receive it, rests upon the individual 
who has possession, knowledge, or control of the information 
involved, and not the prespective recipient. 
Bound Documents. Permanently bound books or pam-
phlets, the pages of which are permanently and securely 
fastened toe;ether in such a manner thaL one or more pages 
cannot be extracted without defacement or alteration of the 
book or pamphlet. No document shall be considered a 
permanently bound document unless it is sewed or side-stiched 
and has the glued binding which is common to the art of 
bookbinding. (This eliminates docllinents fastened only with 
staples, brads or other commercial paper fasteners.) 
Closed Areas. Areas in which classified information 
is accessible (See Access, AccessibiliLy, above) where such 
classified information cannot be stored during working and 
nonvwrking hours. 
Cognizant Securit! Office. Any command office, 
unit, agency, or person with n a military department, desig-
nated by that military department as being ~esponsijle 
for exercising control over industrial security matters 
at a facility. 
Classified Contract. Any contract that requires 
or will require access to classified information by the con-
tractor or his employees in the performance of the contract. 
(A contract may be a classified contract even though the 
contract document is not classified.) 
Classified Information. Official information 
which requires protection in the interest of national 
defense. 
Compromise. A loss of security due to an un-
authorized-person obtaining knowledge of classified 
information. 
CONFIDENTIAL Information. Defense information 
and material, the unauthorized disclosure of which could be 
prejudicial to the defense interest of the Nation. 
CONFIDENTIAL- nModified Handling Authorized.n 
CONFIDENTIAL information and material, so designated, and 
for which less stringent standards are prescribed with 
respect to transmission and storage and which will be 
adequately protected by such less stringent standards. 
(Clearance requirements are the same as for CONFIDENTIAL.) 
Contractin~ Office. Any officer or civilian 
employee 0~ any mill ary aepartment who, in accordance 
with procedures prescribed by each respective department, 
has been or shall be designated a contracting officer (and 
whose designation has not been terminated or revoked) with 
the authority to enter into and administer contracts and 
make determinations and findings with respect thereto, or 
any part of such authority. 
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Contractor. Any industrial, educational, commercial 
or other entity which has executed a contract or a Depart-
ment of Defense Security Agreement (DD Form 441) with a 
Department of Defense Agency or activity. 
Executive Personnel. Those individuals in 
managerial positions, other than owners, officers, or 
directors, who administer the operations of the facility. 
{This category includes such designations as general manager, 
plant manager, plant superintendent, facility security 
officer, or similar designation.) 
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Facility. A plant, laboratory, office, college, 
university, or commercial structure with associated warehouses, 
storage areas, utilities and components, when related by 
function and location, form an operating entity. (A business 
or educational organization may consist of one or more 
facilities as define above.) For purposes of industrial 
security, the term does not include military installations. 
Facility Security Clearance. (An administrative 
determination that, from a security viewpoint, a facility 
is eligible for access to classified information of a 
certain category (and all lower categories). 
Forei~n Nationals. All persons not citizens of, 
not nationals o , nor immigrant aliens to, the United States. 
(Such persons cannot be granted a security clearance.) 
Foreign Representatives. Citizens or nationals of 
the United States and immigrant aleins who are acting as 
representatives, officials, or employees of a foreign 
government, firm, corporation, or person. 
Graphic Arts. Facilities and individuals engaged 
in performing any consultation, service, or the production 
of any component or end product which contributes to, or 
results, in, the reproduction of classified information. 
Regardless of trade names of specialized processes, it 
includes writing illustrating, advertising, services, copy 
preparation, all methods of printing, finishing services, 
duplicating, photo-copying, and film processing activities. 
Immigrant Alien. Any person lawfully admitted 
into the United States under an immigration visa for 
permanent residence. 
Information. Knowledge which can be communicated, 
either orally, visually, or by means of material. 
Material. Any document, product or substance on, 
or in whic~ information may be recorded or embodied. 
Material shall include everything, regardless of its physical 
character or makeup. Machinery, documents, apparatus, de-
vices, models, photographs, recordings, reproductions, notes, 
sketches, maps, and letters, as well as all other products, 
substances and material, shall fall within the general term 
of material. 
National of the United States. 
(1) A citizen of the United States, or-
(2) A person who, although not a citizen 
of the United States, owes permanent 
allegiance to the United States. 
"Need to Know." The requirement that classified 
information shall be made available only to persons whose 
employment requires access (see access, accessibility, 
above) and knowledge or possession in the interest of 
national defense. 
Negotiator. Any employee, in addition to owners, 
officer, directors, or executive personnel, who require 
access to classified information during the negotiation 
of a contract or the preparation of a bid or quotation 
pertaining to a prime or subcontract. (This category may 
include, but is not limited to, accountants, stenographers, 
clerks, engineers, draftsmen, production personnel, etc.) 
Restricted Area. Areas in which classified 
information is accessible (See Access, Accessibility, above) 
during working hours and such information is stored during 
nonworking hours. 
"RESTRICTED DATA." All information designated 
as being "RESTRICTED DATA" within the meaning of public law 
703, 83rd Congress (Atomic Energy Act of 1954)including 
all documents and other material of such designation which 
bear the following markings in addition to their security 
classification markings: "RESTRICTED DATA - Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954." (Includes that previously marked, "RESTRICTED 
DATA- Atomic Energy Act of 1946.") 
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SECRET Information. Defense Information and material, 
the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious 
damage to the Nation. 
Security. Refere to the safeguarding of informa-
tion classified TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL (including 
CONFIDENTIAL -"Modified Handling Authorized") against un-
lawful or unauthorized dissemination, duplication or 
observation. 
Security Cognizance. The responsibility for 
the implementation of the Department of Defense industrial 
security program for an individual facility which the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, and 
Reserve) has assigned to one military department for that 
purpose. 
TOP SECRET Information. Defense information 
and material, the defense aspect of which is paramount, 
and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in 
exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. 
Unauthorized Person. Any person not authorized 
to have access to specific classified information in 
accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Security 
Manual. 
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APPENDIX B 
FILM BIBLIOGRAPHY FOH SECURITY BRIEFINGS 
Films Available through the Cognizant Agencies 
1. COMMUNISM 
AFIF - 5 "Communism" - RT 32 min. - 1950. Traces the 
history of world-wide Communism. "ii'ii th Moscow as the hub, 
the picture outlines the spread of Communism by means of 
front organizations, propaganda, etc., and points out that 
the Communists' efforts fail in the face of the sharp 
awareness and vigilance shown by members of the Armed Forces. 
AFIF - 21 "Face to Face Hith Communism"- RT 26 min. - 1951. 
In town on furlough, Sgt. Jim ConHay of the u.s. Air Force 
learns that the Communists have taken over. He sees the 
Chief of Police removed from office by force. Enraged by 
such high-handed tactics, he goes m the aid of a patriotic 
citizen who cries out against the RED masters and is 
arrested. Brought before a "People's Court", he is 
sentenced to death for treason. Later, Sgt. Comr1ay learns 
to his relief that America is still free and the entire 
nightmare of the Communist seizure.of the town has been 
staged by the citzenry to show what could happen. Examin-
ing the motives for his spontaneous act of rebellion, he 
realizes that his background of knowledge based largely 
Upon the information program of the AillvlliD FORCES,has 
determined his positive attitude Loward the democratic Hay 
of life and his hatred of dictatorship. 
AFIF - 37 "Korea and Communism In the Pacific" - RT 30 min. -
1953. Stimulating and provocative questions are asked by a 
group of keen-minded young people Hhose awareness of world 
problems is both surprising and encouraging. ilnsHering 
questions is l1r. James A. Michener, author of "Tales of the 
South Pacific." Topics discussed are: "How can He Counter-
act Communist Propaganda in the Pacific?" The danger of 
Losing Asia to the Communist," Use of the Atomic Bomb in 
Korea,""Use of Chinese Troops in Korea," and "Have the peace 
Talks been a Failure?" 
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AFIF - 46 "The Hoaxters" - RT 45 min. - 1953. This film 
reviews the various phases of Communism in Russia from the 
time of the Lenin revolution. It is especially fine for 
its authentic shots of the periods of climax and personal-
ities such as Stalin, Hitler, Goering, Roosevelt, Churchill. 
It shows the change in Russia's foreign policy throughout 
the decades, with American favor rising and falling with 
events in Europe. The photography is brilliant and the 
film succeeds very well in its premise that the Communists 
stopped at nothing to try to win over the world's peoples 
to their gigantic hoax of saving them from the strangle-
hold of Capitalism. How millions. fell under this hypnotic 
philosophy is the most frightening part of the film •. 
AFIF - 50 "Armed Forces Forum -- Geor e Kennan Discusses 
Communism" - RT min. - 1 Presents former U. S. 
Ambassador to Russia, Mr. George Kennan. Mr. Kennan discuss-
es the topic of International Communism -- how great a 
threat it is today. Members of the audience, consisting 
of enlisted men and women of three branches of service, 
pose various questions to Mr. Kennan. Their queries 
include: Do the Communists have a master plan to dominate 
the world, what effect does Stalin's death have on Russia's 
stability: will Malenkov evince a greater friendliness to 
the Western World; what appeal does Communism have for 
the peoples of Asia and Europe; what can the u.s. do to 
forestall the spread of Communism; should courses on 
Communism be taught in our schools; how strong is the unity 
between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets; would 
recognition of China in the U.S. be desirable; is war 
between two great economies inevitable, and it is not the 
instrument to resolve the world problem. Mr. Kennan sub-
scribes to mutual understanding and trust between nations 
as the only real solution to the problem. 
AFIF- 76 "The Communists' Blueprint for Conquest" - RT 32 
min. - 1956. The purpose of the film is to give personnel 
a clear understanding of the danger of Communism and the 
insidious methods its leaders have used to conquer unwary 
countries. Understanding their methods is the first step 
in preventing further communists successes. Produced by 
the Department of Defense, the film shows in detail how 
the Communists have acquired satellites. The narrator, 
Mr. Boris Klosson, uses charts to illustrate the systematic 
way the Communists gain control of the various branches 
of the Government and influential private groups in a nation 
With the help of animated cartoons, the narrator explains 
that the communist idea is to secure a monoply over all 
sources of power. What cannot be controlled must be either 
undermined or destroyed. The Communist Party is a 
paramilitary organization. In its seizure of power it has 
followed the classic military principles, including economy 
of force, surprise, simplicity and coordination. 
OC - 1 "Officers Conference - Kennan Discusses Soviet 
Objectives"- RT 50 min. - 1955. This is a pictorial record 
of the Officers' Conference held at the National War 
College of Washington in which former U. S. Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union, Mr. George F. Kennan discusses the tactical 
and strategic objectives of the Soviet Union. The Conference 
is conducted as a question-answer forum with an audience 
of officers and civilians from the Military Services and 
Foreign Service of the State Department engaged in the study 
of world problems at the College. In closing, Mr. Kennan 
sums up his views, recommending strength and unity within 
the U. s. and a policy of containment toward the Soviet 
Union. 
SEP - 317 "Make Mine Freedom" - RT 10 min. 1954. Color. 
This is an animated short subject on the totalitarian threat 
to the rights and freedom which have made America VJhat 
it is. A mountebank, surrounded by a group of Americans, 
it is peddling a patent medicine called "ISM" 1-.rhich is guar-
anteed to cure all their worries and problems. The anxious 
crowd, clamoring for a chance to sign the charaltan's 
contract to get a free bottle of "ISM" are stopped by a 
quiet observer, Mr. John Q. Public, who asks that they taste 
the pancea before signing the document Hhich promises their 
complete care by the state in exchange for their rights 
and freedoms. A taste of "ISM" takes them through a 
sequence of experiences under tot ali tar ian rule I'Jhich gives 
them a new appreciation of their American rights and freedoms. 
Led by John Q,. Public, the enlightened and irate crowd runs 
the mountebank out of town and back to his psuedo-Utopia. 
2. SECURITY REQUIRENENTS (Violations of) 
AFIF - ~1 "About Rumors" - HT 15 min. In color. 1953 
This film def1nes a rumor. It illustrates ho-v; a rumor 
starts and ho1-..r it spreads. 11'/hether a rumor is started in 
fun or deliberately to do harm it spreads for various reasons: 
(1) to enliven conversation: (2) to inspire fear, hate, 
bitterness or false hopes: (3) to ridicule our leaders. 
Since no one is completely Fumor-proof, individuals should 
be skeptical about all rumors. They should not repeat them 
or act on such hearsay. A good morale builder. 
SEP - 356 "Man Behind the Badge." -RT 24 min. - 195L!. This 
film is about a sabotage attempt at a Strategic Air Command 
Base. Saboteurs poot destruction of a SAC mission upon 
learning from an Air Policement at a bar that C-99 
tankers are a~riving at the Base. This can mean only 
one thing -- that B47's are coing out on a mission. 
vii thout tankers, B-L~ 7' s cannot fly lone distances. The 
saboteur's plan is to immoblize the tankers by putting time 
bombs in them thereby Hrecking the whole mission. After a 
meeting in a bar with the woman saboteur, the AP becomes 
wary and reports his supicions to the Provost Harshall. 
Sabotage alert control is put into operation and the 
saboteurs are caught by the Alert AP and an effective 
security system. 
TF 1-L,-601 "Safeguarding Hili tary Information" - RT 16 min. 
1943. Designed for botll military and civilian personnel 
film stresses the absolute necessity of keeping eyes open 
and mouth shut. 
TF 1 1 685 "Securit Control, You Never Can Tell 11 - RT 30 min. 
- 19 1. This film is particularly adaptable for USO use. 
It deals with security vi.olations, visi to2 control, handline 
of classified material, and security alertness. Recommended 
for extensive use. 
TF 1-4862 "Low Treason" - RT 26 min. - 1S•53. Loi-.r Treason was 
produced by the Narch of Time to be shown to employees of 
the United States Government employed overseas. It concerns 
the diplomatic service and security violations committed 
in a foreign land. The violations are the result of careless 
thoughtless acts; the kind of violations all of use could 
commit at Hright-Patterson Air Force Base, Hhen we are in 
a hurry, or when we are careless. The executive pictured 
in the movie and his secretary· commit many security -violations 
any one of which may have resulted in the compromise of the 
classified material. 
3. AHERICAN HERITAGE 
AFIF - 14 "My Country Tis of Thee" -HT 21 min. In color. 
1951. A panorama of the highlights of American History. 
This film serves to remind all Americans of the magnificent 
heretage that is theirs to enjoy and preserve. Our 
forfathers endured sacrifices so that our nation could 
grow and_)rosper through the crimes of the past, and will 
see us through the present one. 
AFIF 22 "Letter to A Rebel" - H.T 17 min. 1951 Relates in the 
form of a letter from father to sor .. · some of the advantages 
of life under our American system of free enterprise. The 
letter contrasts the rebel's grumblings against life in our 
"undemocratic democracy" with the habit of taking for granted 
and making use of his every day democratic privileges. The 
young rebel is exhorted not to sell his democratic freedon 
short; it is his heritage from the past and his legacy to 
the future. 
AFIF - 25 -"A Free People"- RT 26 min. In color. 1952. 
Recounts the priceless legacy left to us and the record of 
irJhat 1.-re have done Hi th America. Dramatically depicts the 
exploits of our forefathers at Lexington, Valley Forge and 
other great battles in American History. Suitable to support 
a talk on Unity of Action to show how security can be used 
to maintain our freedom. 
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